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

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SURVEY

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DOCTRINE AND FOREIGN POLICY

Robert V. Daniels

SOVIET Russia under Khrushchev and since his fall has not ceased to bear out the paradoxical reality of a dogmatic movement that is hardly ever doctrinaire. Particularly in the realm of official utterances about foreign policy, the Soviet authorities continue to exemplify both terms of this seeming contradiction: they cling to the rigid self-righteousness of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy, and they bend or twist the orthodoxy in innumerable practical applications to make it yield the interpretation that squares with prudence, challenge, or opportunity. In specific statements about the West as well as in general pronouncements about the communist movement, but above all in the context of the Sino-Soviet schism, the leadership has hewed to the old Stalinist use of doctrine as an instrument of policy rationalisation and justification, however much it tries to sustain the illusion of unyielding doctrinal rigour in the eyes of the world communist movement, the Soviet masses and itself as well.

Communist ideology, particularly in its foreign policy aspect, is often discussed but seldom defined. 'Ideology', 'doctrine', and 'theory' are commonly used as synonyms, with little effort to distinguish them. Theory, in the ordinary usage, denotes a hypothesis or guess that might be true or might not. Doctrine suggests a hard-and-fast teaching or policy on any particular subject. Ideology designates a general system of doctrine and belief that is professed by a particular political movement or regime. All three terms are used by the Russians—*teoriya*, *uchenie*, and *ideologiya*—but in their usage the meanings of the first two are virtually identical with the definition of ideology. There is certainly nothing tentative or partial in the official communist commitment to Marxism-Leninism.

According to official communist spokesmen ever since Lenin's time, Marxism-Leninism offers both a scientific prediction of the course of history and a guide to successful revolutionary action. In particular, it is supposed to give the analytic key to understanding the weaknesses of capitalist society and the forces that can overthrow it. It is also supposed to be the vital factor in clarifying the class consciousness of the proletariat and galvanising its will to seize power.

Contained in this official view of the ideology are several different conceptions of its actual political role. These different conceptions are inherent, in turn, in the unacknowledged contradiction within the original corpus of Marxism, between the scientific-analytic-predictive-deterministic side of the ideology, and its revolutionary-moralistic-hortatory-activist side.[1] From the analytic standpoint, Marxism may have the

[1] Cf. Alfred G. Meyer, *Marxism: The Unity of Theory and Practice* (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), and R. V. Daniels, 'Fate and Will in the Marxian Philosophy of History', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, October 1960.

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force of prophecy, or, more modestly, it may serve to interpret political and social situations around the world and suggest to the policy-maker whether a given move will work or not. From the moralistic standpoint, Marxism may be the categorical imperative to fight and risk death for revolution and the world-wide victory of the proletariat, or it may be simply an instrument of propaganda to get the workers or anybody else to do what the communists want.

All four of these functions of ideology have figured in Soviet foreign policy at one time or another, though with different weights. The trend has been clearly and heavily towards the propaganda function, with some residual role for the interpretive function. The most important function of all, however, is not inherent in the origins of the ideology, but developed historically during the early years of the Soviet regime. This is the function of legitimising the regime and its authority in the eyes of the communist rulers themselves, however much the specific acts of the regime may appear to deviate from the original spirit of Marxism-Leninism. Ideology thus becomes a self-justifying dogma of a quasi-religious nature, totally dependent for its day-to-day meaning on the interpretations which the political authorities decide to lay down.

Lenin himself began the practice of dogmatic ideological restatement, beginning with his propositions about the role of the conspiratorial party in bringing about revolution, and culminating in his retraction of the revolutionary war commitment in 1918 in favour of the Russia-first 'citadel of revolution' doctrine. Stalin merely spelled out the implications of Lenin's policy with his own doctrine of 'socialism in one country', according to which Russia could overcome its own relative backwardness and progress through 'socialism' to 'communism' independently of any proletarian success elsewhere.

THE legacy of ideological manipulation during the period of Lenin's leadership and Stalin's rise was to tie both the meaning and the function of Marxist-Leninist theory to the authority of the communist party-state. The leader has had the power since Stalin's time to establish the meaning of ideology in an absolutely binding way. Criticism of his interpretation is heresy or treason, literally a crime against the state. There is no force to keep his interpretations honestly in conformity with the original meaning of the ideology; on the other hand there is every temptation to modify the meaning of the ideology, through reinterpretation, to make each new practical policy or expedient appear consistent with the original ideology. Thus, as the analysis of some recent Soviet policy shifts will show, ideology cannot determine or limit action except for some short-run rigidities; it is action, rather, that eventually supplies the up-to-date meaning of ideology.

While ideology is consequently very flexible over the years, it is rigid and dogmatic at any given moment. The authorities cannot admit that their reinterpretations are novelties, since this would defeat the

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whole purpose of doctrinal rationalisation of new policies as the supposedly imperative application of Marxism-Leninism. To sustain their self-justification, they are compelled to enforce their interpretation of ideology with all the power at the disposal of the state. In no realm of thought can they tolerate the autonomy that might allow the party's ideological authority to be questioned—hence the principle of party decision in art and science that has stood for thirty-five years.

Despite the administrative burden and intellectual stifling that this entails, it nevertheless constitutes an element of major strength for the regime. The imposed ideology serves as a vehicle of mental discipline, to enforce the tests and demands of political conformity on every citizen in the land. It matters not so much what particular idea or ideology or verbal formula is proclaimed, but that some official thought is available to answer every public question and that the regime constantly exacts conformity. The exercise of doctrinal authority therefore becomes a necessary element in sustaining the general authority of the regime, a permanent fixture in the communist system of totalitarian rule.[2]

It follows from the foregoing that communist ideology is primarily significant for the internal working of the regime. Foreign policy is one of the least ideological aspects of Soviet politics, in reality if not in words. Rather than foreign policy being governed in any substantial way by ideological requirements, the chief connection of the two lies in the decisions and situations which foreign policy considerations bring about and require the ideology to justify or explain away.

There is one respect in which foreign developments have struck more deeply at the system of ideological authority in the USSR. This is the factual emergence of new power centres in the communist world, in the now well-recognised phenomenon of polycentrism, above all as represented by China. The establishment of a communist regime in China strong enough to rival the Soviet Union for influence in the world communist movement has had a serious effect not only on the unity of the movement from country to country, but also on the intrinsic character of the movement. China, by challenging the single ideological authority of the leaders of Soviet Russia, threatened the entire system of mental discipline formerly imposed by the single authoritative interpretation of doctrine. Such a challenge may not have been intended by the Chinese or foreseen by the Russians, but it was inherent in the emergence of a second power centre within the single ideological movement.

Far from ideology serving as a bond between Russia and China, inhibiting their conflict, it was bound by its nature to force the conflict to the open cleavage the world has witnessed since 1961. The communist system, with its peculiar imposition of a constantly revised ideology, depends on a single authority that will hand down authoritative

[2] For a fuller development of this point, see my studies, *The Conscience of the Revolution: Communist Opposition in Soviet Russia* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), pp. 248–52, and ' What the Russians Mean ', *Commentary*, October 1962.

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interpretations of doctrine to fit the practical needs of each new development on the world scene. Given two centres of power, each strong enough to issue its own interpretations of doctrine, and each seeing the practical requirements of policy in a different light, each is led to make theoretical pronouncements inconsistent with the view of the other. By its nature the movement cannot tolerate such differences, though neither centre is willing to make the symbolic surrender of authority implicit in a recognition of the rival's theoretical correctness. Therefore every hair-splitting theoretical issue becomes the potential source of a major political clash, no less than the theological subtleties that led up to the Great Schism between the Churches of Rome and Constantinople in the eleventh century. The problem cannot logically be resolved until each centre has anathematised the other and read it out of the movement—so splitting the movement into two, each with its own authoritative centre issuing its own binding interpretations of a once common ideology. The dogmatic ideology of revolution may be compatible in practice with peaceful coexistence with the anti-revolutionaries, but it is a direct cause of rupture with all co-revolutionaries who are able and willing to proclaim their independence.

KHRUSHCHEV'S career bears eloquent witness to the function of Soviet ideology as the instrument of political authority and justification after the fact. For all his railing at the perversions of Stalinism, Khrushchev did little to alter the basic workings of the Stalinist state, and in the manipulation of doctrine as the Marxist high priest he all but outdid his former boss. In one central area of theory after another, Khrushchev laid down new pronouncements to accommodate his foreign policy or to embarrass his communist challengers, and when his startling overthrow ended his tenure of power in 1964, the principles of the Marxist philosophy of politics were in a shambles. No one in Russia could criticise the mess while he was in power, nor have they so far done so since his fall, but in the name of battling 'revisionism', the Peking wing of the movement has done us the service of calling attention to most of Khrushchev's arbitrary modifications of theory.

Khrushchev was involved in ideological manipulations in the very first phase of his manoeuvring for the succession, between 1953 and 1956. The area of theory he moved into was, significantly, international; the particular issue he raised was the Marxist assessment of the capitalist powers and the prospects for war and victory. Khrushchev chose his stand as a manoeuvring point against his rival Malenkov, and proceeded to stress the possibility of war, the assurance that communism could emerge even from a nuclear conflict, and the necessity of continuing Russia's heavy industry stress and military build-up.

How contrived Khrushchev's interpretations were became obvious when, as soon as he had humbled Malenkov early in 1955, he reversed his field and adopted most of his rival's views in order to force the

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hand of his next victim, the hard-liner Molotov. The whole manoeuvre was strongly reminiscent of Stalin's manipulation of the issue of economic development in the 1920s, first to defeat Trotsky with a moderate line and then to break Bukharin by pressing an exaggerated version of Trotsky's programme.

The manoeuvres of 1955 were only the prelude to Khrushchev's grand slam of theoretical innovation, the twentieth congress of the CPSU in February 1956. The congress is justly famous for his not-so-secret 'secret speech' denouncing the excesses of Stalinism. For the theoretical guidelines of the Soviet Union and the world communist movement, however, the most significant new interpretations were contained in Khrushchev's open report to the congress. Regarding the international relations of the communist movement, Khrushchev proclaimed three sweeping innovations, couched of course in the language of undeviating Leninist orthodoxy: the doctrine of peaceful coexistence and non-inevitability of war; the doctrine of separate national roads to socialism; and the doctrine of non-violent communist revolution. All these propositions were radical breaks with Leninism; all were prompted by pragmatic temptations of foreign policy or domestic politics; and all were instrumental in precipitating the schism and polycentrism that subsequently sapped the strength and resolve of the communist movement.

'Peaceful coexistence' was Khrushchev's doctrinal sanction for policies to reduce tension with the West and lessen the threat of nuclear war. He tried to make it look like an old idea:

> The Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems has always been and remains the general line of our country's foreign policy. It has been alleged that the Soviet Union puts forward the principle of peaceful co-existence merely out of tactical considerations, considerations of expediency. Yet it is common knowledge that we have always, from the very first years of Soviet power, stood with equal firmness for peaceful coexistence. Hence it is not a tactical move, but a fundamental principle of Soviet foreign policy. . . . Indeed, there are only two ways: either peaceful coexistence or the most destructive war in history. There is no third way.

Interestingly, Khrushchev gave the Chinese a credit line for peaceful coexistence as it had been enunciated in their 1955 'five principles' agreement with India. He was sufficiently aware of the novelty of his line to try to dispose of doctrinaire doubts: 'There is, of course, a Marxist-Leninist proposition that wars are inevitable as long as imperialism exists.' But now, Khrushchev contended, the 'degree of organisation and the awareness and determination of the people' could offset the 'economic basis of wars under imperialism'. This was hardly consistent with Marxist teaching about the influence of economic base on political superstructure, but for Khrushchev it was enough to observe,

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> Now there is a world camp of socialism, which has become a mighty force. In this camp the peace forces find not only the moral, but also the material means to prevent aggression.

The notion of separate roads to socialism, meaning the possibility of independent decisions and policies on the part of various communist governments, was anathema in Stalin's time. Tito's line in Yugoslavia after 1948 was the first attempt at such a separate road, and even this came only after Stalin had read Tito out of the communist movement. A greater problem for the integrity of Stalin's unilinear conception of communism came with the accession of the Chinese communists in 1949, though they were content for the time being to confine their separate roads to the realm of practice and not to challenge Soviet doctrinal supremacy. Khrushchev's embrace of the separate roads doctrine followed as the obvious corollary of his rapprochement with Tito in 1955 (and as an effective move in his manoeuvring against Molotov). 'Alongside the Soviet form of reconstructing society on socialist lines', Khrushchev told the twentieth congress, 'we now have the form of people's democracy.' ('People's democracy' had hitherto been regarded by the Russians as a preliminary to socialist construction, not an alternative route.) Khrushchev's gestures to both Peking and Belgrade were explicit:

> Much that is unique in socialist construction is being contributed by the People's Republic of China. . . . Having taken over the decisive commanding positions, the people's democratic state is using them in the social revolution to implement a policy of peaceful reorganisation of private industry and trade, and their gradual transformation into a component of socialist economy.
>
> The leadership of the great cause of socialist reconstruction by the Communist Party of China and the communist and workers' parties of the other people's democracies, exercised in keeping with the peculiarities and specific features of each country, is creative Marxism in action.
>
> In the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia . . . specific concrete forms of economic management and organisation of the state apparatus are arising in the process of socialist construction.

Khrushchev's third line of departure from Lenin followed closely on the separate roads idea:

> It is probable that more forms of transition to socialism will appear. Moreover, the implementation of these forms need not be associated with civil war under all circumstances. Our enemies like to depict us Leninists as advocates of violence always and everywhere. True, we recognise the need for the revolutionary transformation of capitalist society into socialist society. It is this that distinguishes the revolutionary Marxists from the reformists, the opportunists. There is no doubt that in a number of capitalist countries the violent overthrow of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and the sharp aggravation of class struggle

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> connected with this are inevitable. But the forms of social revolution vary. It is not true that we regard violence and civil war as the only way to remake society.

Though the practical import of all this was restricted—Khrushchev had in mind as the 'non-violent' model the communist take-over in Czechoslovakia in 1948—it was nonetheless a far cry from Lenin's insistence that the 'bourgeois' state must everywhere be 'smashed' with revolutionary force.

Altogether, Khrushchev's modifications of the international theory of communism constituted a long step towards the revisionism that the Chinese were soon to charge him with. His purpose was pragmatic—a restatement of theory so that it would not impede his realistic or opportunistic foreign policy in the two directions he proposed to push: accommodation with different communist states which he could not control; and reduction of the danger of nuclear war with the United States.

THE international doctrines of 1956 served Khrushchev sufficiently well for the rest of his career, though they did not prevent his great diplomatic setback, the loss of China. The Chinese communists, for their part, seized upon Khrushchev's interpretations as an object of power contest, so that they might assert their independence of Soviet doctrinal authority by taking issue with the new Moscow line.

The Chinese revolt built up gradually between 1956 and 1960. Its particular foci were the appraisal of Stalin and (of more relevance to foreign policy) the question of unity or autonomy within the communist movement—i.e. the issue of separate roads to socialism. Preferring not to attack Khrushchev head-on, the Chinese made Yugoslavia the butt of their critique of tendencies that weakened 'international proletarian solidarity'. In the spring of 1958, in the face of a projected state visit to Yugoslavia by Soviet Chief of State Voroshilov, the Chinese opened their blistering attack on the new programme of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia—a document of surrender to capitalism, in Peking's view.

By this point the Chinese clearly had the ideological initiative. Khrushchev endorsed Mao's attack on revisionism, and could only add (in his Sofia speech of June 1958) that 'attempts to find different shades in the criticism of present-day revisionism on the part of the fraternal parties are in vain'. Mao, his appetite for authority in the movement whetted by Khrushchev's gestures of appeasement, immediately struck out in another direction—the transition to communism. The actual move, in the fall of 1958, was the programme to reorganise the loosely-collectivised Chinese peasants into tightly knit communes, and with this the strong theoretical suggestion that China was leaping ahead of Russia on the path of transition from the socialist to the communist form of society.

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This time the Russians rebelled, and dismissed the Chinese commune experiment as an aberration entirely irrelevant to the transition to communism. Khrushchev then threw himself into a glowing exposition of the Soviet transition to communism, in his report to the twenty-first congress of the CPSU in January 1959. This was the first Soviet treatment of the subject since Stalin's speeches of the 1930s, and Khrushchev's motive of countering the Chinese commune claims came clearly through the lines:

> The Marxist-Leninist party considers the setting up of a communist society its final aim. But society cannot switch over to communism from capitalism without passing through the socialist phase of development. From capitalism, Lenin said, mankind can switch over directly only to socialism, that is, to communal ownership of production means and distribution of products to individuals in accordance with their work. Our party looks farther ahead. Socialism must inevitably develop gradually into communism, on the banner of which is written: From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs.

As to the concrete details of the stateless society of communism, Khrushchev took pains to rule out any expectations that might interfere with the practical operations of the Soviet state. For him, as for Stalin, there would be no equalising of rewards for the foreseeable future of the transition period: 'One cannot fail to see that equalisation would lead to unjust distribution. Both the good and bad workers would receive the same. . . . Equalisation would mean not a transition to communism but the discrediting of communism.'

From the old promise of the 'withering away of the state', Khrushchev escaped by defining the future regime 'dialectically' as 'communist public self-government', with 'certain public functions . . . analogous to present state functions'. He thus anticipated the doctrine, spelled out in the party programme of 1961, of the permanence of the communist state in everything but name, and of the Communist Party in name as well as in fact.

DURING the following year Khrushchev vigorously pursued the line of peaceful coexistence, capped in September 1959 by his visit to the United States and his guarded censure of the Chinese in their first clash with India. In Peking following his American tour, he spoke forcefully against the use of war to expand communism:

> We must think realistically and understand the contemporary situation correctly. This, of course, does not by any means signify that if we are so strong, then we must test by force the stability of the capitalist system. This would be wrong: the peoples would not understand and would never support those who would think of acting in this way. We have always been against wars of conquest. Marxists have recognised, and recognise, only liberating, just

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> wars; they have always condemned, and condemn, wars of conquest, imperialist wars.

After some mutterings of disquiet about revisionism and the exclusion of China from international agreements, Peking finally drew up its lines of ideological battle against Moscow in April 1960. On the occasion of the ninetieth anniversery of the birth of Lenin, the Chinese theoretical journal *Red Flag* published, under the title 'Long Live Leninism', an extended attack on the errors of 'modern revisionism':

> Are the teachings of Marxism-Leninism now 'outmoded'? Does the whole, integrated teaching of Lenin on imperialism, on proletarian revolution and proletarian dictatorship, on war and peace, and on the building of socialism and communism still retain its vigorous vitality? . . . Is it that there can be no question of war even if imperialism and the system of exploitation are allowed to survive for ever?
>
> As long as the peoples of all countries enhance their awareness and are fully prepared, with the socialist camp also mastering modern weapons, it is certain that if the US or other imperialists refuse to reach an agreement on the banning of atomic and nuclear weapons and should dare to fly in the face of the will of all humanity by launching a war using atomic and nuclear weapons, the result will be the very speedy destruction of these monsters encircled by the peoples of the world, and the result will certainly not be the annihilation of mankind. We consistently oppose the launching of criminal wars by imperialism. . . . But should the imperialists impose such sacrifices on the peoples of various countries, we believe that, as the experience of the Russian revolution and the Chinese revolution shows, those sacrifices would be repaid. On the debris of a dead imperialism, the victorious people would create very swiftly a civilisation thousands of times higher than the capitalist system and a truly beautiful future for themselves. . . .
>
> We believe in the absolute correctness of Lenin's thinking: War is an inevitable outcome of systems of exploitation and the source of modern wars is the imperialist system. Until the imperialist system and the exploiting classes come to an end, wars of one kind or another will always occur.

In their efforts to discredit Khrushchev, the Chinese had (perhaps deliberately) confused the Lenin and Stalin doctrine of inevitable war among capitalist countries, with the question of likely war between capitalist and communist states. (On this the Soviet leaders had never been dogmatic. Stalin himself had maintained in his valedictory article of 1952 that the rivalries among the capitalists were stronger than the contradictions between the capitalist camp and the socialist camp.) The purpose of the Chinese communists, again, was to raise a theoretical point which the Russians could not accept without acknowledging Chinese initiative, but could not reject without risking the appearance of softness and revisionism.

The now familiar political clash between the Russians and the Chinese began soon after this ideological challenge, with the

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confrontation at the Rumanian Communist Party congress in June 1960, and the acrimony surrounding the Albanian problem. There followed the decisive conference of 81 communist parties in November 1960, with its bitter behind-the-scenes exchanges and its expression of superficial unity in the statement published in December.

IN 1961, to offset the Chinese pretensions to Marxist superiority and keep his foreign policy free of strictures about inevitable war, Khrushchev gave renewed attention to the updating of ideology. This time he put emphasis on the theory of the internal development of the communist society, with the occasion for discussion provided by the proposal and adoption of the new programme of the Soviet Communist Party.

In his presentation of the programme (notably in his address to the twenty-second congress in October 1961), Khrushchev made it official that Soviet Russia had entered on the stage of the all-out building of communist society. Like Stalin before him, he was at pains to square the revised vision of the communist utopia with his practical intentions regarding Soviet internal development and leadership in the communist camp. As he spelled out the expected provisions of communism, it was evident that he envisaged only more of the same Soviet reality, ameliorated by an American living standard.

Khrushchev complicated the problem of accommodating the utopian theory of communism by enunciating a new political doctrine, devoid in fact of any textual roots in Marxism. As this was stated in the programme, 'The dictatorship of the proletariat has fulfilled its historic mission and has ceased to be indispensable in the USSR. . . . The state . . . has . . . become a state of the entire people. . . . The state as an organisation of the entire people will survive until the complete victory of communism.' Such a non-class notion of the state had been explicitly rejected by Marx in his criticism of the German social-democrats. At an opportune moment Peking picked up the cry of orthodoxy:

> In the view of Marxist-Leninists, there is no such thing as a non-class or supra-class state. So long as the state remains a state, it must bear a class character; so long as the state exists, it cannot be a state of the 'whole people'. As soon as society becomes classless, there will no longer be a state. . . . In calling a socialist state the 'state of the whole people' is one trying to replace the Marxist-Leninist theory of the state by the bourgeois theory of the state? Is one trying to replace the state of dictatorship of the proletariat by a state of a different character? If that is the case, it is nothing but a great historical retrogression.[8]

Finally, Khrushchev's international application of the transition-to-communism vision showed an interesting twist. As earlier understood, all socialist states were to accomplish the transition to communism at the same time, which implied that Russia, with its head start, would

[8] Letter of the CC of the CCP to the CC of the CPSU, 14 June, 1963.

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have to lend a substantial hand to countries such as China. The final draft of the 1961 programme got around this: The transition by the various bloc countries could occur merely 'in the same historical epoch', no definition being given of the length of an epoch. Separate roads to socialism were thus to carry separate arrival dates, and presumably separate national responsibilities for completing the journey at all. Thus did polycentrism show its mark on what had originated as a movement of international revolution.

* * * *

The history of official Soviet thinking during the Khrushchev era repeatedly confirms the instrumental character of contemporary communist ideology. Ideology serves foreign policy as justification after the fact, while the principal concern of Soviet policy-makers in the realm of doctrine—since the fall of Khrushchev no less than before—is to retain a free hand for any opportune move, unrestricted by possible theoretical inhibitions.

As an instrument of policy, communist ideology has figured more prominently in the internal politics of the movement than in the more pragmatic area of relations with the non-communist world. Ideology has notably been employed as a device both to provoke and to discredit opposition factions and dissident communist governments. Within the Soviet Union, the ideological statement of foreign policy was adroitly employed by Khrushchev in his political contest with Malenkov and Molotov in the mid-1950s. Within the communist bloc, ideology has provided the most visible arena of political contest between the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic, with a series of ideological initiatives taken by both sides to force the rival either to follow abjectly or to stand and fight.

As in the earlier history of the Soviet Union, the use of ideology as a political instrument in the Khrushchev era had a substantial impact on the meaning of the doctrine itself. Nevertheless, as was the characteristic under Stalin, there was no official acknowledgment that the doctrine was being modified. Every reinterpretation was represented as a mere restating and application of the original orthodoxy.

With the schism between Moscow and Peking, however, this reinterpretation was carried on in different directions, independently. The consequence was, as it could only have been, the crystallisation of two distinct and mutually exclusive versions of the Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. Neither communist power, after the parting of their ideological ways in 1960, could acknowledge the virtue of the other without undermining its own authority at home as well as abroad. The ideological habits of communism thus had, in a peculiar way, a profound impact on the course of foreign policy, not in uniting the bloc, not in guiding the campaign against the West, but in driving home an unbridgeable wedge into what had once passed as a monolithic revolutionary whole.

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EAST EUROPE: THE SOVIET GRIP LOOSENS

J. F. Brown

BREZHNEV and Kosygin inherited many failures from Khrushchev; one of them was the failure of a policy in Eastern Europe. He left a problem which had become insoluble on any terms that were really acceptable to the Soviet Union.

His main aim there had been to strike a balance between unity and diversity, a balance which would ensure Soviet predominance but would also allow the others enough freedom and flexibility to develop viable systems of their own within the communist world system.

Events in Poland and Hungary in the autumn of 1956 disabused him of many of the ideas and illusions with which he had come to power. Strangely for a man brought up in the Ukraine, Khrushchev had grossly underestimated East European nationalism. Though aware of the wrongs of Stalinist colonialism and of the grievances to be redressed, he had also underestimated the damage which the Stalinist period had done, not only to Soviet East European relations but to the cause of communism itself in the area. He had also failed to foresee the serious harm his forceful repudiation of Stalinism would do to the new and still rickety socialist edifice there. What was withstood by a mature Soviet Union nearly ruined the infant People's Republics. Above all, the events of 1956 showed Khrushchev that too much faith in the cohesive properties of a commonly held ideology led to disaster. His negotiations with Tito had also made it clear to him that there was no single view on just what the ideology was. He failed to understand that Tito was as serious in his 'revisionism' as he in his 'orthodoxy', and did not realise the dangerous inroads which this revisionism was to make in the other East European ruling parties.

What he tried to do after 1956 was to find some kind of organisational device which would not only neutralise the centrifugal forces in the area but also achieve a more positive degree of unity. His pursuit of this goal often took a devious course and he was often preoccupied by more urgent or important matters. But he never abandoned his aim even when, towards the end, it became more and more evident that he was never going to attain it.

Khrushchev had abolished the Cominform in April 1956 largely to please the Yugoslavs. It had long since been defunct and was serving no useful purpose. Even if it had been allowed to survive, it was too closely associated with Stalin's tyranny and his mistakes for it to have been revived in the post-1956 atmosphere. Gomulka, who had always been opposed to it, would not have tolerated it now. Nor, of course, would Tito, in whom Khrushchev still had hopes despite the disaster in

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Hungary. Indeed, Khrushchev found it was too early to press for any kind of formal institutional device, and wisely settled for what was practicable. The November Declaration of the 12 ruling parties in 1957 publicly acknowledged the leadership of the Soviet Union in the camp, and, though Tito had refused to sign it and Gomulka had done so very reluctantly, it was a useful demonstration of bloc unity. The November 1957 meeting also established a precedent for the subsequent series of multilateral meetings which were to become one of Khrushchev's favourite methods of dealing with the East European regimes.

After the November declaration the only notable organisational move was the launching, in September 1958, of *Problems of Peace and Socialism* (*World Marxist Review*). Though based on Prague, this 'theoretical and informational monthly' had a Soviet editor-in-chief and became a Soviet propaganda instrument of considerable importance. In its first phase it was used mainly as an ideological weapon in the offensive against Yugoslav revisionism, an offensive which for a time provided a formal point of unity between the Soviet Union and the rest of Eastern Europe.

THE November declaration, *Problems of Peace and Socialism*, and the offensive against revisionism did not, however, constitute a strong enough bulwark against those centrifugal forces which, despite the apparent calm in the late fifties, had not been subdued. But Khrushchev had not been confining his efforts to political integration alone. As early as 1957 he had begun to realise the potentialties of Comecon as an agency of economic-political integration of a most subtle and durable kind. The Soviet press, and he himself, began to stress the value of mutual interdependence in the economic sphere. In May 1958 a meeting of party leaders from the Comecon members was held in Moscow to discuss methods of strengthening economic coordination. As a result of that meeting Comecon enjoyed a notable revival; the number of its agencies was strikingly increased and moves towards specialisation by branches of industry among the member countries were accelerated. What Khrushchev hoped this economic integration would lead to was clearly shown in a speech he made in March 1959. After referring to the future communist society and its benefits, he went on:

> In these conditions the old concepts of borders as such will disappear. . . . In all likelihood only ethnic borders will survive for a time and even these will probably exist only as a convention. Naturally these frontiers, if they can be called frontiers at all, will have no border guards, customs officials, or incidents. . . . Extensive cooperation in all spheres of economic, social, political, and cultural life is developing among the sovereign countries of the socialised camp. Speaking of the future, it seems to me that the further development of the socialist countries will, in all probability, proceed along the lines of consolidation of the single-world socialist economic system.[1]

1 *Pravda*, 27 March 1959; quoted by Z. K. Brzezinski in *The Soviet Bloc* (1960), p. 401.

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The implications were obvious; they were political as much as economic. Khrushchev was outlining a Utopia towards which the initial steps were being taken.

After this lunge towards some kind of unified control, no new initiatives were publicly taken by the Soviet Union for about three years. This is probably explained by a number of interacting reasons. Beginning in 1960 the Soviet regime—and this was coming more and more to mean Khrushchev personally—became preoccupied with certain intra-bloc problems of much more immediate importance. Among these were the dispute with China, the rapprochement with Yugoslavia, and the defection of Albania. Eastern Europe, always an important but never a predominant subject on the Soviet leader's time-table, was overshadowed by the problems of the bloc as a whole. The year 1960 saw the first showdown with China at the 'little summit' in Bucharest in June and the great confrontation at the Moscow conference of 81 parties in November. In 1961 Albania reached the point of no return and in October of that year the 22nd CPSU congress publicly revealed the unbridgeable chasm in the communist movement. On top of all this, there were Khrushchev's domestic preoccupations and the attention to his policy towards the West. In 1960 and 1961 East European integration had to take a back seat.

But after the 22nd congress Khrushchev returned to the subject. Comecon had made considerable progress since the meeting of May 1958 but the real question of centralised direction had still not been faced. Now, however, impressed by the dangers of the divisive tendencies within the bloc and aware that Comecon could not make decisive progress in its present form, he boldly took up the question of a supra-state planning agency. His first official step was to call another Comecon summit meeting of first party secretaries in June 1962 in Moscow. This meeting approved a set of Principles which said, in part, that 'the consolidation and expansion of economic relations among socialist countries would contribute to the development of the objective trend, indicated by Lenin, of the establishment in the future of a world communist economy regulated on the basis of a single plan by the victorious working people'.[2] This was not a strong statement: it would probably have been much stronger but for the opposition it aroused. Khrushchev's visit to Rumania immediately after this meeting showed clearly (at least in retrospect) the quarter from which the fiercest opposition had come.

His effort to persuade the Rumanians failed, but he decided to press on with his idea and, in doing so, became more explicit about it. In an article in the September 1962 issue of *Problems of Peace and Socialism*, he wrote that 'all possibilities exist today . . . for a centralised balance which should play the role of a collective plan for the economic development of the member countries'. At a Soviet central committee plenum

[2] *Pravda*, 18 June 1964.

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the following November, he openly advocated the setting up of a single planning organ of the member countries with 'fully empowered representatives who should elaborate overall plans and resolve problems with a view to coordinating the economic development of the socialist system.'[3]

The story of what happened to Khrushchev's plans, how they were sabotaged by the skilful Rumanian exploitation of the Sino-Soviet dispute, has been told many times and need not be recounted here. It is enough to say that just over one year after Khrushchev had begun his offensive for a supra-national planning body he was forced to break off the engagement. Another Comecon summit meeting held in July 1963 ended with a communiqué which not only failed to mention anything about central planning but, by implication, conceded to Rumania the right to proceed with her comprehensive industrialisation programme. The subject was not publicly referred to again; it seems, however, to have been put in cold storage rather than abandoned completely. The force with which the Rumanians condemned the idea in their April declaration almost a year later, together with any other ideas for economic cooperation encroaching on national sovereignty,[4] may have reflected their fear that it might be revived. Their violent reaction to the suggestions of a Soviet geographer, E. B. Valev, for an economically integrated region in South-East Europe to include a part of the Ukraine and large parts of Bulgaria and Rumania also showed a continuing sensitiveness on this point.[5]

IN the twelve months before his fall Khrushchev was chiefly concerned with trying to organise a conference of communist parties to expel China from the world movement. On this question, too, he had trouble in Eastern Europe. Rumanian intransigence over what the April declaration called the 'principle of excommunication' is well known. But there were others who either dug in their heels or dragged them. The Yugoslavs, although the issue did not affect them directly, were reluctant to back Khrushchev. Gomulka was also opposed to seeing the principle of excommunication revived. Though he agreed to an international conference, he hedged his agreement with conditions that would have meant an indefinite postponement. To the Soviet party's proposal for the 26-party preparatory conference in Moscow in December 1964, he had not replied by the time Khrushchev fell. Even Kadar in Hungary, notoriously close and loyal to Khrushchev, was slow to support a world conference, and only a personal visit from the Soviet leader helped him to make up his mind. Khrushchev received prompt support only from the East Germans, Bulgarians, and Czechoslovaks The Rumanian example and Italian influence were now real factors in Eastern Europe.

Frustrated by this inability to carry all the East European states with him, and alarmed at the prevailing disunity, Khrushchev returned

[3] TASS, 19 November 1962.
[4] *Scanteia*, 26 April 1964.
[5] *Viata Economica*, 12 June 1964.

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once more to the idea of some kind of political organisation, to the proposal on which he had hesitated in 1957. At a Soviet central committee plenum in February 1964, Suslov dwelt at some length on the need for 'general proletarian discipline'. His speech was not published until April 3, when it appeared in *Pravda*. On the same day, while on a visit to Hungary, Khrushchev said:

> Clearly it would be expedient to consider jointly the question of organisational forms to improve the constant exchange of opinions and the coordination of foreign policy between the members of Comecon, the countries which take part in the Warsaw Pact.[6]

Within 24 hours, therefore, the East Europeans were told by Suslov of the need for more proletarian discipline and by Khrushchev of a way to reach it. They evidently did not like what they heard. The Italians objected and were quickly joined by the Poles, in language that was clear enough.[7] Even from the strongly pro-Soviet parties, like the Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, and East German, there was no positive response. Much more in line with the new currents in Eastern Europe was the Togliatti memorandum the following September, which ruled out the establishment of any new international agencies.

KHRUSHCHEV fell in October 1964, leaving behind his legacy of unsolved problems. Before describing how his successors have reacted to them, it is worth discussing briefly the main reasons why Khrushchev failed. They should be sought both in external factors and in developments inside the East European states themselves.

It is dangerous to generalise, because the various countries were not affected to the same degree or in the same way by the external factors; nor were domestic developments uniform throughout the area. But, without too much over-simplification, one can say that the most important external factor was the Sino-Soviet dispute. This enabled Albania to defy the Soviet Union completely, and Rumania to ease gently but firmly away from Soviet tutelage; the Rumanian case also gave an example for others to follow. Again, so much has been said on this subject that one need not elaborate. It should simply be stressed that one of the most important consequences of the Sino-Soviet dispute was that Soviet prestige and authority declined in the whole of Eastern Europe, a decline accelerated by the Cuban debacle in 1962.

Secondly, the East-West détente, the pursuit of which cost Khrushchev so much in his relations with Peking, also undermined control over Eastern Europe. It tended to attenuate that polarisation of forces which international hostility and the threat of war produced. In addition, the beginnings of a slightly more positive Western policy towards Eastern Europe, all within the rules of the fiercely competitive game known as peaceful coexistence, played its small but growing part in the process.

[6] *Nepszabadsag*, 4 April 1964.

[7] *Trybuna Ludu*, 11 April 1964.

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Obviously, none of these external factors would have been of much consequence had the necessary conditions for taking advantage of them not existed. In this respect the domestic developments in Eastern Europe were crucial. Part of Khrushchev's policy had always been to allow a large measure of internal autonomy to these countries. He also favoured the regimes identifying themselves as closely as possible with the peoples they ruled. Despite its short-term advantages, this also was a policy which worked against the interests of the Soviet Union. Once again Khrushchev failed to assess the strength of nationalism. Since it was still the most potent force in the whole area, any regime wishing to identify itself with its population had to embrace some of it. Not all the regimes did this: the Bulgarian did not, the East German could not. But the others did, albeit in widely differing degrees, and this assumption of a nationalist posture, even if not intended to be anti-Soviet, could, in the East European context, mean little else. Rumania was a case in which overt anti-Soviet moves and gestures were part and parcel of the regime's nationalism. In Poland, on the other hand, Gomulka had always been at pains to stress that his nationalism had nothing to do with anti-Sovietism, and he has always tried to discourage the strong anti-Russian sentiments of the Polish people. But Gomulka's nationalism, very much diluted though it has now become, has occasionally led him to differ from Moscow, inevitably to the detriment of the Soviet Union's position and authority.

Of almost equal importance was the rise in self-confidence of the new elites in the East European countries. They had been nurtured in the belief that the Soviet example was the correct one to follow in everything, a proposition about which many had been sceptical from the very beginning. As they grew more entrenched and conscious of their own importance, they became increasingly impatient of Soviet tutelage. Two developments only served to strengthen this impatience. One was the revelation of the Stalinist excesses in the Soviet Union. (Later, of course, the fall of Khrushchev was itself another damaging blow to Soviet prestige.) The second was the opening of the window to the West in the late fifties, and of the door in the early sixties. The impact of this on the intellectuals is not so important in this connection as on the economic, scientific, and technical cadres. These were given a chance to compare East and West and they knew which impressed them the more. The decline in the prestige of the Soviet Union through the exposure of her own internal weaknesses was perhaps just as important in Eastern Europe as the decline through the reverses she suffered in intra-bloc and foreign policy.

Russia was no longer the model nor the accepted pioneer. The fact that East Germany and Czechoslovakia, always considered two of the most devoted followers, could launch far-reaching programmes for economic reform in 1964 without waiting for the Soviet Union to do so was a most significant development in Soviet-East European relations.

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THE removal of Khrushchev was another serious blow to the Soviet position in Eastern Europe. It meant the disappearance of a man who, in spite of failures and mistakes, had been easily the dominant figure in European communist politics, a man who, because of his personality and prestige, had been a brake on the centrifugal forces which were at work. It was also another exposure of instability and weakness; trust in Moscow was still further undermined. Finally, it was carried out in a manner well calculated to injure the growing sensitivities of the East European regimes and was a striking example of the Soviet Union's own lack of concern for the feelings of her allies. For allies, rather than satellites, most of them had now become. Their reactions to Khrushchev's downfall, of shock and sometimes of anger, were a sobering initiation for Brezhnev and Kosygin into the new realities of Soviet-East European relations. Only Bulgaria greeted the Kremlin revolution in a way the new leadership would have liked. Even East Germany, a satellite by definition, expressed feelings of affront.

The reaction of the Czechoslovak regime must have particularly impressed the new Soviet leaders. Moscow had always considered President and First Party Secretary Novotny one of the most dependable East European leaders. He was certainly loyal to Khrushchev, but in the years after 1960 his was not the loyalty of a helpless vassal. The two men had needed each other. Khrushchev had needed Novotny's support in bloc and foreign policy, and got it. Novotny had needed Khrushchev's support in 1963 and 1964 in Czechoslovakia itself—and he got it.[8] It was an arrangement which benefited both. Now, in October 1964, it was abruptly broken, and Novotny showed his pique by refusing to attend the October Revolution ceremonies in Moscow some three weeks later. It is true that, in December 1964, he did lead an important party and government delegation to the Soviet Union and normal relations were restored. But he had served notice on Brezhnev and Kosygin that he was not to be trifled with, and subsequent Czechoslovak-Soviet political relations, as well as developments within Czechoslovakia itself, suggest a growing aloofness on the part of the Prague regime.

It is too early to speak of any new Brezhnev-Kosygin policy towards Eastern Europe as a whole. What they do seem to be stressing are the economic ties between the Soviet Union and her allies. It is a sensible course of action, since this is one of the few areas left where there is a great deal of common ground. The economic dependence of the East European countries on the Soviet Union is still very great. The great publicity which their developing economic relations with the West has received should not blind one to the fact that the Soviet Union still dominates the East European economies, accounting for 42 per cent of the total foreign trade even of rebellious Rumania. The long-term agreements signed by the East European regimes with the Soviet Union

[8] See J. F. Brown, 'Eastern Europe', *Survey*, January 1965.

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to cover the 1966–70 planning period mostly provide for great increases in trade turnover. It is too early to talk of a *shift* in trade from East to West. But while the implications of Eastern Europe's economic dependence should not be overlooked, this dependence, as Khrushchev realised only too well, is no guarantee of Soviet control, nor is it any real substitute for the kind of unity Khrushchev tried to impose and failed.

Otherwise, the new Soviet leaders have seemed content up to now to try to avoid trouble and stop the rot. Their two ventures in joint consultation so far—the top-level meeting of Warsaw Pact members in January 1965 and the 19-party preparatory conference in Moscow in March—are hardly likely to have convinced them of the usefulness of multilateral meetings. The first ended in a series of unconstructive platitudes and the second was a serious diplomatic and propaganda defeat for the Soviet Union. It is quite likely that in future, to avoid public disunity and embarrassment over the failure to promote joint action, Moscow, though not entirely dispensing with multilateral meetings, will rely more and more on bilateral consultations with the East European regimes. Understandably enough, they seem to have abandoned Khrushchev's ideas for a new Cominform. Any such form of institutionalised unity is, in the foreseeable future, out of the question.

ONE international development which, in normal circumstances, might have been expected to produce an impressive demonstration of unity has very significantly failed to do so. This is the US air offensive against North Vietnam. Just as an atmosphere of international détente tends to promote disunity, so, conversely, the jeopardising of that détente by American action should in theory have helped to restore some unity. This has not happened, and, while this point should not be stretched too far because of Moscow's obvious dilemma over the Vietnam crisis, it has nevertheless been striking that, in a situation where a communist country was being attacked, even the Soviet's minimal gesture of offering to send volunteers to Vietnam has not met with a unified response from Eastern Europe. There has been an impressive display of sentimental solidarity with Hanoi but only Bulgaria and Hungary have specifically followed the Soviet example on the offer of volunteers. And if the Soviet Union were to take the initiative for more direct military intervention, Rumania would certainly not be the only ally who would balk.[9]

Up to now there has been no clear evidence that the Soviet Union has had any trouble with its Warsaw Pact allies about membership or

[9] Although Rumania has strongly condemned the US actions, her own relations with the Hanoi regime seem to have been strained for some time. There was a dramatic drop in trade between the two countries in 1964, from 65·7 million lei in 1963 to 21·8 million (*New York Times*, 3 June 1965). In June 1965 an important North Vietnamese delegation visited five East European capitals but not Bucharest. Ho Chi Minh, in a telegram to Ceausescu acknowledging Rumanian greetings on his 75th birthday, expressed his 'hope' that fraternal relations between the two countries would develop (Radio Bucharest, 8 June 1965). In telegrams to all other East European leaders, Ho expressed his 'conviction' on this score.

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participation in the activities of the Pact. All have now been equipped with ground-to-ground missiles and in May 1965 a meeting was held of the Defence Ministers of the member countries. But the question of concerted military action would become a political issue of the first magnitude on which the Soviet Union could hardly expect an unequivocally unified response.[10]

In some specific areas of Eastern Europe Brezhnev and Kosygin seem to be continuing Khrushchev's policy and in others abandoning or modifying it. One of Khrushchev's partial successes in his last years was the rapprochement with Yugoslavia. Domestic weakness and uncertainty forced Tito to strengthen his relations with the Soviet Union and the East European regimes. He visited Khrushchev in June 1964 and the following September it was announced that Yugoslavia was entering into some kind of association with Comecon. Brezhnev and Kosygin have evidently been successful in persuading Tito that his fears about Soviet policy after the fall of Khrushchev were unjustified, and the Yugoslav leader's visit to Moscow in June 1965 was marked by great cordiality on both sides. With Yugoslavia there is, therefore, continuity. With East Germany, however, there has been a shift highly gratifying to Ulbricht. Khrushchev never sought to undermine the GDR or to repudiate its leader, but his moves in 1964 towards a rapprochement with Bonn certainly caused consternation in Pankow. These moves were discontinued by his successors, who have seemed anxious to reassure Ulbricht and have also urged that the expanding trade relations between the East European states and the Federal Republic should not be at the expense of East Germany.[11] There have, however, been some signs recently that Moscow was resuming interest in better relations with Bonn, and it remains to be seen what Pankow's reaction will be.

In the case of Albania the new leaders seem to have tried, and failed, to improve relations. Radio Moscow's Albanian broadcasts have been much more moderate in tone than they usually were under Khrushchev, and the Soviet Union, probably at the suggestion of the Poles, agreed to invite Albania to the Warsaw Pact meeting in January 1965. The reply was a torrent of abuse from Tirana which put paid to any hopes for a normalisation of relations.[12] With Hungary, relations have improved considerably since their low point immediately after Khrushchev's fall, when Kadar was the most outspoken of all in defence of

10 The meetings which the Warsaw Pact C.-in-C., Marshal Grechko, had with Rumanian Premier Maurer (24 May) and party leader Ceausescu (16 June) may have been an indication of some difficulties with Rumania within the Warsaw Pact. It should also be noted that Art. 43 of the new Rumanian Constitution stipulates that a state of war can only be declared in case of aggression against Rumania, or allies to which Rumania has mutual defence obligations, ' if the situation occurs on which the obligation of declaring the state of war is based '. This proviso, which was not in the old constitution, may reflect Rumanian anxiety not to be drawn into any unwelcome conflict. But neither Grechko's conversations nor this new proviso is direct enough evidence on which anything but speculation can be based.

11 See article by Sanakoyev in *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn*, No. 5, 1965.

12 *Zeri i Popullit*, 2 February 1965.

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his old friend and protector. But the Hungarians have made it clearer than ever they did under Khrushchev that the Soviet Union is no longer the centre from which inspiration must come. With Czechoslovakia, as has been said, relations are correct but more distant than they were under Khrushchev.

A SPECIAL note should be made of relations with Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria, since all three have a particular importance and relevance at the moment.

The particular relationship which Gomulka's Poland had with Khrushchev seems to be continuing under his successors. Less than two weeks after Khrushchev's fall the new leaders met Gomulka and Premier Cyrankiewicz on Polish territory. Immediately after the Warsaw Pact conference in Warsaw in January 1965 the four men conferred together near the Masurian Lakes, and in April Brezhnev headed a Soviet delegation to Warsaw. The new leaders were obviously anxious to reassure the Poles that they contemplated no basic changes, and were evidently prepared to listen to Gomulka's advice. The attention paid to Gomulka reflected the serious concern which the Soviets had over Poland's attitude towards the change of leadership in Moscow. It showed not only a respect for Gomulka and the influence he has in Eastern Europe. It revealed once again the Soviets' awareness of Poland's importance in their whole European policy and strategy. East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland form a northern tier of states in Eastern Europe which include the greater part of the industry of the whole area and well over half its population, and are considerably more important to the Soviet Union than the southern tier comprising the Balkan states, with Hungary providing the link between the two groupings. The strategic position of Poland in this northern tier is of the greatest importance. She is the military and economic link between the Soviet Union and East Germany. Any defection on the part of Poland or any dangerous display of independence, even on the Rumanian, let alone the Yugoslav, model, would gravely weaken the Soviet position in Central Europe and would endanger the very existence of the East German state. Gomulka, of course, is never likely to display too much independence, still less to defect. Poland's geopolitical position is more of a handicap than an advantage. The Soviet Union is still the only guarantee of her western frontier and Polish economic weakness is such that Gomulka has always been prepared to sacrifice a good deal of independence for the benefits he thinks economic integration might bring. But, in circumstances which are on the whole unenviable, he is not without a certain bargaining power. He knows it, and so do the Russians. Hence the special place which they have accorded him. What applies to Poland also applies in lesser degree to Czechoslovakia, and this is why Moscow's reaction to the new course which Novotny appears to be adopting is of particular interest.

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The northern tier has, on the whole, held firm for the Soviet Union. The southern, less important but still of great value, has been disastrously eroded. First Yugoslavia and then Albania broke off completely, and more recently Rumania has become a doubtful element. Any hopes the new leaders may have had that the fall of Khrushchev would bridge the gulf between Moscow and Bucharest must soon have been dispelled. Khrushchev's removal only confirmed the Rumanian victory. Any hopes they may have had that the death of Gheorghiu-Dej would aid their cause must also have been disappointed. Ceausescu, the new Rumanian party leader, is, if anything, more militant in his nationalism than was Dej. Since October 1964 the Soviet leaders have adopted a policy of sweet reasonableness, almost of turning the other cheek, to Rumania. They have avoided any move which might worsen relations, and the presence of Brezhnev at the Rumanian party congress in July 1965, and the friendly speech he made, were clearly meant as a conciliatory gesture. The Rumanians for their part have been very correct but have shown no sign whatever of retracting. In fact, at their party congress in July this year, they contrived to give a Marxist-Leninist justification for their independent course.

The deterioration of relations with Rumania was probably one of the reasons why the Soviet Union, under both the old leadership and the new, has striven for better relations with Yugoslavia. The very friendly relations which developed between Gheorghiu-Dej and Tito in late 1963 and the first half of 1964 did not go unnoticed in Moscow. The formation of a Belgrade-Bucharest axis would have meant the isolation of Bulgaria, the Soviet Union's only remaining trusted ally in the Balkans. Soviet efforts to prevent it seem to have had their effect. During Tito's visit to Leningrad in June 1964, Khrushchev may have impressed on him the inadvisability of too close an alliance with Gheorghiu-Dej, and subsequent Rumanian-Yugoslav relations, though very good, have not developed with their previous momentum. Moscow is more important to Belgrade at present than is Bucharest.[13]

The deterioration of the Soviet Union's position in the Balkans has made Bulgaria more valuable to her now than at any time since 1945. Her strategic importance as an outpost bordering two unstable Western allies—Greece and Turkey—was generally recognised. But now Bulgaria has become the only state in the whole of South-East Europe on which the Soviet Union can completely rely. Up to now, mainly because of its own weakness, the Bulgarian regime has been steadfastly loyal. The Soviets have accepted the loyalty and turned a blind eye to the weakness and the incompetence. But in April 1965 a conspiracy was uncovered in Sofia motivated by strong dissatisfaction over the Zhivkov regime's subservience to Moscow.[14] The conspiracy never had the

[13] The invitation to visit Sofia in September extended by the Bulgarians to both Ceausescu and Tito will lessen the isolation of Bulgaria among its Balkan communist neighbours.

[14] See J. F. Brown, 'The Bulgarian Plot', *The World Today*, June 1965.

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chance to become a putsch and its leaders were not men of the first importance. But Moscow thought it expedient to send a man as authoritative as Suslov to make an on-the-spot investigation. This was the Soviet Union's way of telling everybody that Bulgaria was a sphere of interest that she was determined to preserve.

Indeed, 'hold what we have' seems to be the policy of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime for the whole of Eastern Europe. It is a negative, defensive policy. Perhaps it is meant only as an interim one. But it is difficult to see how it can be successfully replaced by something more positive. The Soviet Union will remain the biggest single factor in the East European situation for many years to come, but its power to lead has already diminished greatly and seems hardly capable of being restored. It remains to be seen whether Brezhnev and Kosygin, or any future leaders, will defy the odds and try to restore it, or whether they will take the line of least resistance by making the best of what has already become a very unsatisfactory situation.

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TACTICS IN THE THIRD WORLD

Contradictions and Dangers

Uri Ra'anan

MOST of the writing on the Soviet attitude to the 'third world' has dealt with it almost exclusively in terms of the Sino-Soviet conflict, as if Russia's difficulties were due entirely to Peking's militancy. In fact, the problems the Soviet leaders have been grappling with in the last three or four years in their relations with these countries arise directly from the inherent contradictions in Moscow's strategy and tactics, irrespective of the obvious pitfalls created by Mao's policy.

This neither is nor can be regarded by Moscow as a minor matter: as this analysis will endeavour to show, the USSR regards the 'third world' as a crucial arena and the 'national liberation movement' as one of the decisive forces in its attempt to overcome the global stalemate imposed by the thermo-nuclear age. Moreover, Moscow believes that the particular stage now reached is highly propitious for a major breakthrough, changing the balances of forces. As *Pravda* declared on 19 December 1964: '[In Africa, Asia and Latin America] objective conditions are now rapidly developing for a further aggravation of the external and internal contradictions of imperialism, for the advance of the left-wing revolutionary forces'. Basically, this remains Moscow's attitude, even if recent events in Vietnam have dampened Soviet optimism. Since the Russians feel that historic opportunities may be unfolding and that they may miss their chance, it has remained a matter of particular importance and urgency for them to try to fashion a coherent and realistic system of tactics for exploiting the present constellation in the third world.

A closer look at their efforts in recent years shows, in fact, that there has not been much scope for deliberate choice; scientific and military developments have drastically limited the methods to which a major power can safely resort. Nor does this apply only to tactics; the very selection of the third world as a focal region of Soviet policy has been largely imposed by circumstances. This becomes readily apparent if one reconsiders the history of the Soviet concept of peaceful coexistence.

In its earliest stages, peaceful coexistence under Malenkov and Khrushchev perhaps implied little more than a realisation that direct, armed East-West confrontation in a thermo-nuclear age was fraught with consequences unacceptable to the USSR, as well as to the rest of the world, and must therefore be avoided. It quickly became apparent, however, that such a concept could be damaging if it inhibited or paralysed all Soviet political and para-military initiatives. Such an outcome clearly would have been unpalatable to a Soviet elite still speaking the jargon of 'revolutionary dynamics', and, moreover, would have required the surrender to Peking of hegemony over all militant movements outside the bloc. The Soviet leaders thus found it essential to

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develop a strategy which would permit the selective application of peaceful coexistence so that a Soviet offensive could be maintained at least in some parts of the globe.

It was obvious which areas would favour a dynamic, and which a static policy: where the forces of the nuclear opponents confronted each other in physical proximity, as in Europe and in parts of the Far East, fear of a holocaust clearly left the USSR little choice. Only a status quo policy was feasible there. (This applied even to enclaves like West Berlin, as the Russians quickly discovered.) In regions where direct confrontation had not occurred, on the other hand, i.e. in the third world, a continued Soviet offensive might well be feasible. In Afro-Asia, the forces of the major global antagonists were separated by vast distances and, in most cases, neither East nor West was bound by formal treaties to come automatically to the aid of local parties. Such fluidity in the international status of the third world, as well as in its internal make-up (with weak and unstable regimes prevailing), rendered this area ideal for the possible achievement—with relative impunity—of significant Soviet gains. Thus, peaceful coexistence came to imply a stalemate in the northern sector of the globe, coupled with a dynamic Soviet thrust into the southern regions.

SO much for the strategy; as for the tactics, it was evident that the successful implementation of such a Soviet policy depended upon the exercise of a great deal of subtlety. It was clearly incumbent upon the USSR to pursue its offensive in Afro-Asia by methods that would avoid provoking major Western intervention. After all, it was Moscow's purpose to remove any Western foothold there, and not to re-establish the Western presence through Russia's own actions. If the Soviet leaders failed to meet this condition, and if incautious Soviet moves precipitated massive Western counter-action, the third world would no longer meet the definition of a fluid non-confrontation area. It would, in fact, no longer be a third world. The frozen lines of Europe and the North Pacific would then extend into the southern sector of the globe and no regions would be left in which the nuclear antagonists would not be standing face to face. In that case, the nuclear stalemate would paralyse Soviet initiatives everywhere and Peking would inherit undivided leadership over all militant forces. Thus, by lack of restraint or by overt provocation of the West, the USSR would merely be defeating its own purposes.

In order to avoid such an eventuality, the Soviet Union fashioned two guidelines for a thrust into the third world: a. since Western counter-action was most likely to be precipitated by the physical presence of the USSR in Afro-Asia, it was essential to proceed, whenever possible, through intermediaries rather than directly; b. in case of such indirect action, it was all the more important to maintain firm Soviet control over each stage of a developing offensive, in order to prevent untoward events or to stop escalation in time.

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As for the modalities of such a policy, a number of definitive Soviet statements (editorials in *Kommunist*, 3, 1965, *International Affairs*, 12, 1964, *Pravda*, 19 and 26 December 1964) show that these tactical concepts were, in fact, being integrated into a working manual of general action. Postulating, apparently, that the Sino-Soviet conflict might still be overcome—or, at least, subdued during a communist offensive in Afro-Asia—Moscow put forward a number of theses: the third world was designated as the focus of an offensive, to be conducted by a united front of the communist countries (with or without China), the communist parties of the West, and the 'national liberation movement' (subdivided into: I. insurgent forces in colonial or disaffected areas; II. militant or expansionist regimes in newly-independent countries). Specific tasks were assigned to each of these elements, with the USSR leaving overtly active roles almost entirely to her various partners. Not all the details of this scheme of action were spelled out, but much could be inferred from the terminology employed and from reference to contemporary events.

The USSR and its East European allies were to keep the West engaged by a suitable admixture of armed deterrence and closer bilateral relations; at the same time, they would give political encouragement and military and economic aid to radical regimes in the third world, while granting indirect assistance to insurgents against pro-Western or colonial governments. Moscow may have hoped that a general relaxation of relations between the Great Powers would reduce the likelihood of a massive Western reaction to developments in the third world. Far from constituting a master plan, this Soviet scheme of action simply attempted to reconcile revolutionary dynamics with the demands of cold reality. Thus, Soviet publications clearly indicated just why the USSR had to confine itself to the strictly limited role of neutralising Western power by political means, while leaving the real struggle to be fought out by others. Quite apart from the prohibitive physical consequences of an East-West clash, Moscow warned its readers that the supremacy of moderate elements in the West should not be taken for granted; other forces were alleged to be growing stronger there and they would only benefit from any unnecessary crisis. This would not be in the interests of the Soviet Union. No less important, Moscow admitted that the USSR and its allies required prolonged tranquillity to grapple with serious economic problems and to assuage dangerous political tension within the communist camp itself.

In areas of the third world where governmental authority was insufficiently established or had alienated the population, insurgent forces, guerrilla elements, or infiltrators were to receive some Soviet assistance, indirectly if possible. Since such conflicts would be treated as domestic, danger of East-West nuclear confrontation could be regarded as a remote contingency, except for the general vicinity of China (i.e. Vietnam). Referring to insurgency situations in general, *Communist of the Armed Forces* (January 1964) stated: 'It is fully understood that the

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question of rocket-nuclear weapons being used will not arise'. In other words, the USSR could pursue her policy with reasonable safety in such cases.

Certain absolutist regimes in ex-colonial countries, implementing radical measures at home and militant policies abroad, were to receive very considerable support from Moscow, acting in their turn as arms conduits for insurgent forces elsewhere. Since these 'revolutionary democrats' monopolised all power, whole societies might eventually be influenced through them. By means of adroit and elastic policies towards such regimes, therefore, the USSR could gain hegemony imperceptibly, without catastrophic international reverberations. During 1964 the Russians did, in fact, resort to tactics of this kind, departing from ideological orthodoxy in order to endorse various non-communist regimes, which were hailed as being firmly 'upon the non-capitalist path' or even 'the socialist path'. Countries thus distinguished included Algeria, Mali, the UAR, Burma, Ghana, Congo (Brazzaville), and Guinea. An Algerian communist leader exulted: 'in our time new Cubas will appear in Africa, Latin America, and Asia'. Whether these moves could really produce lasting success was, of course, another question. (At any rate, debating points could be scored against Peking by crediting peaceful coexistence with the power of producing such achievements.)

THIS, then, was the rather elaborate framework of Soviet global policy envisaged in Moscow. The entire concept was predicated upon the strict avoidance of armed East-West confrontation in the third world. Moreover, even where there appeared to be no danger of such confrontation, Soviet policy attempted to discourage any overt act by militant local regimes which was likely to provoke physical intervention by Western forces. The reason for Moscow's attitude was quite simple: Soviet interests required the removal, not the reinforcement, of the Western presence in Afro-Asia. Even though the West was not bound by formal treaties to come to the aid of non-aligned countries, there were several cases of moral commitment which might lead to Western intervention. The USSR could prevent such contingencies only by keeping discreetly in the background while maintaining firm control over the actions of the more militant elements in the third world. Covert moves by such elements to aid insurgent groups in neighbouring areas, i.e. 'domestic' conflicts, could be viewed with equanimity by the Soviet Union (although, of course, there was Russian concern about the possible consequences of guerrilla action in sensitive 'frontline' areas, e.g. Vietnam or the Caribbean); overt, full-scale invasions across international frontiers, however, could not be regarded as safe or desirable.

Judged by these criteria, the Soviet scheme was impaired by a serious weakness. There was an inherent contradiction between two basic requirements: on the one hand the need to refrain from direct Soviet action and to act through intermediaries, and, on the other, the

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necessity of maintaining firm control over the tactics employed. In fact, the subtle moves postulated by this policy could be sustained only if the USSR itself implemented each step. Yet, in accordance with the scheme, all direct action in the third world was entrusted to the 'national liberation movement', upon whose whims Moscow must thus depend. Indifferent to outside interests, erratic and unpredictable elements in Afro-Asia and Latin America pursued their own goals, frequently obstructing Soviet tactics. Thus, indirect action and the maintenance of firm control became incompatible aims for the USSR.

Although Soviet publications have enlarged only recently upon Moscow's general policy scheme, it has, actually, constituted the basis of Soviet actions for several years now, and the serious contradiction inherent in this programme has been apparent for some time. Soviet leaders have resorted to various devices in their attempts to deal with this difficulty, but success has proved elusive. The nature of the problem, with all its ramifications, may perhaps best be illustrated by analysing one particular form of Soviet activity in the third world—military aid—and by examining some instances where conflict over tactics has occurred between the USSR and recipients of Soviet weapons.

Military relations between the Soviet Union and certain developing countries constitute a particularly significant example of the complexity and the potential dangers of Moscow's policy. The USSR had originally extended arms credits to newly independent or revolutionary regimes as a bait, to secure entry into regions such as the Near East, Africa, and the S.E. Asian archipelago, where the West enjoyed conventional military predominance. Unable to confront a stronger opponent, the USSR had resorted to outflanking tactics.[1] The regimes enticed by Soviet weapons were generally embroiled with their neighbours, their national purpose usually enshrining the recovery of some irredenta. The West, whose protective aegis extended over these regions, pursued a policy of even-handed friendship towards local powers, regarding the maintenance of a balance between them as the best guarantee of stability. A local arms race or the growth of military imbalance, tempting some ruler in the area to surprise his neighbour, could therefore not be welcome to the West. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, an outsider without share of responsibility for regional tranquillity, considered it advantageous to pour in arms, exacerbating local conflicts. The West was bound to be embarrassed since, in areas under its own aegis, it could hardly compete with the USSR in creating turbulence.

Such Soviet calculations were sound only so long as Afro-Asian arms recipients utilised Russian weapons for *political* purposes—e.g. to gain prestige and extort concessions from weaker neighbours, or to equip militant insurgent elements in other states. If, however, tempted by an abundance of hardware, a Soviet arms recipient were to launch a full-scale invasion of a pro-Western country, the USSR would be confronted with a dilemma. Soviet leaders naturally assumed that the West might interpose itself in case of such open aggression, in order to

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halt the conflict. Since the West had maintained military predominance over the approaches to Afro-Asia, the USSR would then be obliged either to resort to a nuclear strike or to abandon its local arms recipient, with the consequent loss of prestige, influence, and investments. Neither alternative being palatable, the Soviet national interest clearly required measures to prevent full-scale local wars of this type. Nor, for that matter, could the USSR welcome the embarrassing possibility of conflict between its arms recipients and other Afro-Asian beneficiaries of Soviet favour. The problem was how to steer emotional and erratic regimes away from such dangerous paths.

Theoretically, the USSR could always attach strings to military aid, threatening to cut off supplies if defied. In practice, however, Moscow discovered that the strong are handicapped in applying leverage to the weak. The donor of aid, in his unwillingness to jeopardise his material and political investments, may become nearly as vulnerable as the recipient. Moreover, Soviet assistance had proved acceptable to Afro-Asians precisely because it eschewed political strings. Were Moscow openly to demand political control over the use of Soviet weapons at this late date, local reactions might be fierce. (Cuba, on the front line of East-West conflict, constituted an exceptional case requiring particularly stringent controls, however much Castro might complain.) The USSR, of course, disliked having to injure military aid relationships which it had so laboriously fostered. Significantly, throughout this period, Moscow dared to cut off military supplies only to communist recipients—Yugoslavia, Albania, and China. Presumably the USSR believed that communist countries had fewer alternatives open to them than the non-aligned.

EVENTUALLY, the Russian leaders decided to circumvent the unpleasant choice between tolerating dangerous tendencies in the third world and having to resort to harmful altercations with individual arms recipients. Knowing full well that many African and Asian countries had taken Soviet weapons in the first place in order to satisfy their territorial aspirations, the USSR realised that they would not gladly abandon chances of utilising these arms. Moscow, therefore, thought of a method which might hamstring the actions of such irredentist countries without causing the full brunt of their wrath to fall upon the USSR. In a move which internationalised the problem, Khrushchev on 31 December 1963 dispatched lengthy messages to over one hundred surprised governments, proposing a global agreement renouncing the use of force in solving territorial disputes. By thus applying the leverage of world opinion to recalcitrant arms recipients, Russia hoped to avoid the loss of its own reserves of political capital in such countries. Other considerations were involved, relating to Europe and China, but the text of the message itself (and subsequent comments) dealt largely with the developing regions, denouncing local war:

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> Many young sovereign states . . . have inherited from the colonial regimes a large number of artificially embroiled border problems. . . . The recent events in North Africa leave no doubt that the cause of strengthening and developing the independent African states is substantially harmed when one of them embarks upon the road of using armed forces against another in the attempt to satisfy its territorial claims. . . . [This] may prove to be a bonus for stronger states. . . . And is it not dangerous for the peoples of Asia to use force to revise state borders existing in their part of the world?

Khrushchev frankly indicated concern over the possibility of nuclear confrontation between the USSR and the West, perhaps as a result of armed attack by a Soviet arms recipient upon some pro-Western country:

> [There is] close intermingling of states—economic, political, strategic. . . . A clash that . . . would seem to be purely local in nature might quickly escalate. . . . This would involve commitments of allies and the fears, real or imaginary, of other states, both adjoining the area of the conflict and thousands of kilometres away. . . . Wars that begin by using conventional weapons may develop, today, into world war.

From his general embargo on the use of force, however, Khrushchev specifically exempted 'national liberation' struggles, i.e. cases of insurgency and infiltration in colonial or pro-Western areas. The USSR believed that there was relatively little danger of escalation in such instances of 'domestic' conflict, except in China's vicinity (Vietnam).

Khrushchev's attempt to impose international rather than purely Soviet limitations upon territorial appetites in the third world failed. His Afro-Asian correspondents resorted to the simple expedient of including their pet irredenta in the category of permissible 'national liberation' struggles, while paying lip-service to the renunciation of 'local wars'. In other words, they distorted his text in order to pretend that the USSR had endorsed rather than opposed their intentions. In particularly blatant cases, the Soviet press published abridged versions of replies to Khrushchev's note. In an authoritative comment in *International Affairs* (4, 1964), Professor Molodtsov admitted that 'Some of the official replies to and unofficial comments on Premier Khrushchev's message reveal that attempts are being made to prevent the Soviet proposal being implemented.' Nor did he pretend that it was only the West which reacted this way.

Khrushchev, Suslov, and Mikoyan publicly reminded arms recipients of benefits bestowed upon them, indicating that Moscow expected some consideration in return. On 22 December 1963 Khrushchev stated:

> The USSR dispatched large quantities of weapons to the Algerian patriots, free of charge. We also gave Indonesia, Yemen, and other countries great help in their armed struggle. We lent all our power to the support of the Egyptian people when they were faced with the necessity of dealing imperialist aggressors an armed rebuff.

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On 14 February 1964, in an anti-Chinese speech to the CPSU central committee, published two months later, Suslov repeated Khrushchev's remarks, mentioning Panama, Cyprus, Vietnam, Zanzibar, and East Africa as additional examples of Soviet support. Moscow, he said, was helping 'the national liberation movement—economically, politically and, if necessary, militarily'; was 'actually supporting just wars which the people wage against their enslavers', and was preventing both the 'unleashing of local wars' (for which he blamed 'imperialists') and the 'export of counter-revolution'.

The USSR apparently regarded prevention of local wars, in return for Soviet aid, as part of a package deal. The examples of Russian support cited were clearly intended to rule out full-scale invasions. In all the instances referred to, arms had been utilised only for purposes of political demonstration, guerrilla, infiltration, or 'domestic' conflict, but never for full war between two nations. As for the USSR itself, its performance over Suez and Cyprus was actually marked by supreme caution at the peak of crisis, by sabre-rattling only as danger receded, and by heroic poses afterwards. Its behaviour over Algeria was strikingly ambivalent and its support elsewhere predominantly verbal. (Admittedly, the examples cited by Soviet leaders were intended to disprove Peking's claim that in the third world the use of force was essential.)

Regarding the Indonesian case, Mikoyan said on 16 May 1964 that Russia had 'sent military specialists and weapons when necessary, so that Indonesia could return to the lap of the motherland the territory seized by the colonisers, in case this should be necessary. Indonesia then showed such a fist that the colonisers withdrew quietly, and West Irian passed to Indonesia without bloodshed'.

On 20 June 1964, in Bandung, Mikoyan reminded the Indonesians that they had been able to gain West Irian 'without firing a single shot', allegedly with Soviet help. He mentioned North Borneo in the same breath, apparently implying that the identical methods should be adopted there. In this context, it is revealing to read Professor Molodtsov's comment, in his authoritative interpretation of the Khrushchev note. 'The UN, in the final analysis, contributed to the peaceful settlement of the West Irian issue . . . which recognised West Irian as Indonesian territory.'

In the same article, Professor Molodtsov praised the Organisation of African Unity for helping to 'bring about a cease-fire on the Algerian-Moroccan frontier in October last and on the Somali-Ethiopia frontier in February'. In these two embarrassing instances, Soviet arms recipients used force against countries which the USSR itself was wooing at the time. Khrushchev's message had referred to the Algerian-Moroccan conflict as a particularly sad case; shortly afterwards, on 10 February 1964, he took the unusual step of addressing personal requests for a cease-fire to Ethiopian and Somali leaders. At the same time, Moscow's Africa expert, the late Professor Potekhin, announced

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that 'a general revision of [African] borders is unthinkable'—after years of insisting that artificial colonial frontiers must be swept away!

MOSCOW'S problems in attempting to influence the tactics of non-aligned countries received particularly illuminating documentation during Khrushchev's May 1964 tour of Egypt, his only major visit to an arms recipient following his message on territorial disputes. Replying to him in February 1964, President Nasser and Syria's Premier Hafez had excepted the Arab-Israel conflict from the category of disputes that must be settled peacefully. At the time, the USSR did not react officially to this interpretation. Three months later, however, reading a prepared text to the UAR National Assembly, almost immediately upon his arrival in Cairo, Khrushchev gave a veiled warning:

> "How is it that on the one hand the Soviet Union comes out for settling international problems through negotiations, and on the other hand does not refuse to supply arms to some countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America? . . . It is true that we give arms to those who ask for our assistance in the just struggle for national independence. But . . . we give arms for the defence of freedom, and not for attack on other countries.

As the visit continued, however, Khrushchev became increasingly concerned with scoring a popularity hit, often departing from his text to gain the plaudits of his audience. Consequently, several of his remarks had to be amended *ex post facto* from Moscow, offering analysts a rare opportunity for insight into Soviet thinking. Thus, at a dinner given by Marshal Amer on 18 May, Khrushchev revealed that his host had requested additional Soviet weapons. He commented, speaking off the cuff: 'There will be no difficulties with the weapons when they will be necessary. It is better to have good weapons so that our enemies know about them and do not force us to use them.'

On the morrow, Moscow Radio changed the text of his speech by adding a significant qualifying phrase which Khrushchev had not employed: 'There will be no delay over arms *should it be necessary to rebuff aggressors*.'

In his 19 May speech in Port Said, Khrushchev declared: 'The UAR is also in favour of . . . the proposals for solving regional problems peacefully.' A few sentences later, he added 'The Soviet government believes that a logical and just solution should be found for the Palestine problem. The Soviet Union fully supports the position of the Arab peoples.'

While thus supporting a solution which would be *just*, according to the Arab definition, he did not indicate clearly whether this came within the category of problems requiring peaceful solution; Khrushchev's enthusiastically applauding listeners clearly were *not* under the impression that he was placing any limitations upon the methods by which this territory might be gained. Yet on 15 June 1964, in an Arabic broadcast from Moscow, the speech was completely re-edited:

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> Premier Khrushchev said . . . in Port Said . . . that a reasonable solution *through peaceful means* must be found to the disputes, *including those between Israel and the neighbouring countries.* (Author's emphasis.)

The UAR reacted with an authoritative statement (*Al Ahram*, 25 September 1964) which, according to the *New York Times* correspondent, constituted criticism of the Soviet ban on local war: Some powers [i.e. the West] 'have fleets in the sea near us and bases that can have direct results on the battle and tip the balance at critical moments', while another power [i.e. the USSR] reflects 'the era in which we live' which 'is under the pressure of nuclear terror, making many want peace even if it is not based on justice'.

The Chinese nimbly exploited these instances of friction between the USSR and Afro-Asian countries. The USSR requested endorsement of Khrushchev's message on territorial disputes at the sixth session of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Council (Algiers, 22–27 March 1964). The Chinese delegate, Mme. Kuo Chien, supported by Indonesia, sharply opposed this suggestion, demanding the recognition of conflicts in the Pacific, the Arab-Israel area and elsewhere as 'just' struggles, where violence was permissible. The conference did not endorse the Soviet proposal. The Soviet attempt to retain control over Afro-Asian militants while at the same time avoiding risk of confrontation with the West, proved a failure, and the Chinese openly rejoiced.

In September 1964, the USSR requested the inclusion of Khrushchev's message on the agenda of the UN General Assembly. Gradually, however, the Soviet press ceased giving prominence to this note, partly, perhaps, because of its close association with the name of the deposed First Secretary and partly because of continued friction with the third world. The failure of Khrushchev's initiative left Russia once more facing the basic dilemma of peaceful coexistence: the success of the Soviet offensive in the third world required the avoidance of situations likely to precipitate Western counter-action. In turn, this required both that the USSR should act only through third parties, and that it should at the same time maintain firm control over the tactics employed. However, the chosen instrument for the implementation of its policy—the 'national liberation movement'—insisted upon employing its own methods, rejecting all Soviet attempts at control.

THE failure to overcome this difficulty might have led to an impasse but for the fact that a different approach had earlier suggested itself to Soviet military leaders. Some of them apparently argued that, since it was proving so difficult to ensure that the 'national liberation movement' would avoid provoking the West, the attempt should be made to deter the West from reacting to such situations, that is, from exploiting its regional military predominance for the purpose of suppressing local wars; in that case, the USSR could pursue its offensive in the third

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world without having to worry over the possible consequences of Afro-Asian militancy. In this context, the 'West' meant primarily the United States 6th and 7th Fleets, whose movements in the Mediterranean, Pacific, and Indian Ocean provided continuous subject matter for the Soviet media, especially the Army's *Red Star*, during 1963–64.

By this time, Soviet military leaders were beginning to devote increasing interest to the third world and to the problem of local conflicts. Previously, they had asserted that local wars must inevitably escalate into a general holocaust if the nuclear powers participated in any way. It was a natural corollary to this thesis that the USSR, a nuclear power, must fear involvement in such conflicts and would, therefore, keep out. Now Soviet military leaders came to feel that it was precisely this impression which conferred freedom of action upon the West. If, however, they could present the USSR as being ready to take risks, then the West might well be deterred from intervening against local acts of aggression. The West could be made to believe—it was felt in Moscow—that any Western action might lead to Soviet counter-action. Consequently, late in 1963, Soviet strategic definitions were revised, conveying a clear hint to the West that the Red Army no longer considered escalation in local wars *inevitable*, merely *possible*; the USSR hoped, apparently, that this change would indicate that it no longer feared the consequences of participating in local wars and that the West, therefore, should not take Soviet non-intervention for granted.[1] In addition, the authoritative Soviet textbook on military strategy carried an ominous warning that 'an aggressive local war against one of the non-socialist countries that affects the basic interests of the socialist states' would produce vigorous Soviet counter-action. The same work referred to Soviet military preparations for participating in overseas wars of this kind.

These esoteric warnings to the West were reinforced from time to time. At the end of 1964 the Soviet weekly *New Times* (48, 1964) carried an article by Colonel Glazov on 'The new concept of "Local War"'. While writing at length about Europe and S.E. Asia, he also dealt with the third world:

> Those Western military and political leaders who countenance local wars are playing with fire. . . . Use of tactical nuclear weapons in 'underdeveloped' theatres, they believe, would not produce a big international reaction and might thus be indulged in without serious consequences. . . . We know, for instance, that when sent to interfere in Lebanon's internal affairs in 1958, the US Sixth Fleet had Honest John missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. The US and other NATO armies have been making extensive studies of methods of employing nuclear weapons in operations in Asia and the Middle East.

This sounded almost like a warning that the USSR might react not only to Western employment of tactical nuclear weapons in local war,

[1] Cf. T. W. Wolfe, 'Shifts in Soviet Strategic Thought', *Foreign Affairs*, April 1964.

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but even to the use of Western units merely possessing nuclear capability. Perhaps the Soviet Union simply intended to convey the impression that no type of Western action in the third world should be considered immune to Soviet counter-action.

There is room for doubt whether Soviet leaders themselves considered such warnings convincing. After all, while Soviet terminology had changed, the balance of power in the developing regions had not. The West still retained military predominance over the approaches to the third world, and political thinkers in Moscow may well have doubted the deterrent value of Soviet statements.

It is true that by 1965 the USSR was beginning to develop some of the elements required for any military action overseas, for instance by reactivating the marine corps (Maritime Infantry). However, in the continued absence of important ingredients of a naval-air striking force, above all aircraft carriers, it did not appear likely that there would be a real Soviet capability in the near future to intervene in Afro-Asian situations by limited and conventional means. The US 6th and 7th Fleets were still decisive factors in the region and Soviet threats of counter-action did not appear to have too much substance behind them (assuming always, of course, that nuclear confrontation is ruled out).

Thus, altogether, the Soviet leaders can be under few illusions as to the success of their various attempts to grapple with the contradictions of their policy towards the third world. Moscow has found no way either of ensuring that militants in the developing regions will abstain from actions provocative to the West, or of deterring the West from reacting to such situations. On the contrary, the Vietnam situation has borne out the determination of the United States to defend the areas under its protection, notwithstanding threats from Moscow and Peking. The Soviet dilemma, therefore, remains unresolved and uneasiness has begun to grow in Moscow as to the direction of Afro-Asian developments. At the same time, Soviet leaders feel tempted by the fluidity of the situation, thinking apparently that, in the present circumstances, they are expected by some means or other to produce tangible gains for their side. Constant jeers from Peking and unceasing competition with the Chinese at Afro-Asian meetings have made it particularly hard for the Russians to escape this feeling. The result is that no logical conclusions have been drawn in Moscow from the obvious difficulties and dangers in which the Soviet Union is becoming involved.

Thus, in a nuclear age, Soviet policies in the third world can hardly be considered foolproof. The dynamics of the national liberation process have produced hesitation in Moscow, but apparently no-one there has suggested that the USSR should disengage. Any misgivings have been covered by a screen of relatively militant verbiage, probably because of the need to keep up with Peking. Recently, Soviet involvement in developing areas has actually increased rather than diminished. This being the case, the problems analysed here are likely to assume greater proportions.

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NATIONALITIES POLICY: A NEW PHASE?

Geoffrey Wheeler

ONE of the most frequent and proudest boasts of the Soviet rulers is that they have solved the nationalities problem to the entire satisfaction of the formerly subject peoples of Russia and to the envy of colonial and 'semi-colonial' peoples in the rest of the world. During the past five years, however, the future of the nationalities and their status in the eventual form of the Soviet state have been subjected to serious consideration. There is evidently some doubt in the minds of the authorities whether the evolution of the nationalities is proceeding according to plan and whether indeed the plan itself should not be modified. The object of the present article is to trace the course of Soviet thought on this matter and to see how far this thought has been translated into action. The problem affects the nationalities throughout the USSR but it is here proposed to concentrate attention on those of the eastern republics, which by reason of their proximity to China are clearly an object of very great concern to the Soviet government.

It will not be necessary to describe the nature and working of Lenin's and Stalin's nationalities policy beyond saying that although it is open to criticism, and has in fact been strongly criticised in the West, on ethical grounds, it has undoubtedly been accompanied by spectacular material results. Whether these results are directly attributable to the nationalities policy or could have been obtained in some other way is a debatable matter; but the fact remains that in many respects such as industrialisation, standard of living, public health, and in general and technical education, the people of the eastern republics are far ahead of those of the neighbouring countries of Sinkiang, Afghanistan, Persia, and even Turkey. Although the Party has constantly expressed its dissatisfaction with the progress made in such matters as the uprooting of nationalist survivals, the abolition of religion, and the learning of the Russian language, it has generally been believed both inside and outside the Soviet Union that the so-called 'federative system' had come to stay. It was not until 1960 that the first indication appeared that the Party leadership was having doubts about the future of the republics.

In an article published in No. 20 of the *Bulletin* of Leningrad University (Series 4, 1960), Lenin's views on the transitional nature of the federative system were restated as follows: 'He was of the opinion that where the opportunity to build a single centralised multi-national state on the basis of territorial autonomy exists, it is imperative to make use of it and it has been made use of in many peoples' democracies. . . . At the same time, historical experience of the development of our state shows that it is necessary to consolidate and develop federation in every

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way possible as one of the transitional forms of state system, aiming at an even closer unification of the working masses of the different nations.' The article quoted various examples of states, including China, where the unitary as distinct from the federative system was said to be working satisfactorily, and it seemed to suggest that the adoption of a similar system in the Soviet Union was nearer than had previously been supposed. The implications of this article were brushed aside by most Western sovietologists on the ground that it was merely a formal reiteration of one of Lenin's favourite theories. During 1961, however, other articles appeared which made it quite clear that the Soviet Government now visualised as a practical proposition the two phases of *sblizheniye* (drawing closer) and *sliyaniye* (merging), which would inevitably result in the abolition of various national distinctions within the Soviet Union such as languages and frontiers. This intention was epitomised, albeit somewhat vaguely, in the programme adopted at the 22nd party congress in October 1961, where it was proclaimed that 'full-scale communist construction constitutes a new stage in the development of national relations in the USSR in which the nations will draw still closer together until complete unity is achieved'. During the proceedings of the congress, however, a certain note of caution was observable: Khrushchev took care to say that, though 'in the course of the full-scale construction of communism complete unity of the nations will be achieved,' 'even after communism will be built in the main, it will be premature to proclaim the merging of nations. Lenin, as is known, pointed out that state and national differences will exist for a long time after the victory of socialism in all countries.' As will presently be seen, doubts about the speed with which the change could be effected, and even about its practicability, were to increase during the next few years.

BEFORE considering the practical effects of the Soviet plan as conceived in 1960, it will be useful to consider some of the possible reasons for Soviet doubts about the future of the republics. Assigning reasons for Soviet action has never been an easy matter and it has become much more difficult since Party principles began to conflict more and more with the interests of the Soviet state. Soviet thinking about the eastern republics of the Union must obviously be affected by economic as well as by political and cultural considerations; here, however, it is only proposed to consider the last two.

The national delimitation of 1924 seemed to achieve three objects: it kept the Tsarist colonial territories with their important natural resources within the Soviet Union; it effected a necessary compromise in the eyes of the world between the ideology of communism and the practical requirements of imperialism; and it went some way towards satisfying the embryo nationalist aspirations of the Muslim peoples of Central Asia. As an administrative expedient it proved successful: all active resistance to the new regime had died down before 1930; and by and large, particularly since 1950, it contributed greatly to the material

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welfare of the people. But although many Soviet hopes and wishes have been fulfilled to an extent undreamt of by the West, in certain other matters regarded as fundamental there has been little or no progress. Soviet propagandists have repeatedly informed the world that the Muslim peoples of Central Asia have always loved the Russians and have loved them more than ever since the Revolution. But the plain fact is that colonial peoples do not as a rule love their conquerors and rulers and the peoples of the eastern republics of the Soviet Union are no exception. They may for a short time have believed that the Revolution would put an end to Russian rule, but they were quickly disillusioned. They probably do not dislike the Russians any more now than they did before 1917, but they may well respect them less; and the Russians themselves are well aware of this.

The second reason for Soviet disappointment has been in regard to social grouping and Soviet patriotism. The planners imagined that with the abolition of the old tribal and joint family grouping, which has to a large extent come to pass, the people would be content to regard themselves as Soviet citizens and would not take the facade of the national state too seriously. But it now seems probable that the artificially created republics have acquired a certain reality and that there has come into being something which can be called ' regionalism ', based on the republics and subscribed to not only by the various Muslim nationalities living in them, but also, perhaps, by the non-Asian officials, mainly Russians and Ukrainians, who have made them their home. This last phenomenon is by no means confined to Soviet Central Asia; it was common in Tsarist times and also in other imperial colonies in Asia and Africa. Thirdly, there is the Soviet awareness of the ' contradiction ', to use one of their own terms, between their ruthless suppression of nationalism in the eastern republics and their manifest support of nationalist regimes in the Muslim countries of the Middle East and Africa. Finally, there is the question of China, which adjoins the republics of Kazakhstan, Kirgiziya and Tadzhikistan to the extent of about 1,500 miles. China's military and economic potential is still of course far below that of the Soviet Union, and Russian prestige among the Muslim peoples on both sides of the frontier has probably stood higher than that of China for the past two hundred years. But it can hardly be supposed that the Soviet Union views with equanimity the emergence on her Asian frontier of a great Asian power, and one, moreover, which has constituted itself a unitary multi-national state in contradistinction to the federative system still nominally operative in the Soviet Union.

These reasons, coupled with the great and growing economic importance of Central Asia, would surely have been enough to make the Soviet Government consider what steps could be taken to ward off the danger of regional if not national deviation.

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BEFORE and after the 22nd party congress there appeared a number of articles which provide an important clue to the course taken by Soviet thinking on the question of nationalities. The first of these, by Gardanov, Dolgykh, and Zhdanko, was in *Sovetskaya Etnografiya* (No. 4, 1961) under the title of 'The Main Trends of the Ethnic Processes among the Peoples of the USSR'. This was a scholarly article written with studied moderation. It distinguished two main trends in the present-day processes of ethnic development in the USSR: '(1) The continuing consolidation and development of the socialist nations and *narodnost*; (2) a general process of the ever greater coming together of the socialist nations and *narodnost* of the USSR on the basis of the development of fraternal co-operation and friendly international contacts in the sphere of economy, culture, and intellectual life, a process accompanied by the emergence of all-Union Soviet forms of culture and way of life'. Throughout the article the emphasis was not on the cultural and other differences among the nationalities which formed the basis of the national delimitation of 1924, but on their inter-resemblance. 'Under the socialist system . . . the regional ties of peoples inhabiting historical and ethnographic areas of the USSR, ties in the development of which, even earlier, differences of language and state frontiers never played a substantial role, become stronger and develop on a new, high, socialist plane of economic collaboration and fraternal friendship'.

An article on 'The Cultures of the Socialist Nations, their Present and Future' by an Azerbaydzhani, the late N. Gadzhiyev, in *Kommunist* (No. 1, 1962) was in much the same vein; but its tone was somewhat more cautious than that of the preceding article. After explaining that the process of *sblizheniye* was already taking place and would become more intensive in the future and that 'fewer and fewer signs will remain distinguishing one nation from another', the author went on to say that the process would take a long time and that 'there are grounds for thinking that even after the transformation of the socialist nations into communist ones, the culture of the latter, for a certain time, will be communist in content and at the same time will still preserve its national form'. From this, coming as it did on top of Khrushchev's cautionary remarks at the 22nd congress, it may be assumed that a note of alarm had already been sounded in the republics.

During the next two years there were several signs that the implications of the new Party programme had not been lost on the peoples of the eastern republics, and that the authorities realised that considerable efforts would have to be made to allay the doubts which had been sown in the minds of the native 'establishments' of the various republics about their future. Early in 1962 a spirited controversy arose in the pages of *Izvestiya* and various literary magazines on the subject of the internationalisation of literature. The Russian poet Soloukhin strongly challenged certain statements made by the Dagestani writer Agayev about the formation of a single international culture. He said that

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Agayev's idea of the fusion of national literatures amounted to this: 'introduce into your books as many heroes as possible from other republics, try to write in some other language (but preferably in Russian) and also, when you write, create "consciously" not only in the name of your own people but also that of all the peoples inhabiting our multi-national homeland'. Soloukhin asserted that there could be no such thing as a Dagestani literature in Russian: 'the formation of the single international culture about which Agayev writes should hardly take the part of levelling and removing national traditions, national peculiarities, and national colour of music and language'. Replying in *Literatura i Zhizn*, Agayev accused Soloukhin of failing to understand the historical process whereby the national cultures draw together. 'In incomprehensible fear of this historical process, Soloukhin, appealing to national feelings, essentially calls for the preservation of national differences and peculiarities for all time.' He concluded that Soloukhin not only contradicted the Marxist-Leninist understanding of the national question, but had also indulged in the 'nationalistic philistinism' which Lenin had so strongly condemned. *Izvestiya* now entered the lists and, while observing that Soloukhin had rightly noted 'certain unsuccessful formulations' in Agayev's statements, came down strongly on the latter's side: 'the sacred duty of each true internationalist and builder of communism is to promote by all his actions and thoughts the strengthening of the friendship of the Soviet peoples, the drawing together of their national cultures, and the development of a single Soviet culture'. It was noteworthy, however, that at a meeting in Tbilisi of the Transcaucasian regional conference on artistic translation 'The viewpoint of Agayev . . . which unconvincingly tries to settle the problems of the development and mutual influence of national cultures and languages, was justly not supported'.

AT the plenum of the CPSU central committee which opened in Moscow on 19 November 1962 certain practical steps were taken which had the effect of reducing the individual responsibility of the Central Asian republics by creating a series of regional bodies which would be more easily controlled by Moscow. A Central Asian Bureau was established 'to work under the direct guidance of the CPSU central committee presidium'. This Bureau would consist of the First Secretaries of Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Kirgiziya, and Turkmenistan, as well as the heads of the four new Central Asian economic organisations to be set up at the same time. These were the Central Asian Council of National Economy, the Central Asian Construction Agency, the Central Asian Directorate for Cotton Growing, and the Chief Directorate for irrigation and the construction of sovkhozes.

The central committees of the republican communist parties held plenums in the course of December 1962, to discuss the new decisions taken at the centre and the tasks facing their own Party organisations. On the surface, these fundamental changes were received with universal

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approbation. But to students of Soviet affairs outside the USSR it was now clear what the changes, if carried to their logical conclusion, would involve: if the national republics were to continue to exist in name, which was by no means certain, they would be shorn even of the faint semblance of self-determination and sovereignty with which they had been endowed in 1924. During 1963 and 1964 articles appeared which unmistakenly reflected the growing apprehension in the minds of the nationalities and the efforts being deployed by the central authorities to dispel it. One of the most important and authoritative of these articles was one entitled 'Some Questions of the Leninist Theory of Soviet Federalism in the light of the new CPSU Programme' in *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo* (No. 5, 1963) by its chief editor, Lepeshkin. He emphasised that although Lenin and the Party considered federation to be a transitional stage, it had not yet outlived its usefulness in the Soviet Union. But he pointed plainly to the advantages which would be gained from an eventual merger of the Central Asian republics. The federal relations between the republics were changing and this was exemplified by the new joint Central Asian party and economic agencies created after the plenum of November 1962. Lepeshkin went on to suggest that the republics might eventually coordinate their efforts on the legislative and governmental planes too. In dealing with the question of frontiers he explained that, although these were originally of great importance as one of the guarantees of the nations being able to exercise their right to self-determination and free state development, they were now more and more losing their former significance.

During 1964 more articles appeared which combined reaffirmation of the intention to do away with all obstacles to the eventual abolition of national distinctions with attempts to gild the pill by emphasising the gradualness of the process. Lepeshkin's statement that Soviet federation was far from having exhausted its potentialities was twice repeated: by Tadevosyan in *Voprosy Filosofii* (No. 4, 1964) and by Mansvetov in *Voprosy Istorii* (No. 5, 1964). Probably the most significant of all the articles which appeared was one by Khakimov called 'Some Problems of the Development of National Soviet Statehood during the present period' in *Obshchestvennye Nauki v Uzbekistane* (No. 6, 1964). A full translation of this article appeared in *Central Asian Review* (No. 4, 1964), which commented that to non-Marxists it would appear 'to combine the homiletic drone of a sectarian religious tract with the drumming and repetitive insistence of a tribal dance', and added that it was 'hard to believe that it could bring reassurance or comfort to any but the most dedicated Uzbek Party members in whom was left no spark of national consciousness'. Khakimov dealt at length with the question of sovereignty. He argued that organically speaking the sovereignty of the USSR and of the Union Republics was one and the same thing, and he distinguished between sovereignty and 'competence'. This presumably meant that (a) since the unity of the sovereignty of the USSR and the Union Republics is based on an

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identity of interests, what the Party does in the interests of one is automatically in the best interests of the other, and (b) since the sovereignty of both the USSR and the republics is complete and unlimited by definition, any interference with the rights of the republics cannot be said to infringe their sovereignty, but only affects their powers.

WITHIN three months of the appearance of Khakimov's article Khrushchev had been removed from office, and by the middle of 1965 many of the decisions taken at the November 1962 plenum over which he had presided had evidently been rescinded. The only official pronouncement, and that a brief and inconspicuous one, was in respect of the abolition of the Central Asian Sovnarkhoz on 23 December 1964. Nothing specific has so far been said about the fate of the Central Asian Bureau of the Party and the three other joint Central Asian agencies set up at the same time. By the end of December, however, it was clear from the re-establishment of republican Ministries of Construction and the ' transfer to other work ' of the chairman of the Central Asian Construction Agency that this too had been abolished. It has since become obvious, both because they are no longer mentioned and because their chairmen and deputy chairmen have been identified in other posts, that the Central Asian Bureau itself as well as the directorate for Cotton Growing have also ceased to exist. The only body which may still be functioning is the Chief Directorate for irrigation and the construction of sovkhozes, whose chairman was last mentioned as its head in March 1965.

There seems little doubt that the creation of the Central Asian agencies was carried out on the personal initiative of Khrushchev and their abolition so soon after his fall from power could hardly have been a coincidence. It was probably felt that the consternation caused in the republics by the changes foreshadowed at the 22nd congress had been unnecessarily increased by Khrushchev's too precipitate action to put them into effect. This action may have been one of the causes of his downfall, or his downfall may have been thought a suitable occasion to reverse a decision which had been ' collectively ' approved at the time it was taken, but which was later seen to be a wrong one. In an article in *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* (No. 2, 1965), Grindin and Markin in a veiled but transparent reference to the Central Asian agencies wrote that, while the republics would come more and more to co-operate in the economic field, ' one cannot solve the new tasks of the economic drawing together of the republics by means of premature reorganisations, administrative measures, the setting up of inter-republican agencies which duplicate one another, or by the mechanical restoration of old organs which existed in these areas in the first years of socialist construction '.

Since the change in leadership care has been taken to affirm that the 1961 Party programme was drawn up ' collectively ' and there is, therefore, no question of the principles of *sblizheniye* and *sliyaniye* having been abandoned. Nevertheless, in addition to the annulment of

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at least some of the decisions taken to speed up their realisation, there has been a marked decrease in the amount of writing advocating 'internationalisation' of culture and the abolition of national distinctions. The present Party leaders are evidently aware that the achievement of these ends is a far tougher proposition than had previously been supposed. They also know that the days are over when the nationalities could be bulldozed into submission, and they are likely to approach any change in their status with the same caution which has characterised their attitude to other internal and external problems confronting the Soviet government. While the republics cannot be said to have gained a reprieve, their position as permanent political and economic realities has probably somewhat improved since 1961. Whatever the long-term ideal of the Party may still be, practical considerations may well constrain the Soviet government to condone, if not nationalism on the lines familiar elsewhere in Asia and in Africa, at least some form of regionalism in Central Asia based on the republics. Such an arrangement could conceivably contribute to rather than prejudice the welfare and security of the Soviet state as a whole.

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MODERN WARFARE AND SOVIET STRATEGY

Curt Gasteyger

IN few domains have the changes since Stalin's death been as great as in Soviet military doctrine. Basic Marxist-Leninist dogmas on war and its objectives went silently overboard or were gradually adjusted to the requirements of the nuclear age. Little could have shocked class-conscious communists more than the statement that 'the atomic bomb does not adhere to the class principle: it destroys everybody within range of its devastating force' (*Pravda*, 14 July 1963). What Stalin during his lifetime staunchly refused to accept had to be eventually accepted by his successors, namely, that weapons of mass destruction do not automatically grant victory to those who claim to be on the side of history. The reasoning behind Stalin's refusal to attribute decisive influence to nuclear weapons was mainly political; so long as the Soviet Union did not have such weapons of her own, her leaders could not admit that no defence against them was yet possible. Although he was clear-sighted enough to realise the enormous impact these weapons were going to have in almost every respect, he left it to his successors to bring them into the context of Soviet strategy and foreign policy. This turned out to be a more difficult task than Stalin's heirs may at first have assumed. They soon came to realise, however, that nuclear weapons could be used not only to increase national security and defence capabilities in wartime, but also as an instrument of political bargaining in times of peace. There was one essential condition attached to this: the possibility (if need be), to hit directly the United States itself. Recent statements in the Wennerstroem trial have confirmed that since 1949/50 (i.e. still under Stalin!), the Soviets were concerned to match American air power. 'It was immediately obvious [Wennerstroem stated] that the [Soviet] deterrent, to be effective, had to be able to reach the United States'. Also, he added, 'the effective force that the American strategic air force could apply against the Soviet Union had to be more or less balanced by the effective force the Soviet Union's strategic air power could bring to bear on America'.[1]

This objective was achieved in 1957 with the successful testing of a first intercontinental ballistic missile. It gave the Soviet leaders the sense of security they had been seeking for over ten years, and at the same time made them confident that, unless they seriously provoked the West, the danger of a world war or, in the Soviet view, of an American attack, had become slight. These views were reflected in two new doctrines: first, that world war is no longer 'fatally' inevitable and, second, that the victory of socialism in the USSR is 'final'.

1 *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 14 December 1964, pp. 22–23.

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Khrushchev's nuclear policy

There remained, however, the crucial question whether and, if so, to what extent this assumed superiority in the field of nuclear weapons and rockets could be used to promote Soviet interests abroad. This fundamental question of political strategy became a major issue in two bitter controversies. First between Malenkov and Khrushchev in 1953–55, then between Moscow and Peking some years later. In view of his country's increasing nuclear stockpile, Malenkov held that the Soviet Union was strong enough to deter the USA from any attack and therefore could afford to promote the hitherto neglected light industry. It was on this assumption that Malenkov made the famous statement he later had to revoke, namely, that a future world war would annihilate civilisation as a whole and not only the capitalist world. Oddly enough, Khrushchev and his followers used precisely the same argument against the 'warmongering' Chinese after having themselves bitterly criticised Malenkov for it. At that time (1955), however, although Khrushchev shared Malenkov's view on the unlikelihood of American aggression, he was much more pessimistic in his conclusions: in his mind the Soviet Union should not only be able to survive (or deter) an American attack but should herself have sufficient capabilities to retaliate. The better she was equipped with nuclear weapons and means of delivery, the less likely was an enemy's attack. Nuclear weapons were important not just and not only because of their deterring function, but also for their physical effects on the aggressor. Most of the military leaders, such as Zhukov, Sokolovsky, and Rotmistrov shared Khrushchev's view, and one year after Malenkov's dismissal, at the twentieth Party Congress, Stalin's basically defensive doctrine of 'active defence' was replaced by the more dynamic doctrine of 'massive nuclear retaliation'. The main purpose of this far-reaching decision was twofold: to increase the deterring effect of Soviet defence, and by threatening with nuclear retaliation under all circumstances, to regain the political manoeuvrability which for several years had been impaired by American nuclear superiority.

Khrushchev's speech of 14 January 1960 (*Pravda*, 15 January) before the Supreme Soviet probably presents most clearly his assessment of Soviet military requirements in the nuclear-missile age. He touched upon all or almost all major problems of modern war, describing its main features and stressing the importance of its initial phase. Above all, he left no doubt that henceforth nuclear weapons would be given priority over conventional forces. Anticipating a short war in which strategic missiles would achieve all important military objectives, he then proposed to cut the ground forces by one-third (from around 3·6 to 2·4 million). This, he said, meant no loss of combat capability since nuclear firepower would replace conventional manpower.

Khrushchev's almost unlimited confidence in the might of nuclear weapons did not come out of the blue. It was based on the astonishing

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achievements in Soviet rocket technology which now gave the Soviet leaders (rather wrongly, as it turned out later), the comforting feeling of military superiority over the West. It was this which encouraged Khrushchev to exert increasing pressure on the West in critical areas such as Berlin and Cuba. His various actions of that time faithfully reflected his conviction of the political power of such weapons. The failure in Cuba and Berlin, pressing economic difficulties, the mounting tensions in the Sino-Soviet dispute, and the disunity in the communist world, forced the Kremlin to reappraise Soviet capabilities as well as those of the Western Alliance. The result was the recognition of the definite limits of any military bargaining power in times of a nuclear stalemate. It is on this more realistic evaluation that Soviet policy and strategy at present rests.

Permanent strategic factors

Soviet strategy is shaped by the particular characteristics of the country's geographical and political environment, its historical traditions, and its economic potential. Both Soviet and Russian strategy 'has always been dominated by the need to preserve the security of the Russian State in a world which, seen from Moscow, is divided into three or four major land masses, and a number of similar areas which can be dominated by land power'.[2] Militarily speaking, Tsarist Russia as well as the Soviet Union have always acted as a land power drawing its main strength from a huge land army. Since the defeat of its major continental opponent, Germany, in 1945, the prime factor in Soviet strategy has been to preserve a superiority of armed forces in Europe. Their size and deployment was adjusted and eventually subordinated to the emerging nuclear forces, but it is nevertheless striking that the basic Soviet strategy towards Europe, i.e., maintaining a superiority of both conventional and nuclear forces, has remained unchanged.[3]

The third characteristic feature has to be seen in connection with these two elements, land power and large ground forces. As a main source of power, they explain why Soviet strategy has been guided by the principle that the Soviet Union must not expose her military establishments to the risk of destruction or capture beyond the reach of the main bulk of the Soviet Army, and must not be formally committed to the defence of an area which is not vital to the survival of the Soviet state.[4] The stationing of Soviet medium range missiles on Cuba was the first

2 Malcolm Mackintosh, 'Soviet Strategic Postures', in *Survival* (London), No. 3, 1962, p. 116.

3 Cf. Philip Windsor, 'Western Europe in Soviet Strategy', Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Papers, No. 8, January 1964.

4 Cf. Malcolm Mackintosh, 'Soviet Motives in Cuba', in *Survival*, No. 1, 1963, p. 16. Mackintosh recalls a Soviet move illustrating this cautious strategy: during the Suez crisis in 1956 the Soviets withdrew their most modern military equipment from Egypt when it was in danger of becoming involved in hostilities: the force of Ilyushin-28 jet bombers supplied by the Soviet Union was flown out of the country at the moment of the British and French attack when the Egyptians needed them most.

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departure from this basic rule; had it succeeded it might have fundamentally changed Soviet strategic outlook and military doctrine (apart from many other things). Since it failed it may well have served as a serious warning to the Soviet leaders not to relinquish easily long-tested rules of general strategy.

Another element in Soviet strategy—secrecy—is slowly losing its value as space technology and instruments for high altitude detection improve. Secrecy, in contrast to the 'open society', was, indeed, always regarded by Russian leaders as a precious asset; Khrushchev himself repeatedly referred to its military importance when rejecting measures for arms control. These almost elementary and stable factors of Soviet strategy may partially explain why, in spite of many changes, it has preserved a certain consistency which properly reflects that of Soviet policy as such.

Major problems

Soviet military doctrine has long ceased to display the 'monolithic unity' it appeared to have under Stalin. This is not to say that there is not a wide area of consensus left on basic issues; but dissensions have become increasingly apparent in recent years. It is now openly or implicitly admitted that some problems cannot be solved by the often arbitrary dictum of a single party leader out of touch with 'daily realities': with the appearance of modern weapons, Marshal Malinovsky recently said, clearly referring to Khrushchev, 'a subjective approach to military problems, hare-brained schemes and superficiality can cost us very dear and can do irreparable damage'.

Three main trends of opinion may be distinguished in present Soviet military debate. First, there are those who have tended to be more or less in sympathy with Khrushchev's views, arguing for a more radical adaptation of military affairs to the new technological environment and suggesting that this approach might lighten the strain on resources (so-called 'modernists'). Second, there are those who argue against discarding tried and tested concepts merely for the sake of adopting something new, and against over-reliance on nuclear weapons and missiles, while nevertheless recognising the impact of technology on military affairs (these are the 'traditionalists'). Finally, a centrist group stands somewhere in between these two, trying to reconcile or moderate their views. Their differences of opinion centre largely on the following questions: the character, duration, and conduct of future wars; the proper relationship between conventional mass armies and nuclear strategic forces, and the nature and capabilities of defence (including civil defence). The distinction made by Khrushchev between the three kinds of war (general, local, and national-liberation war) is not—or not yet—seriously disputed. Equally, there seems to be a large measure of agreement among Soviet strategists about the character of a general nuclear war. They agree that it would be a 'total war', affecting both

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military and civil targets (cities and industrial areas), a war in which nuclear rocket forces on land, sea, and in the air would have a decisive influence but which would be fought with combined forces, nuclear and conventional, a war of coalitions, highly destructive for both sides without distinction between the front and hinterland and for the first time directly involving American territory. Soviet strategists are unanimous about the decisive importance of the initial phase of such a war because of the massive use of strategic missiles (now supplemented by missile-firing submarines) by both sides. Khrushchev was the first to point out that such a nuclear exchange would take place 'not only in the first days but even in the first minutes of the war', determining its subsequent course and outcome.

At this point the doubts and dissensions begin, since it is a matter of conjecture whether such a war will be short or protracted, in other words, whether there will be a second more extended phase of warfare or not. Much if not all depends on the answer to this question. It concerns, in the first instance, the size of the conventional forces which would have to come in at this second stage. Khrushchev obviously believed in the decisiveness of the first phase, whereas his own defence minister, Malinovsky, more cautiously stressed that in spite of the primacy of nuclear forces, armies of millions would be required for victory in any future war, long or short. Malinovsky was not alone in this view; it was supported by the formerly 'modernist' Marshal Rotmistrov. Equally, the second edition of Sokolovsky's book on military strategy (Moscow, 1963) lays a slightly greater emphasis than the first on the importance of mass armies, which seems to reflect more or less the views of the Soviet leaders. An article in *Red Star* (18 March 1964) supports a compromise solution by stating that the task of the Soviet armed forces is to be prepared for both rapid and protracted general war. Here again no answer is given as to the precise role of the ground forces in such a war. This lack of doctrinal precision clearly indicates that in the present debate there are more than purely military considerations involved. First, it shows a growing awareness of the need to establish organisational tools for integrating the ground forces into overall strategic planning. This is emphasised by the reported abolition of the Ground Forces Command as a separate institution and its integration into the High Command—a measure which seems to be adequately described by their former Chief, Colonel-General Shtemenko, in an article bearing the symbolic title 'The Queen of the Battlefield Gives Up Her Crown'.

This rather defeatist 'surrender' could not remain unchallenged for long. In a surprisingly frank speech on the twentieth anniversary of VE day, Marshal Rotmistrov criticised such views as one-sided, but admitted that there were unsettled disagreements in Soviet military circles about the size and role of the ground forces. At about the same time the new Chief of Staff, Marshal Zakharov, stressed the

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need for basing military decisions and actions much more on 'scientific considerations', so implicitly rejecting Khrushchev's 'subjective approach to military problems'.[5] This refers to the second and most important point in this context: the pending decision on the proper relation between politico-economic considerations and military requirements. The new Soviet leaders have shown their willingness to take greater account of professional military and scientific opinion; they have made it clear, however, that in view of the unsolved problem of economic resource allocation there is more at stake than military doctrine, let alone the competition between the different branches of the armed forces. They are faced with the same dilemma as other nuclear powers—perhaps with the paradoxical exception of underdeveloped China—how to maintain large conventional armies given the high cost of the nuclear arms race. The recent decision of the Soviet Government to reduce from three years to one year the term of compulsory service in the armed forces for young men with higher education, and to cut the defence budget for 1965 by another £200 million, while stressing at the same time the need for greater mobility and efficiency of the ground forces (as did Marshal Sokolovsky in his press interview in February), suggests that the present leaders are trying to find a viable compromise between the pledge for still sufficiently strong conventional forces on the one side and the need for faster economic progress on the other.

Three new developments could make this dilemma even greater and reinforce the arguments of the traditionalists: first, the completion of the 'hardening' of the long-range missile launching sites (i.e. making them less vulnerable to enemy attack); second, further progress in anti-missile defence (mainly by developing an anti-ballistic-missile system, ABM); and third, a possible shift from Khrushchev's strategy of massive retaliation to a more flexible one. It is evident that the first two developments are intended to increase the ability of a country's retaliatory forces to survive and thus make the continuation of war after the nuclear exchange more likely. In such a case—as in the case of a 'flexible' or 'graduated' response on all levels—conventional forces might regain the importance they were about to lose if the strategy of both sides had reduced future warfare to a mutually annihilating nuclear exchange.

The hardening of missile bases and the development of an effective ABM-system will both make a country less vulnerable and reduce the danger of a surprise attack. In fact, Soviet authors seem to be increasingly confident that early warning systems, hardening of retaliatory forces, and the greater mobility of strategic weapons do limit the chances of successful surprise attack: 'The element of surprise, rather important in past wars, now has a different character. Even such weapons as

[5] Shtemenko in *Nedelya*, No. 6, 1965; Zakharov in *Krasnaia Zvezda*, 23 February 1965.

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instant-action rockets, launched at any time of day or night and in any weather, can be detected in the first section of their flight path'.[6]

While accusing the Americans of preparing a surprise attack, the Soviets flatly deny that they are themselves thinking of a pre-emptive strike. There are, however, hints in a number of publications (such as the second edition of the Sokolovsky book) that Soviet doctrine does not exclude the possibility of pre-emption. It is also pointed out here that modern means of detection now make it possible to launch a counter-attack even before the enemy's weapons reach Soviet territory, and the Russians once again stress the importance of civil defence measures: 'At the present time', Marshal Chuikov, the head of Soviet civil defence, declared recently, 'the task of paramount state importance in the course of a war would be to preserve the population, the main productive force, and also the stability and viability of the economy'. Therefore 'civil defence has been organised in the Soviet Union on a countrywide, national basis'.[7] This statement contains more wishful thinking than a realistic assessment of the present insufficient state of nuclear shelters in the country. It shows, however, as does the vast civil defence training programme launched in 1965, that the Soviets are now paying rather more attention to this branch of national defence.

Limited wars and flexible response

Soviet military doctrine does not generally recognise the possibility of limited or local wars. It does not draw a clear distinction either between 'local' (geographically limited) war and 'limited' (with regard to the kind of weapons used) war. There are, however, signs that this attitude is undergoing some modification. Soviet authors still maintain, rightly so it seems, that the concept of limited war contains many contradictions and that the danger of its escalation into global war remains very high. Some of them admit that not all local conflicts would inevitably expand into a nuclear war, and others stress the need to prepare for both kinds, conventional-limited and nuclear-global wars. This suggests a desire to see the 'escalation threshold' raised, in order to provide greater flexibility for local use of military power below the nuclear level. The Russians also seem to have realised that the credibility of this all-out retaliation, even in cases of minor conflicts, has been substantially weakened in recent years, especially by their own statements about the destructiveness of nuclear weapons.

Recent developments seem to confirm this tendency, indicating, though still tentatively, the adoption of a more qualified attitude towards the American strategy of flexible (or graduated) response. This strategy, initiated under the Kennedy Administration and intended to replace that of 'massive retaliation', had hitherto been flatly rejected by the Soviets on the ground that it was designed solely to make nuclear wars

[6] *International Affairs* (Moscow), November 1963, p. 32.
[7] *Soviet News* (London), 19 March 1965.

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more 'acceptable'. Recently the hints of a possible change have been strengthened by mounting criticism of Khrushchev's contribution to Soviet strategy. The first hint was indirect: in an article by Marshal Rotmistrov, West Germany was accused of trying to force the United States 'to revise its views on the use of nuclear weapons, and to consider only a single variant of war with the use of nuclear weapons only'. He went on to say that German strategy would therefore 'exclude the possibility of waging war without the use of nuclear weapons in the event of any conflict, with all the consequences following therefrom', implying that US strategy of a 'nuclear pause' was accepted as more reasonable by the Soviets. As the meeting of the Warsaw Pact in January 1965 also condemned this German attitude, it seems likely that the Russians are prepared to consider the possibility of waging war without the use of nuclear weapons—at least in its first stage. Such a major change, if it does take place, would have far-reaching repercussions on the many fields of Soviet strategy discussed above, and almost certainly on Russia's allies. Their confidence in unconditional Soviet nuclear protection may well be clouded by the same shadow of doubt which fell on the West European countries when Mr McNamara announced his country's espousal of a graduated strategy: would a conflict in Europe be important enough to invoke the intervention of either of the two great Powers?

The East European countries, and particularly East Germany, are entitled to have at least as many doubts about the positive answer to this question as have their Western counterparts. Past experience has taught them that major changes in Soviet strategy have always been motivated by national interests rather than their own. These were expected to coincide with those of the Soviet Union. In fact, the Soviet assurance to protect its allies by way of automatic massive retaliation even in minor conflicts created a community of interests which, in theory, could hardly be closer. But was it credible—not only to the West but also to those who were asked to rely entirely on this Soviet nuclear shield? In military terms the European People's Democracies are doubly linked with the Soviet Union: In addition to the multilateral Warsaw Pact, all of them (with the notable exception of Albania) have concluded with the Soviet Union a bilateral treaty of friendship and mutual assistance. The same is true for China and North Korea. Together with the Warsaw Pact, these agreements form a closely knit though unbalanced system of defence in Eastern Europe. Its backbone has always been the overwhelming military superiority of the Soviet Union, which did not fail to present it to its allies as making any independent defence unnecessary. By maintaining its nuclear monopoly, Russia remains in a position to control their defence policy. Apart from the obvious political advantages, such a concentration of responsibilities in one hand makes the command and control of strategic weapons incomparably easier and, in case of war, more flexible.

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The first to oppose Moscow's military hegemony were the Chinese. Not only had they to pay a political price for Soviet protection, but they also came to realise their military weakness whenever they wanted to pursue a foreign policy not necessarily in strict conformity with Soviet interests. As the tension with Moscow rose, the Chinese began to insist that 'in fighting imperialist aggression each socialist country had to rely in the first place on its own defence capability'.[8] The Soviets countered this 'chauvinistic' argument on several scores.[9] They pointed out that China, in its present state of development, was not yet ready to produce nuclear arms in quantity, and they belittled the military significance of any nuclear weapons China might acquire. It may well be that Khrushchev himself underestimated the economic and scientific capacity of China to produce within the foreseeable future nuclear weapons of her own. This may explain why he eventually yielded to growing Chinese pressure when he signed the 1957 agreement on Soviet technological assistance for Chinese national defence 'providing the Chinese with a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture'.[10] This agreement was cancelled by Moscow only two years later, when the Soviet leaders realised that China had irrevocably committed itself to becoming a nuclear power in its own right and was determined to make use of it with or without Soviet agreement. It was of little help when Moscow made it clear to Peking that 'the attempt of any socialist country to rely on its own force in insuring its defences can prove to be a fatal mistake in the age of nuclear arms'. This statement was followed by the patronising advice from Moscow that China would do better to devote its efforts to the development of its national economy, science, technology, and agriculture, implying that the Soviet Union on its side would take care of the defence of the entire bloc.

Apart from the offensive undertone in this advice, it was precisely the Soviet claims for the effectiveness and reliability of the Soviet defence guarantee that the Chinese were increasingly sceptical about. For them Moscow's refusal to support their actions during the Quemoy crisis in 1958 and again in the Sino-Indian border dispute in 1962 was not only a reminder of their relative military weakness, but also a proof that Russia was not prepared to give the necessary military backing to its allies when it did not suit its own national interests.

Khrushchev's adventure in Cuba provided the Chinese with the major example of Soviet failure to come promptly and unconditionally to the rescue of an ally. When the Soviet Union tried to station medium-range missiles on Cuba, the Chinese concluded that the Soviets themselves did not believe that intercontinental missiles stationed on Soviet territory were sufficiently credible as protection to deter any potential

[8] *Peking Review*, No. 33/1963, p. 14.
[9] Cf. an interesting analysis of this dispute: A. Langley Hsieh, 'Sino-Soviet Nuclear Dialogue', *Survival*, No. 5/1964.
[10] *Peking Review*, No. 33/1963.

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American attack. And when, under American pressure, the missiles were withdrawn from Cuba, the Chinese concluded that such a Soviet guarantee could not be relied on when it was most needed. The Chinese minister of defence asked: 'What is the Soviet assurance worth? This sort of promise is easy to make, but worthless'. And he added: 'No outsiders can give us protection, in fact, because they always attach conditions and want to control us'. It was easy to recall that Marshal Malinovsky in January 1962 warned everybody who wanted to listen that Soviet strength would defend 'those socialist states friendly to us'.[11]

As to the sharing of nuclear power within the communist bloc, the Soviet Government stated on 21 August 1963 that it had tried more than once to convince China that prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons was in the interest of all socialist states, including China. To justify its nuclear monopoly in the communist camp on the one side, and to prevent a further spread of nuclear weapons (especially to West Germany), Moscow argued that its own nuclear potential was sufficiently strong to protect the 'socialist community'. The addition of one or more socialist countries to the nuclear club would make no material change in its defence potential, all the more so since (in the Soviet view) these states would be unable to acquire more than a small nuclear capability. Basically, the East European countries have accepted this Soviet proposition, presenting it as some kind of socialist 'division of labour', as one East German officer euphemistically called it.[12]

It is a matter of conjecture how long this state of affairs will remain unchanged. While the creation of some 'Atlantic Nuclear Force' may not be enough to persuade Moscow to set up more than a sham counter-organisation in Eastern Europe, the further spread of nuclear weapons outside the communist camp might well create additional dilemmas for the Soviet Union. The present trend in Soviet doctrine to replace Khrushchev's strategy by a more flexible one, is likely to raise the question in some of the Warsaw Pact countries (especially in East Germany) whether the hitherto lopsided defence alliance should not be reorganised on a more equal footing involving a nuclear sharing with the Soviet Union. Ulbricht's desire for better and safer Soviet defence guarantees was given some satisfaction by the belated conclusion of a bilateral defence agreement in 1964, and, equally important, by the equipment of the East German Army with a considerable range of tactical nuclear weapons under some kind of double-key control, shared with the Soviet Union.

In any case, recent developments in Soviet strategy can be taken as a sign that the Soviet Union has come to a point where it has to face, within its alliance, some of the same problems that the United States has been struggling with in NATO for many years. This, it seems, is the inescapable burden of a great power in the nuclear age.

11 *TASS*, 24 January 1962 (quoted in *Survival*, No. 3/1964, p. 119).
12 Oberst Wolfgang Schiel, *Militärische Probleme des 20. Parteitages der KPdSU* (Deutscher Militärverlag, East Berlin).

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THE LEGAL SCENE

Proceduralists and Paternalists

A. J. C. Campbell

LAW and, more particularly, criminal procedural law, is not perhaps a Soviet field of activity where one would expect to find sharp, persistent, and basic debate between various schools of thought. The names of the leading lights among Soviet legal theorists are little known outside their own orbit and many of the issues on which they advance to do battle appear somewhat arcane. Nor, for that matter, unlike some Soviet litterateurs, do they seek the limelight for its own sake. Nevertheless the continuing debate over procedure in the field of criminal law is of some importance. Not only does it show the extent of the touchlines between which play is permissible, but it also brings to light the way in which, from the point of view of the onlooker, although at any one given moment there are two discernible sides, their composition is subject to infinite variation. The encounter as a whole therefore seems to be more of a melee than a match.

The admission of a perceptible measure of debate goes back no further than 1954. Before that Soviet lawyers, in common with other sections of the intelligentsia, stoically endured the various phases of the Stalin era during which there was virtually no opportunity for debate and when, in the period 1936–39 and to some extent the post-war years, any resemblance between the workings of the law and the operations of the punitive organs was purely haphazard. In such circumstances it was hardly to be expected of Soviet theorists that they should venture to examine subjects such as the procedural guarantees of the rights of the accused, incriminational trends on the part of the investigators, and so forth. As has been mildly said:

> Of course, such a state of affairs when disagreement with the point of view of A. Y. Vyshinsky was regarded as a departure from Marxism-Leninism, as a 'heresy', did not contribute to creative discussion, all the more so in that individual lapses in the field of theory or in practical activity were readily designated in the conditions of the sharpening of the class struggle under socialism as sabotage.[1]

The first sign that law was to come again into its own was the cutting down to size of the extra-legal apparatus: the MVD lost its Special Conference in September 1953; the forced labour camps started to shed some of their inmates in the same year, and the pace quickened with the amnesties of the following year; the process of bringing the MGB/MVD to heel got off to an overdue start in about June 1953. On

1 *Sorok Let Sovetskogo Prava, 1917–1957*, vol. 2, ed. M. D. Shargorodsky (Leningrad, 1957), p. 590.

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a more positive plane, Soviet legal theorists were given a series of permissive nudges, ranging from a leading article in the party journal *Kommunist* in May 1954, to the concerted barrage trained on Vyshinsky's teachings soon after the twentieth CPSU congress. By 1956 even the USSR Prosecutor General was emboldened to call for wider publication of derivative acts and easier access to statistical data.[2]

AT first the response to these developments was hesitant and restrained. Though the books on law and the articles in the legal journals were ready enough to echo the denunciation of Vyshinsky and to approve *ex post facto* the repeal of the laws and tribunals associated with the inter-war purges, it was a little while before they carried it further. To this there were some notable exceptions: one such was the Leningrad study published in 1957, *Forty Years of Socialist Law*, which among other things spelt out in black and white the irregularities, anomalies and obsolete norms accumulated as a result of the failure to attend to the codification of criminal law or criminal procedural law between 1930 and 1955 (an omission likewise true of all other fields of law); they included: (a) failure to repeal or amend old acts when issuing new ones; (b) the annulling or amending of previous acts in an insufficiently specific form; (c) the introduction by non-normative acts of amendments to normative ones; (d) the inclusion of long-term general rulings into fixed-term orders or acts; (e) contradictions arising from the failure to coordinate the contents and drafting of acts concerning one and the same subject; (f) complex, diffuse formulation of acts; (g) the plugging of gaps in criminal law by USSR Supreme Court rulings and by current court practice.[3]

In this post-1957 period two overlapping processes were at work; on the one hand, the institutional leeway in terms of codes, statistics, textbooks, and procedural clarification, was being made up; on the other, a new trend towards the substitution of communal sanctions for judicial process was being launched, with the evident approval of the party authorities. The landmarks of the first were the All-Union enactments of December 1958, which included new All-Union Basic Principles of Criminal Law and of Criminal Procedural Law; and after that the derivative Republican Codes of Criminal Law (brought out seriatim in the period May 1959-December 1961) and of Criminal Procedural Law. The landmarks of the second were the institution in 1958 of the unpaid, voluntary guardians of public law and order or druzhinniki, as they later came to be known; the breathing of new life into the comrades' courts (which had existed on and off ever since 1919), and the regularisation in mid-1961 of their status, scope, and functions; and the widespread reintroduction of collective probation (peredacha na poruki) which had also fallen into disuse, as well as of other forms of public participation in the discharge of justice ('communal defenders' and

[2] *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, No. 3, 1956, p. 20.
[3] *Sorok Let*, pp. 50–51, 499.

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'communal prosecutors', commissions for the protection of socialist legality, street committees and councils of elders, etc.).

These two trends, which might be called, respectively, the proceduralist and the paternalist, were not, of course, necessarily mutually exclusive nor, for that matter, mutually inimical. The effective resuscitation of communal probation dates from the December 1958 enactments, in addition to which it has also been the subject of numerous decrees of the USSR Supreme Court. Nevertheless, they definitely tend to pursue divergent lines: to take but one specific point, the comrades' courts can deal with actionable offences without being bound by standard judicial procedure. Where the proceduralist argues in terms of procedural rights and sanctions, the paternalist has in mind a 'moral boycott'; it has, for example, been said of the former by an exponent of the latter viewpoint:

> There exists the view that the practice of settling criminal cases by public action tends to widen the scope of criminal law. In this connection it was proposed to supplement the Criminal Code with a section setting out the norms which regulate in detail the settlement of criminal cases by public procedure. It was, for example, proposed that the comrades' courts should be converted into special first instance courts with their verdicts being subject to cassation appeal to the people's courts. Here we are dealing with an attempt to expand the sphere of law at the expense of the relations regulating norms of moral conduct. At the base of this attempt lies the conviction that the siting in the field of law of public forms of applying pressure to offenders will impart to these norms those features of stability that characterise jurisdiction and with which the high authority and immutability of legal decisions are usually associated, and confer greater guarantees of the rights of the individual.[4]

SINCE 1957 there have been at least three identifiable subjects of current importance on which Soviet lawyers have given the public a sustained sight of their debates. These were: the intermittent debate of 1957–61 over the so-called parasite laws; the skirmishing prior to the adoption of the All-Union enactments of December 1958; and the discussion by RSFSR lawyers and others of the RSFSR Draft Criminal Code.

Of these three discussions, the most intensive was undoubtedly that over the adoption of the law against 'anti-social parasitic elements'. These laws, directed at petty speculators and idlers (including initially collective farmers who failed to work their allocated number of working days), established procedures running directly counter to the principle enunciated in the Basic Principles of Criminal Judicial Procedure of December 1958, that 'No-one may be pronounced guilty of the commission of a crime and subjected to criminal punishment other than by sentence of the court.'

[4] Galkin, B. A., *Sovetski Ugolovno-Protsessualny Zakon* (Moscow, 1962), pp. 250–51.

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The procedures as enacted in 1957–59, though varying in minor details from republic to republic, provided for various public organisations, including residential committees, to initiate action against 'parasites'; sentence of from two to five years exile with compulsory labour could be passed by a public meeting of not fewer than 100 persons in urban areas and of the majority of residents in small villages, subject only to confirmation by the Executive Committee of the corresponding local Soviet; the accused had to be summoned to be present but could be condemned *in absentia*. Within a period of six months (February-August 1957) draft laws to this effect were published in fourteen of the fifteen Union Republics, the Ukraine following suit in May 1958. Thereafter, unlike the other republics (an honourable exception being made for the Ukraine), the RSFSR refrained from enacting its own draft law until May 1961, which it then did in a perceptibly amended form. This gave the other Union Republics the opportunity to amend accordingly, and with some promptitude, the more drastic versions which they had themselves enacted at varying dates from February 1958 onwards. It was evident that this rearguard action was the result of a considerable volume of informed protest in the RSFSR.[5] The amendments, though not extensive, did provide that the action could be initiated not only by the collective of factories, farms, etc., but also by the local people's courts. Other features, such as the offender having no right to defence counsel, remain.

The second occasion for which there is chapter and verse, was the review of the draft Basic Principles of Criminal Judicial Procedure by the thirteen-man sub-committee set up by the Legislative Proposals Commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet in April 1958, consisting of S. A. Golunsky (Chairman), B. A. Galkin (Deputy Chairman), S. V. Borodin, S. L. Zivs, N. Ya. Kalashnikova, T. V. Malkevich, G. N. Novikov, I. D. Perlov, V. P. Radkov, L. N. Smirnov, V. N. Sukhodrev, M. A. Cheltsov, and M. P. Shalamov. The composition of the sub-committee implies an imbalance against the proceduralists which is reflected in the account given by Evteyev and Saratovskikh.[6] Among the proposals considered by the sub-commission, they list *inter alia*:

(a) admission of defence counsel from the moment of the preferment of charges: proposed by Strogovich, Kaminskaya, and Semenkov; rejected;

(b) specific inclusion of the presumption of innocence (as in the draft Criminal Procedural Code wording); proposed by Strogovich and Rakhunov—opposed by Karev, Zgurskaya and Cheltsov; rejected.

It is, perhaps, a tribute to the resilience of the proceduralists that in the same volume, both Golunsky and Cheltsov should find it necessary

[5] e.g. by the deputy chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Court (*Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 12 October 1957). After 1961 the proceduralists had to be content with pointing out the practical pitfalls, while seeming to concede the principle.

[6] *Voprosy Sudoproizvodstva i Sudostroistva v Novom Zakonodatelstve Soyuza SSR*, ed. S. A. Golunsky (Moscow, 1959), pp. 437–73.

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to contribute their own condemnation of the partisans of the inclusion of the 'presumption of innocence' clause, the latter of the two commenting:

> Unfortunately, even after the adoption of the Basic Principles of Criminal Judicial Proceedings, certain supporters of the presumption of innocence strive to demonstrate its presence in Soviet criminal procedural law, citing in this matter various clauses of the Basic Principles in which they discern various aspects of this presumption.[7]

THE third glimpse of the continuing debate was afforded by a conference on the subject of the then recently adopted RSFSR Criminal and Criminal Procedural Codes and the Law on the Judiciary held by the All-Union Institute of Judicial Science in Moscow on 29–30 November 1960, a shortened version of the proceedings of which was published in mid-1961.[8] The conference was attended by everyone who was anyone in the field of law and justice, and provided interesting proof both of the degree of sophistication of RSFSR legal thought and also of the location of points of divergence. On this occasion, as on others, the customary mutual reproaches were exchanged between the 'theorists' and the 'practical workers' (i.e. judges, prosecutors, investigators, and militia) of being 'divorced from practice' and 'divorced from theory' respectively. More significantly, the Deputy Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Court criticised the desire of 'certain comrades' to tinker with the recently adopted Criminal and Criminal Procedure Codes. Another practical jurist, this time from the Office of the USSR Prosecutor General, appealed for a cessation of the discussion on the much debated theme of 'material truth' and for the formulation by the appropriate scientific bodies of a precise system of principles of criminal proceedings, adding, 'I want to emphasise that we are not against debate in science as a whole but formalist debates ruin science.'[9] It was in any case apparent—to judge from the reports and concluding speeches of two of the main 'theorists,' Nikiforov and Perlov—that it was not the proceduralists who were advocating a moratorium on further re-drafting.

To judge from the comments on it, there must have been more recently a far more controversial symposium held in Leningrad—latterly the source of franker analyses and less inhibited legal theorists—in May 1963. To quote *Soviet State and Law* for January 1964:

> However, basic shortcomings and sometimes manifest irresponsibility still occur in the preparation and holding of discussions and conferences. An instance of this was the irresponsible attitude taken by its organisers to the holding of the scientific conference in

[7] Ibid. footnote to p. 70. See also V. Z. Lukashevich, *Garantii Prav Obvinyaemogo v Sovetskom Ugolovnom Protsesse* (Leningrad, 1959), p. 43; *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, No. 7, 1959, p. 80; *Kommunist*, No. 14, 1959, p. 120–22.

[8] *Novoe Ugolovnoe Zakonodatelstvo RSFSR—Materialy Nauchnoi Sessii* (Moscow, 1961).

[9] Ibid. p. 165.

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> Leningrad in May 1963 on the topic of criminal law in the period of the intensified construction of communism. The subject-matter for the papers to be read at the conference, which was in effect of an All-Union nature, was considered in a hole-and-corner way without suitable consultation of specialists. Certain papers did not even follow any set lines. The agenda for the conference was overloaded with a large number of papers and other communications (over 40) on the most varied aspects of criminal law, both topical and trivial. Thus, broad-based discussion of the questions raised was excluded. As is known, M. D. Shargorodsky's paper on so important a subject as 'The CPSU Programme and Questions of Criminal Law' contained gross theoretical and political errors. The serious organisational shortcomings and the theoretical and political errors which took place in the work of the conference testify to the backward state of certain sectors of Soviet legal science, to the lack of attention paid to questions of ideological-educational work among legal scholars, and to the incorrect understanding on the part of certain experts in law of the principle of partymindedness in science.

Apart from one magisterial rebuke in *Izvestiya* (22 January 1964) from the Deputy Prosecutor General of the USSR, there appears to have been only one other major reference to this conference of May 1963, of which the proceedings never became publicly available nor even the names of the *rapporteurs* known, other than Shargorodsky. It is, however, highly probable that the unnamed target of the gentler rebukes to 'certain scientific workers' in an unsigned leader in the November 1963 issue of *Kommunist* may also have been the Leningrad speakers. Though the nature of the 'political errors' was left unspecified, there were tell-tale asides in the above articles to 'dogmatism and scholasticism', to 'incorrectly appraising the state of bourgeois law', to 'errors on the subject of the means of liquidating crime in our country', to 'the superficial similarity of certain institutes' of bourgeois and Soviet law, and to the undesirability of Soviet lawyers remaining passive listeners 'when attempts are made to propagate odd ideas about the apolitical nature of science and the special role of scientists, who stand outside politics'. The tone of the *Soviet State and Law* comment on this was, indeed, almost reminiscent of the practice of earlier days of affixing cautionary labels to those who expressed views contrary to the received legal doctrine.

It was, in fact, the organ of the USSR Prosecutor's Office which had provided in its issue for November 1963 the first and last circumstantial attack on the Leningrad conference. This issue carried a leading article, which commented on it as follows:

> However, of late certain legal scholars have been giving an incorrect, one-sided picture of the role of legal science in relation to the legislative activity of our State. They see this role as consisting in criticising individual statutes, including those which have only recently been adopted. This was what in fact came out above all else at the Leningrad scientific conference. The *rapporteur* on the

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basic topic, Professor Shargorodsky, could find nothing more important to say in pursuit of his theme than to subject to totally unfounded and unmotivated criticism the recently adopted edict of the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet on intensifying liability for feeding bread grain to cattle—an edict which was dictated by actual experience and warmly approved by the entire Soviet public.

One may ask what sort of contribution the learned specialist can make towards instilling in citizens respect for the law and strict compliance with it if he himself treats it so disdainfully?

This sort of attitude to laws about to be adopted and other legislative acts was observable not so long ago in a number of other cases. It is well-known, for example, that after the adoption in 1958 of the Basic Principles of criminal judicial procedure, which rejected the proposals put forward by certain scholars, some research workers continued the dispute instead of actually assisting in the implementation of this legislative act. The continuation of the dispute even after the adoption of the law diverted the attention of scholars from the task of affording practical help in solving genuinely important questions concerning the implementation of this and many other legislative acts in the field of criminal procedure. . . .

The development of science and practice is possible only in close collaboration, in unity and reciprocal enrichment. One would have thought this clear enough to require no special comment. However, in his paper on the problems of criminal law at this same conference in Leningrad, Professor Shargorodsky stated that science could only be regarded as science when it said 'no' to practice. This was to proclaim a totally non-Marxist thesis, which counter-posed science to life and to practice. . . .

One of the theses of Professor Shargorodsky's paper at the Leningrad conference was devoted to the tasks of the Soviet science of criminal law in the struggle against bourgeois ideology. But in his presentation of it, this struggle takes on a completely distorted aspect. The whole of this thesis in his paper was devoted in essence to arguing about certain progressive elements in the bourgeois science of criminal law and about the need for using the institutes of bourgeois law in our law. He roundly asserted that although new methods of fighting crime in capitalist countries were in fact directed towards protecting capitalist exploitation, nevertheless 'one should not for a second forget that tremendous scientific progress was in fact embodied in them' and that we should utilise and were utilising certain of these methods in combating crime (conditional sentences, release on probation, a specialised system in places of confinement, special measures in relation to juveniles and those not responsible for their actions, and so forth). . . .

Apart from the fact that these attempts to carry over the institutes of bourgeois law into our law are ideologically heinous, they are harmful in that they induce scholars to think in terms of using one or other kind of ready-made legislative phenomena, institutes or formulas of bourgeois law, instead of discovering and developing new legislative institutes deriving from our Soviet

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> socialist legal system, and thus contributing to its reinforcement and development (*Sotsialisticheskaya Zakonnost*, November 1963).

It is not entirely surprising that since early 1964 there has been a distinct falling-off in the volume of theoretical controversy aired in legal publications, at least so far as criminal law is concerned.

IF the proceduralists have registered only minor successes since 1958, it has not been for want of vigour or eloquence. As Bovin, one of the most forceful advocates of procedural guarantees wrote (*Izvestiya*, 9 February 1962):

> Any underestimation of procedural norms is anti-democratic *per se*. It forces judicial practice backward to the times of arbitrary rule and illegality, and contradicts the course set by the party towards strengthening legality and the legal system.

At the same time it must be acknowledged that the changes they urge are not in all cases readily reconcilable with the Marxist expectation that with the attainment of full communism law and the law courts will wither away and be replaced by voluntary self-discipline based on the three elements of customary compliance, personal conviction, and financial control. The proceduralists are always in the dilemma of appearing to want to make law more professional, more comprehensive, whereas it is essentially supposed to become more amateur, more re-educative. If the will of the people and the policy of the party are one and undivided, the corollary is that wayward elements need to be brought not before the court but before the psychologist. At all events, procedural guarantees in both first instance and appellate hearings have been the subject of considerable debate. One of the main issues has been that of 'competitiveness'; from the paternalist viewpoint, competitiveness is a deceptive luxury superfluous to Soviet procedural law, under which the parties to the trial have, or should have, complementary roles. The other school of thought argues that the demarcation of the roles and interests (though this latter factor is sometimes left deliberately obscure) of the defence, the prosecutor, and the court is consonant with greater procedural security. The advocates of 'competitiveness' have at one time or another included Kopylovskaya, Mankovsky, Perlov, Polyansky, Rakhunov, Shifman, and Strogovich; and the opponents have included Cheltsov, Durmanov, Galkin, Golunsky, Karev, Mokichev, Radkov, Tadevosyan, and Trusov.

The issue of competitiveness is necessarily bound up with the relative positions of the judge, the people's jurors, the prosecutor, and the defence counsel and his client. Generally speaking, the demarcation issue runs through both the pre-trial and the court proceedings; those who seek to define more closely the specific role of the prosecutor and the defence counsel in court tend to be those who advocate modifying the interdependence of the prosecutor and the investigator at this earlier stage, and likewise admitting defence counsel to participate before the

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preliminary investigation is closed. On the other hand, if, as the paternalists maintain, the word 'parties' is an unfortunate misnomer, if the Prosecutor is a Janus-like creature and if the defence counsel should be activated not by the interests of the client but by those of society, then there can be no conflict of interest. For the most part the proceduralists have made little headway here. The 1958 Basic Principles of Criminal Judicial Proceedings struck out the designation 'parties' from article 38 of the earlier draft; the question of whether or not the Prosecutor has a dual role in court, in being both prosecution and guardian of legality, remains unresolved; and the latitude allowed to defence counsel appears to have hardly progressed beyond the admission that he may venture to plead for an acquittal where he is himself convinced that inadequate proof has been assembled to demonstrate his client's guilt.[10]

One of the most debated aspects of 'competitiveness' has been that of the position of the people's assessors. It had been suggested that they should be allowed to participate in the preparatory sessions of all second-instance court hearings. This did not meet with approval even though, as USSR Supreme Court rulings of 1950, 1953, and 1957 showed, this extension had on occasion been (wrongly) practised. Even more persistent have been the proposals for enlarging their number and/or functions:

(a) that in certain criminal cases the number of people's assessors participating in the hearing should be increased to six, thus enabling the question of guilt and innocence and the degree of guilt to be 'decided more correctly by a wider collegium than one consisting of three persons';

(b) that the jurors be assigned the one task of pronouncing on the guilt or innocence of the accused, whilst the judge on his own determine the sanction to be applied;

(c) as above, save that jurors as well as judge collectively determine the sanction.

In favour of increasing the number of jurors, it has been argued that this will enhance their independence vis-à-vis the presiding judge (Perlov, Strogovich); in favour of the second that it will assist towards a proper delimitation of the functions of the judge from those of the jurors (Rakhunov, Burlatsky): in favour of the third compromise solution that it obviates the undemocratic dissociation of the jurors from the final judgment (Kan). What, however, all three variants have in common is that they do strengthen the authority of the people's assessors vis-à-vis the judge and thus introduce the element of a jury system. Indeed, as one *Izvestiya* article pointed out (25 May 1962), some time before the 'freeze' of early 1964:

> For example, it needed only certain comrades to express the thought that in the interests of democratising justice one ought to

[10] *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, No. 5, 1961, p. 74.

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> increase the number of people's assessors where the more important and complex cases were being heard, for jurists to make their appearance who discerned in this a 'manifestation of embourgeoisment'. One must not approach important problems in such an oversimplified way. One must not consider, as some people do, that socialist law differs from bourgeois law precisely in that everything about it must be 'just the opposite'.

The same theme of turning towards Western models has tended to recur in other fields of debate on criminal procedure. Assuming that the defence counsel does not have 'the right to lie', how far can he go in defending his client's interests without behaving in a manner alien to the Soviet judicial system? [11] This had been particularly apparent in the protracted discussion on the subject of the specific incorporation of the presumption of innocence into Soviet law. More curiously still, until quite recently the obsessive insistence on the theme that capitalist subversion, aided by the vestigial survivals of 'capitalist morality', was responsible for crime, had induced an ostrich-like stance—at least in public—on the part of many Soviet criminologists. As one of them pointed out:

> Certain of our moralists even today still write and talk, with eyes closed, about the absence of objective reasons for anti-social phenomena, and when they do come across them, they are unable to make any sensible comment but merely refer to the influence of bourgeois propaganda, etc.[12]

Here progress has been made. An All-Union Institute for the Study of the Reasons for and the Elaboration of Preventive Measures against Crime has recently been set up: detailed field studies in an RSFSR oblast have been conducted by the Institute of Criminology attached to the USSR Prosecutor's Office. Criminal statistics have been rehabilitated, though the thirty years lag since 1930 will take a lot of catching up.

WHILE the proceduralists are conducting an uphill campaign, there is no doubt that the paternalists have been having a field day. Though apparently not strongly represented among legal theorists, it is probably the case that the police, the prosecutor's office, and the other 'practical' authorities involved are generally in favour for their own varying reasons of the extra-judicial bodies and procedures. The precise demarcation of where the law ends and where communal action takes over has aroused considerable controversy.[13] Some proceduralists argue that communal probation is not a form of legal but a new form of

[11] On the divergent interpretations of the role of the defence see R. D. Rakhunov, *Uchastniki Ugolovno-Protsessualnoi Deyatelnosti*, pp. 208–225, and *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, No. 5, 1961, p. 71. On one aspect of the terms of reference of defence counsel, see *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, No. 7, 1959, p. 82.

[12] *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, No. 10, 1964, p. 94.

[13] e.g. *Sovetskaya Yustitsiya*, No. 10, 1959, pp. 55–57, No. 1, 1960, p. 49; *Sotsialisticheskaya Zakonnost*, No. 1, 1960, pp. 15–19.

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criminal punishment, which should be applied only by the community on the authorisation of the court (i.e. not by pre-trial authorisation from the militia or the prosecutor); other proceduralists seek to get round the difficulty by introducing a new category of 'misdemeanour' which, being distinct from a 'criminal action', does not involve substituting communal for judicial measures in respect of crimes as such.[14] Needless to say, these procedural heartsearchings did not meet with a sympathetic response from the executive arms of the law, who were very much in favour of the prophylactic efficacy of the new measures, and said so with some acerbity. The notion that where there is a crime, there there must be a specified criminal punishment, is deemed by the paternalists to be an outmoded one, and they see no difficulty in expanding the number of official instances entitled to say when a crime need not be punished.[15] This tends to be allied with the theory that, contrary to the views of the proceduralists, observance of the law is not enough; what is also mandatory in Soviet society is the ensuring of legality—legality being deemed to embrace 'all sides of our many-faceted life'—and the enhancing of the part played in this by the party, State, and public organs.[16]

The one thing clearly to emerge from these and other controversies in the field of criminal law over the last decade is that they will continue. Not only do groups of lawyers as well as individual lawyers evidently fail to see eye to eye, but they have been sporadically successful in obtaining publicity for their divergent views. The latest relevant (undated but evidently passed in early 1964) Central Committee decree on 'Measures for the Further Development of Juridical Science and the Improvement of Juridical Education in the Country' was no doubt intended, to judge from the continuing procession of polite commentaries on it proferred in the Soviet legal journals, to bring together the theorists and the 'practical workers' by promoting contact and interchange between them. But the controversial issues debated cut across this particular division; theorist does not see eye to eye with theorist. The only way to solve this may well be to have it out in public. As the 1962 Symposium on Objective Truth in Criminal Proceedings held by Moscow University was reminded by one of its participants, it was Karl Marx who commented: 'It takes a "foolish friend" to express surprise at what is well known to every schoolboy, i.e. that truth is established by means of polemics.'

The difficulty here is, of course, that if lawyers are allowed to challenge one another, it becomes progressively harder for the party to know whom to back.

[14] *Sovetskaya Yustitsiya*, No. 9, 1959, pp. 22–24; *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, No. 11, 1959, p. 49.
[15] *Sovetskaya Yustitsiya*, No. 11, 1959, pp. 52–53; *Sotsialisticheskaya Zakonnost*, No. 11, 1959, pp. 12–16; *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, No. 2, 1960, pp. 24–25.
[16] See discussion in *Sotsialisticheskaya Zakonnost*, No. 8, 1962, pp. 15–20.

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ECONOMIC CRIME AND PUNISHMENT

George L. Kline

CAPITAL punishment for non-political crimes was abolished in Russia long before 1917; the death penalty was suspended periodically under Lenin and Stalin (in 1917–18, 1920, and 1947–50). But Khrushchev, in his more than six years as Premier and Party First Secretary (1958–64), not only made no move to abolish capital punishment: he steadily enlarged the class of capital crimes and for the first time in modern Russian and Soviet history made a broad spectrum of crimes against *property* punishable by death. The only—and partial—precedent in Soviet history after 1921 was Stalin's decree of 1932 specifying the death penalty for theft or misappropriation of property from state and collective farms. This measure, a part of the massive and cruel programme of forced collectivisation of agriculture, was later dropped. In any case, most of the crimes which Khrushchev made capital offences in 1961 were *not* covered by the 1932 decree.

As of June 1965—eight months after Khrushchev's fall—Khrushchev's successors have not publicly included the decrees against economic crimes among his 'errors' or 'blunders'. There is no evidence to indicate that they plan to revoke his decrees, although they may quietly permit them to lapse. The only death penalties for crimes against property announced in the Soviet press since mid-October 1964 apply to economic criminals' first brought to trial *before* that date.

It was by a series of decrees issued abruptly in May 1961 that Khrushchev's regime introduced the death penalty for certain crimes against property—or, in Soviet jargon for 'exceptionally serious economic crimes'. These are specified as embezzling and plundering (*khishcheniye*) of state (*gosudarstvenny*) and public (*obshchestvenny*)—but not private—property, counterfeiting, speculating in foreign goods and currencies, and short-changing the public—on a large scale (*v bolshikh razmerakh*) or in a major (*krupny*) way.

All the listed activities, when carried out on a scale less than 'large' or 'major', are punishable only by imprisonment, exile, confiscation of property, or some combination of the three. Khrushchevian and post-Khrushchevian criminal law may thus be said to convert quantitative into qualitative differences in good dialectical fashion: a relative difference, or difference of degree, between two crimes—say, the embezzling of n rubles and the embezzling of $n+m$ rubles (where m may be arbitrarily small)—is reflected in an absolute difference, or difference of kind, between the respective punishments: loss of property, imprisonment, or exile in the one case, death by shooting in the other.

A relevant comment by a Polish citizen on the execution of Stanisław Wawrzecki, an official involved in large-scale meat-distribution frauds in

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Poland, was reported in the *New York Times* for 28 March 1965: 'What is the price now for human life in Poland? Is it a ton of meat or is it only half a ton?' Soviet citizens must sometimes wonder whether the price of human life in the Soviet Union today is 300,000, 200,000, or only 100,000 rubles.

It is of interest to consider, in turn, Khrushchev's possible motivation in issuing the decrees which made crimes against property punishable by death; the probable deterrent effect of the decrees; their moral justification, or lack thereof; and, finally, the sense, if any, in which the 1961 decrees are—as they have often been called—anti-semitic.

INTRODUCTION of the death penalty for crimes against property is only one aspect—although the most striking and shocking—of what I have elsewhere called Khrushchevian 'social Stalinism'.[1] Social Stalinism (as distinguished from classical or police-state Stalinism) emerged from the cumulative effect of a series of drastic, and largely unprecedented, measures introduced between 1958 and 1964, including the massive mobilisation of 'volunteers' whose task was to 'check and control' their neighbours' errors of commission and omission. As Khrushchev declared at a plenary session of the central committee in November 1962, if all Party, Komsomol, and trade-union members were put to work 'inspecting and controlling' Soviet society, not even a mosquito could take wing without being detected.

The aim of social Stalinism, like that of classical Stalinism, is to channel all the energies of Soviet society into 'socially useful work'—where 'usefulness' is defined by the current political leadership. Its means are largely public and social, in contrast to the bureaucratic and terroristic means of classical Stalinism. While the agency of inspection is mainly non-professional—groups of unpaid volunteers as contrasted to Stalin's paid police agents—the actual sanctions, under Khrushchev and his successors as under Stalin, are applied by instrumentalities of the communist party and the Soviet state.

Social Stalinism has crystallised into recognisable institutional forms: the Comrades' Courts, the People's Voluntary Militia (*narodnye druzhiny*), the home-and-family-life detachments (*bytovye otryady*) of the Komsomol. (It can hardly be accidental that former KGB officials have assumed leading positions in the *druzhiny*.) The heart of social Stalinism—the laws against social parasitism and the decrees against economic crimes—represents a response to what the post-Stalin Soviet leadership has come to regard as the intolerable persistence in a significant sector of the Soviet population of self-interested and anti-collectivistic motives. Anti-social self-interestedness is in part a product of classical Stalinism; but the relevant Stalinist policies were not reversed by Khrushchev and have been strengthened rather than weakened by his successors. The stress upon acquisitive motivation,

[1] See 'Philosophy, Ideology, and Policy in the Soviet Union', *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 26 (1964).

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implemented by a complicated network of incentive payments, bonuses, and piecework wages, has continued and in some respects increased. The system of positive incentives is supplemented by threats of harsh sanctions for social parasitism, i.e. deliberate non-participation in the 'building of communism' (sanctions applied in 1964 against the gifted young Leningrad poet, Joseph Brodsky), and by the threat of the ultimate sanction for active and large-scale interference in the working of the public economy.

THE question of the deterrent force of the death penalty for crimes against property is a social and psychological, rather than an ethical, question. It may be formulated in these terms: Will Soviet citizens be dissuaded, by the well-publicised threat of the death penalty, from undertaking large-scale embezzling, counterfeiting, etc.—and this in statistically significant numbers? Khrushchev and his successors have assumed an affirmative answer to this question. They thus pay unacknowledged tribute to Trotsky's Machiavellian motto of the Civil War period: 'By killing single individuals the Revolution intimidates thousands.' Yet they appear to be both less decisive and more squeamish than Lenin and Trotsky. The publicity which they focus upon economic criminals is less than total. Death sentences for economic crimes are not kept secret, but they are announced sketchily and schematically: usually in not more than two or three column-inches of newspaper print, without photographs of the convicted persons or mention of the date or place of execution. As noted above, only one or two death sentences have been announced in the Soviet press from 15 October 1964 to the present writing (June 1965)—a period of eight months. During any eight-month period between 11 May 1961, when the decrees were promulgated, and 14 October 1964, Khrushchev's last day in power, several dozen death sentences would be made public. This drastic statistical decline may be variously interpreted:

It may reflect indecision, or disagreement, on the part of the current Soviet leadership as to the justifiability and/or efficacy of the death penalty for crimes against property. If this is the case, the Khrushchev pattern may be either clearly restored or definitely broken in the coming months.

It may result from a collective decision to abandon the death penalty for economic crimes. If this is the case, the fact will become clearer in a year or so, when a significant number of trials begun after 15 October 1964, have been brought to a conclusion. Such a decision, if it has been or soon will be made, could have been motivated by quite different considerations—moral, ideological, or pragmatic. The present leaders could have decided that Khrushchev's decrees were immoral; or that they violated socialist legality (*zakonnost*) and the principles of Marxism-Leninism; or, finally, that the death penalty had simply not proven effective as a deterrent to large-scale crimes against state and public property.

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Thirdly, the decline may reflect a decision to discontinue public announcement of death sentences for economic crimes. For obvious reasons, if this is the case, it will be extremely difficult if not impossible to establish the fact conclusively.

Fourthly, it may reflect a sudden and dramatic decline in the number of such crimes committed in the Soviet Union, thus indirectly establishing the effectiveness of the death penalty as a deterrent to large-scale economic wrongdoing. This seems quite improbable in view of the remarkably steady rate of reported trials for such crimes between May 1961 and October 1964. (During this 41-month period, between three and four hundred death sentences were announced.)

To take a man's life because he has taken the state's property is a practice that cannot be morally justified in terms of *any* ethical position that recognises the non-instrumental worth or intrinsic dignity of the human person. Soviet spokesmen frequently suggest, without stating outright, that in Soviet society individuals count as persons, and have rights, only in so far as they are 'builders of communism'. Thus a Marxist-Leninist might argue that economic criminals, by virtue of their massively and perversely anti-social behaviour, have forfeited any claim to be treated as persons. They are merely obstacles in the way of social progress, and as such may justly be liquidated. In fact, no Soviet spokesman has put the point as bluntly as this. Indeed, it is a striking fact that Soviet commentators—under both Khrushchev and his successors—have remained abjectly silent on this issue, venturing neither to defend openly nor to criticise, nor even to refer explicitly to the 1961 decrees on capital punishment for crimes against property.

FINALLY, there is the question of the anti-semitic consequences of Khrushchev's decrees. Soviet officialdom tends to equate ethnic Jewishness with religious Judaism (although most Soviet Jews are atheists or agnostics), and this in turn with cultural-political Zionism. The Soviet attitude is in part xenophobic—a fear of international contacts and divided loyalties. Soviet Jews, to a greater extent than other minority groups, are assumed to be potentially disloyal; they are treated in many respects as would-be defectors. However, the decrees concerning economic crimes are *not* specifically anti-semitic, even though they have unquestionably had, and continue to have, anti-semitic repercussions. In contrast, Hitler's Nuremberg Laws *were* explicitly and specifically anti-semitic. For example, the law permitting only 'Aryans' to practise medicine in Germany was an anti-semitic law, even though it also excluded a very thin statistical scattering of non-Aryan physicians who were also non-Jews.

Of the Soviet citizens whose death sentences under the Khrushchev decrees have been announced in the Soviet press, some 30 per cent are tentatively identifiable as Jews. Since Jews constitute only about 1·5 per cent of the total Soviet population, this wide discrepancy has been cited as evidence by those commentators who consider the decrees explicitly

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and deliberately anti-semitic. This, however, ignores several relevant factors. In the Soviet Union, as elsewhere, Jews tend to cluster occupationally in the liberal professions (especially medicine, law and teaching) on the one hand, and in economic activities on the other. Except in Israel, Jews are statistically unrepresented, for example, in such occupations as farming. But whereas outside the Soviet Union many Jews are engaged in private business and industry, within the Soviet Union all such occupations are closed, to Jews and non-Jews alike. The Soviet counterparts of non-Soviet Jews engaged in private business and industry are to be found among accountants, office managers, bookkeepers, shop foremen, bank clerks, and the like. All of them, needless to say, are employed by state or public enterprises. But because the percentage of Jews among Soviet citizens engaged in such activities is much closer to 30 than to 1·5, Jews tend to be involved in economic crimes in the higher rather than the lower proportion. (I am assuming, of course, that the actual rate of embezzling, etc., among Soviet Jews does not differ significantly from that among non-Jews.)

Perhaps the point will be made clearer by a hypothetical analogy: Assume that, as a result of extensive scandals in the administration of the United States Interstate Highway Program, the death penalty were to be introduced for large-scale graft, collusion among contractors and suppliers, etc. Assume also that about 40 per cent of the contractors condemned to death were identifiable (by characteristic name) as Italian-Americans, while Italian-Americans constituted only 2 per cent of the total population; then the ratio of Italian-Americans executed to Italian-Americans in the total population would be 20 to 1—about the same as the ratio of Soviet Jews condemned to death for economic crimes to Soviet Jews in the total population. Such a law might be considered anti-Italian. But in fact only its side-effects would be such; and if the proportion of Italian-Americans among highway contractors had been smaller, or if it should subsequently decrease, the law would still be just as much, and just as little, anti-Italian as it otherwise would have been.

The example seems fantastic, I think, not because of the statistics (the actual ratios of Italian-Americans among highway contractors and in the total population are not too far from those cited), but because we cannot imagine executing people for giving or taking ' payola ' or kickbacks, on however large a scale, or for providing only n dollars' worth of highway construction for $n + m$ dollars received, however large m might be. I here assume that the work done and the materials used, although overpriced, are of acceptable quality. If they were not, if safety specifications were not met, and bridges or tunnels collapsed as a result, causing injury and death to motorists, then capital punishment would be less unimaginable. But such crimes would resemble murder more than they resemble grand larceny.

A Soviet analogue might be a restaurant manager who substituted motor oil for cooking oil, and pocketed the savings—like the Moroccan

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merchants who, a few years ago, mixed aircraft motor oil with cooking oil, causing much sickness and several deaths. In such a case the crime, although in a sense economic, and clearly motivated by greed, would be more like murder, and—if high Soviet functionaries frequented the restaurant in question—even like treason. But to date Soviet restaurant managers have been condemned to death only for short-changing the public, e.g. for putting 75 grams instead of 150 grams of meat in their stew, and pocketing the difference.

Having no legitimate outlet in Soviet society, private managerial and commercial initiative and ability tend to be deflected into activities which in other societies are regarded as legitimate and respectable, but in the Soviet Union are classed as illicit and morally reprehensible. To take one case among many: Kotlyar and Begelman, a few years ago, went into business for themselves, manufacturing and selling lipstick. To start their basement factory they needed machinery. To get machinery they had to bribe officials of a state-owned and operated lipstick factory. Their enterprise flourished; but under the decrees against economic crimes both were tried and condemned to death for ' large-scale plundering of state property '.

I would again emphasise that, although there is undoubtedly a high percentage of Jews among the Soviet citizens whose private initiative and acquisitiveness gets them into trouble with the law, this fact can be explained without reference to deliberate anti-semitism on the part of the Soviet government. (Speculators in foreign goods and currencies, of course, need foreign contacts, so that both Jews and non-Jews among them quickly run foul of the morose xenophobia of Soviet officialdom.)

The primary immorality of the 1961 decrees is directed against Soviet citizens generally. They cannot be ' liberalised ' or ' humanised '; they can only be revoked, unequivocally. It remains to be seen whether Khrushchev's successors will take this drastically anti-Khrushchevian step, one which would remove a central prop of their inherited social Stalinism.

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CURRENT TRENDS IN THE SOVIET THEATRE

Erik de Mauny

THERE are various angles from which it is possible to approach and explore the present condition of the Soviet theatre. But whichever point of departure is chosen, one is not likely to make much progress without constantly reminding oneself that this is not a theatre that can be studied in isolation, and its achievements analysed and assessed for their own sake. In other words, whatever ideological watchword prevails at any given moment—whether seeming to encourage a relative relaxation, or demanding, on the contrary, a reaffirmation of the strict canons of Socialist Realism—the Soviet theatre remains at all times profoundly embedded in, and profoundly influenced by, a larger context: which is that of a society officially dedicated to 'building communism'. Now, it is true that this process itself is not as rigidly predetermined as is sometimes supposed by outside observers. Priorities may be reshuffled, subsidiary objectives redefined, new methods and tactics introduced from time to time; and all of these things have, indeed, happened, to some extent at least, since the removal of Mr Khrushchev from power almost a year ago. But this does not mean that the final aim has changed; and since everything else is conditioned by this aim, it follows that the Soviet theatre, like every other branch of the arts in the Soviet Union, is expected first and foremost to serve as an instrument of the communist party's purpose, in the struggle for the final realisation of the dream of pure communism.

Nevertheless, while the final aim remains unchanging, the struggle itself ebbs and flows, in response to those swings and changes in tactics noted a moment ago. And this is one reason why it seems to me not inappropriate to discuss recent developments in the Soviet theatre rather in the terms of a communiqué from a battlefront.

Using this analogy, I would say that the most striking feature of the 1964–65 season was the way in which a number of young Soviet directors and playwrights vigorously enlarged the salient they now hold on territory formerly occupied by the entrenched forces of an older generation. In Moscow, the bridgehead was first established some ten years ago by the Sovremennik Theatre, under the spirited guidance of Oleg Yefremov, and until as recently as two years ago, it was still almost alone in the field. This is certainly not the case today, for the youthful audiences that once flocked to the Sovremennik to see such productions as Schwartz's *Naked Emperor* or Volodin's *The Elder Sister*, are now confronted with several rival claims to their attention: the Lenin Komsomol Theatre under the direction of Anatoli Efros; the Drama and Comedy Company under Yuri Lyubimov's direction at the outlying

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Taganka Theatre, which ended its highly successful current season giving performances in the very centre of town, at the Mossoviet Theatre; and certain productions staged by another young director, Boris Lvov-Anokhin, at the Stanislavsky Theatre.

On the surface, the most enterprising of these groups has undoubtedly been the Taganka Theatre—almost a Moscow equivalent to London's Theatre Royal at Stratford East—and one which provides an interesting illustration of the way in which the bridgehead created by the Sovremennik has been expanded. It came into being through a student production by an established actor at the Vakhtangov Theatre, Yuri Lyubimov, of Brecht's *The Good Woman of Setzuan*. This was so highly regarded that Lyubimov was offered the direction of the Drama and Comedy Theatre at Taganka, and managed to transfer his entire student company there as well. Since this initial success, the company has consolidated its position with such productions as *Anti-Worlds* (*Antimiri*), based on the poetry of Andrei Voznesensky, and an extraordinary adaptation for the stage, using almost every conceivable theatrical trick, of John Reed's vivid eye-witness account of the October Revolution, *Ten Days that Shook the World*.

From a purely technical viewpoint, this ought undoubtedly to be acclaimed the most original production of the season. Nevertheless, the ideological line, as it gradually emerged through a brilliant battery of theatrical devices, proved finally to be no less impeccably orthodox than in a dozen other far more stodgy productions; and if it still had an undeniably contemporary accent, this was achieved more by a deliberate appeal to nostalgia, a harking back to the heroic feats of the founding fathers of the regime, than by anything calculated to raise disturbing questions concerning its subsequent evolution.

FAR more original, to my mind, just because it did raise certain questions of this kind, was the production by the Sovremennik of a first play by Vasili Aksenov, *Always on Sale* (*Vsegda v Prodazhe*). Aksenov, now in his early thirties and a doctor by training, had previously built up a reputation, and also stirred up considerable controversy, as a writer of novels and short stories (*A Starry Ticket*, *Catapult*, etc.), chiefly remarkable for their fresh, tolerant, undoctrinaire portrayal of how young people really live and work and seek their pleasures in the Soviet Union today (critics have accused him of being ' superficial ' and filling his stories with ' repulsive ' slang).

In *Always on Sale*, Aksenov is again well served by his quick ear for authentic contemporary dialogue, his ability to make his characters talk wittily and pungently and yet naturally at the same time. But the play is a good deal more complex than the earlier novels, and indeed, under its surface gaiety and good-humour, has a dark side to it—which is precisely what has aroused the uneasiness of some critics.

Aksenov calls *Always on Sale* a ' satirical fantasy '. There are only two acts, but each is quite long, and makes use of elaborate sets and

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quick changes of scene which must have taxed the Sovremennik's technical resources to the full. Revolving stage, trapdoors, sets within a set, however, all have here a definite purpose, since the whole point of the action is that it moves back and forth between reality and fantasy, and indeed, at times, seems to hover tantalisingly at some midway point between the two.

But in the opening scenes there is nothing at first to indicate that this will not be just one more Soviet comedy of manners. On the stage, we are shown an open cross-section of the first two floors of a typical Soviet apartment block, with hallway, stairwell, and a series of domestic interiors. In a ground floor flat, a party is in progress, and the hero of the piece, a young journalist called Yevgeny Kistochkin, is first encountered as he erupts upon this already animated scene clutching a bottle of under-the-counter brandy, which he has wheedled out of the surly sales-girl at the corner café whose 'always on sale' sign means, in fact, that the shelves are virtually bare.

This opening stroke of irony is obvious enough. But it serves a useful purpose in providing the initial clue to Kistochkin's character. He is, in fact, the eternal 'fixer', who thinks he knows all there is to know about human nature, mocks at other people's illusions, and imagines he will always get his own way because he is quite unburdened by the least moral scruple. Kistochkin's total cynicism towards everything clothes him in an apparently invulnerable armour. But it is also this that makes him an object of fascination for the other, more normally-constituted inhabitants of the apartment block. And it's here that one realises that Aksenov is probing at some rather painful spots. For what he is saying in effect is that, if Kistochkin succeeds in dazzling his fellow flat-dwellers, isn't this because they secretly want to be dazzled by him, that it is only their gullibility that allows his effrontery to flourish?

It is true that, even in these opening scenes, Kistochkin doesn't quite have it all his own way. He succeeds in turning the head of a professor's daughter, but the old man, Professor Abroskin, remains sceptical of Kistochkin's self-proclaimed cleverness. A more direct challenge is also introduced at an early stage by the appearance of his boyhood friend, Pyotr Treougolnikov, who has been working as a miner in the north, and who from his inner fortress of conventional laborious virtue casts a cold eye on Kistochkin's cynical antics. At first, however, the only effect of this disapproval is to spur Kistochkin on to greater efforts. At a later stage, still pursuing the professor's daughter, Svetlana, he tells the girl that there is no such thing as love—it is simply one more hollow sham along with the rest—and simultaneously invites her to come and live with him. When she rejects this proposition, after a certain amount of tormented clawing at the counterpane, Kistochkin is still not noticeably ruffled. His resilience, after all, lies in his imperviousness to rebuff. And in the big set-piece confrontation scene that follows, in which Kistochkin and Treougolnikov expound their diametrically opposed views of life, the former's disillusionment still carries at least as con-

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vincing a ring as the latter's bellicose defence of the basic human decencies.

But it is in the second act that Aksenov fully develops the fantastic element of his theme. The action now moves into the fourth dimension, which is simply the world as seen through the distorting glass of Kistochkin's imagination. Most of the characters encountered in the first act now appear once more, but this time wearing sly or evil-looking masks (rather like figures in a medieval morality play), the masks representing the qualities, or rather the vices and failures, projected on them by Kistochkin. As for Kistochkin himself, whereas in the first act his mockery was sly and allusive, now it becomes open and brazen, as he treats them to a nonsense lecture (in itself not a bad parody of inflated bureaucratic language). But then, gradually, the tables are turned. One by one the masked figures—those projections of Kistochkin's imagination—round on their creator, until he in turn is, as it were, unmasked. The moral Aksenov seems to be making is that a cynicism as total as Kistochkin's is, in the long-run, self-defeating. (I say ' seems to be ' because this scene is such an exuberant whirlwind of invention that one is left in some perplexity as to how many targets Aksenov is trying to demolish at once!)

However, catharsis of a sort has been achieved, because in the final scene we are once more back in the ' real ' world of the apartment block, to witness a happy resolution to all the problems raised earlier. Various characters are shown to have overcome their earlier inadequacies. Treougolnikov wins the hand of Svetlana, and proposes that everyone should set off on a moonlight picnic (presumably an invitation to ' togetherness ' in contrast to the egoistic individualism of Kistochkin). Even Kistochkin himself has undergone a remarkable transformation. With everyone else radiating good humour, he pops up in the final scene disguised as the new sales-girl at the corner café, falling over himself with amiabilities towards the same people he had previously mocked.

This provides a rather disconcerting Charlie's Aunt flavour to the closing sequence, and several Soviet critics, while acclaiming the play as a whole, have found fault with Aksenov for not rounding it off in a less arbitrary way. I think this criticism is well-founded, but that in spite of this and other weaknesses, *Always on Sale* remains the most challenging and original new production of the season.

IT was certainly the most striking new item in the Sovremennik's repertory. But the other young theatre companies mentioned earlier have not been any less enterprising in their different ways. At the Lenin Komsomol Theatre, Anatoli Efros put on a first play by a 24-year-old dramatist, Edward Radzinsky, called *104 pages of love*, which at once proved immensely popular, and has since been taken into the repertory of several other companies (I myself saw it performed at the Maly Theatre by a visiting provincial company from the town of Gorky).

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Both in theme and in style of production (incorporating jazz motives and a brilliantly imaginative use of lighting on a wide, uncluttered stage), *104 pages of love* puts the accent very much on youth. It's also been acclaimed by some as a refutation of the theory, first enunciated by Lunacharsky in the 1920s, that there could be no place for tragedy in the Soviet theatre (on the ground that Soviet drama, imbued with the positive spirit of Marxism-Leninism, must inevitably move towards optimistic conclusions). Personally, I found the ending somewhat arbitrary, although less noticeably perhaps than in the case of *Always on Sale*. One sees the point that the author is making. At the end of *104 pages of love*, Natasha, the young air-hostess heroine, who, in all the earlier scenes, has been portrayed as a charming but empty-headed little flirt, sacrifices her own life in saving others from an air crash. In this way, one is clearly supposed to conclude, she has redeemed the thoughtless egoism of her earlier behaviour. But Natasha's egoism has always been of a pretty innocent variety—a whole world apart from that of a character like Kistochkin; indeed, it is this freshness and innocence that make up her charm. She is eager for love, but without guile when pressed into having an affair by a young designer, who, although young, is clearly a good deal her senior in experience; and in so far as she expresses her feelings openly and frankly, whereas he sophisticates his with some fairly typical male evasions (the contrast is shown up well in a scene in which he reproaches her for not telling him she has left home on his account), one is left in no doubt as to which is the more attractive character. And because of this, her fate seems unnecessarily harsh. But Radzinsky's play undoubtedly deserves its success, particularly with young Russians, because it speaks to them in accents that they know and recognise.

I have already mentioned one other production that attracted widespread attention in the season just ended, the Taganka Drama and Comedy Theatre's version of *Ten Days that Shook the World*, in which the keynote, it seemed to me, was nostalgia for the heroic days of October. Certainly no effort was spared to draw the spectator into an authentic revolutionary atmosphere, an effort that started even before the curtain went up, with a group of young men in 1917 uniforms singing *chastushkas* in the foyer. At the auditorium doors other young men, similarly attired, in long greatcoats and the pointed winter caps of 1917, took the place of ushers, thoughtfully spearing admission tickets on the tall bayonets of their vintage rifles. And so to the production itself, with its exuberant employment of almost every known theatrical device: ballet, mime, shadow-play, a wandering chorus of guitar players, back and side projection screens (on which a hugely blown-up head of Lenin appeared from time to time, bearded and cloth-capped, to cast a benevolent gaze on the revels below), even reversed footlights stabbing powerful rays upward into the auditorium like the beams of a wartime searchlight battery.

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It was certainly very effectively done, and vastly more entertaining than old-style Soviet hagiography (I am thinking of a play like Pogodin's *Kremlin Chimes*, and of all those other drearily literal epics of the Zhdanov era), but as one came away, one was struck by the thought that little of it was really new, and most of it simply a revival of the earliest, liveliest period of all in Soviet theatre, a return to the experimental audacities of men like Meyerhold and Tairov.

So, in a sense, with productions like *Ten Days that Shook the World*, what one has been seeing is the wheel coming full circle. Ten or fifteen years ago, if one asked what had become, for example, of the legacy of Meyerhold, the logical place to look for an answer would have been in such places as Joan Littlewood's Theatre Workshop, or certain of the smaller Paris or New York theatres—anywhere, in short, but in the Soviet Union. Today that is certainly no longer true. But if a new salient has been established, it still requires to be consolidated; and it is at this point that a whole series of other questions arise, involving not merely the enterprise shown by one particular theatre company, or the merits of one especially outstanding production, but the whole system of training and preparation to which the Soviet theatre looks for self-renewal.

The plain fact is that, in all the productions mentioned so far, the standard of actual performance has proved to be extremely uneven, with a disconcerting number of fumbling and amateurish interpretations co-existing alongside those in which one recognises a high degree of polish and skill. In other words, if there is a central weakness in this young, avant-garde Soviet theatre, it can be traced back time and again to the inadequacies of that figure upon whom, in the last resort, the whole enterprise rests: the individual actor.

AT first sight this may seem puzzling, since one assumes that, whatever its other passing faults, the Soviet theatre has never lacked a strong tradition of dramatic training. But I am not sure that this assumption was ever entirely true, and in a long article in a June issue of the newspaper *Sovetskaya Kultura*, it was flatly refuted by a very distinguished Soviet director, Georgi Tovstonogov, who for nearly ten years now has been in charge of productions at the Gorky Theatre in Leningrad. This, in fact, is the most substantial piece of criticism to have emerged from inside the Soviet theatre for a long time past; and it therefore seems to me that Tovstonogov's conclusions may be worth quoting in some detail.

The first point to be made is that Tovstonogov is very much on the side of the young directors whose work I have been discussing. The second is that, in his view, there are far too few of them, and that this dearth of directing talent is impoverishing theatrical life not only in the provinces but even in the major cities, such as Moscow and Leningrad.

Tovstonogov then launches into a detailed analysis to explain this scarcity of talent, and in the course of it throws up some interesting and

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rarely-voiced arguments. Young people with creative gifts, he begins by saying, have always sought out the new and progressive. It is also in their nature to be impulsive and uncompromising. Many young directors, says Tovstonogov, do *not* look on the present-day productions of theatres like the Maly, the Moscow Arts, and the Pushkin Theatre in Leningrad, as providing a standard of excellence. And this in itself, he adds, would not be catastrophic if they did not also repudiate the great cultural heritage of these theatres, and look with suspicion on the realistic tradition of the Shchepkin school and the teaching of Stanislavsky.

A budding young director, he goes on, is naturally drawn to the innovations introduced by such theatres as the Sovremennik and the Taganka, not realising that, in the measure of their various talents and temperaments, such gifted directors as Yefremov, Efros, Lvov-Anokhin, and Lyubimov have in fact continued to develop the realistic tradition of Stanislavsky and Vakhtangov, and that all their best work must be seen, not in opposition to Stanislavsky but as arising naturally from his example.

Nevertheless, Tovstonogov remarks, there are pitfalls in the present revolt against the grey, over-literal realism that formerly constituted the chief danger to the Soviet theatre. In the new productions insufficient attention is given to the role of the actor. 'Purely *acting* successes in the Lenin Komsomol Theatre are few,' says Tovstonogov, 'and in the Taganka Theatre, even fewer.' Part of the trouble, he considers, has arisen from a tendency to elevate the example of Brecht over that of Stanislavsky (there have, incidentally, been half-a-dozen productions of Brecht in Moscow alone during the past season). Tovstonogov himself thinks it is a profound mistake to set them one against another, and he even adds: 'Today, I am convinced that the biggest successes in resolving the problems of Brechtian drama have been achieved by actors raised on Stanislavsky, Vakhtangov, and their successors.'

But this still leaves the problem of the best method of training the new generation of actors, and it is in this context that Tovstonogov goes on to describe some of his own experiences in Leningrad. The chief trouble there, he says, was that an invisible but almost insurmountable wall had been allowed to grow up between directors and actors and other workers in the theatre, and it was to counteract this that a theatre studio was set up, attached to the Gorky Theatre. Its chief aim was to bring together young directors, actors, composers, and stage designers so that, by uniting their efforts, they could learn from each other by practical example.

The setting up of such a studio, he thinks, may in the long run exert a profound influence on the whole future development of the Soviet theatre. For one thing, he says, it is the kind of place where young directors, after their first year or so of independent work, can come back to check their doubts and correct their errors. For another, it should help to combat that 'grey realism' which is still far too prevalent on the

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Soviet stage, and for which it is the drama schools that are principally at fault. ('We are far too conservative in our teaching methods', he remarks, 'and have little knowledge of the constructive experience gained by other countries'.)

Tovstonogov sees one other unfortunate consequence of the present drama school system: the tendency to produce young directors whose chief aim is self-advertisement, and who 'are not too scrupulous how they go about it'. 'Intrigues, cliques, and demagogic declarations', he writes, 'are all given the outward appearance of a struggle for progress and against routine.' The only answer to this, he declares, is the creation of the true theatrical collective, in which people are bound together not just by external discipline, but by mutual responsibilities and mutual respect. For in such a collective there is no room for conceit, egoism, and one-up-manship. 'The sort of director who backs away when difficulties arise, and who shows his credentials not by concrete achievements, not by the visible competence of his creative efforts in rehearsal and production, but by speeches and grievances, is simply a director who's been badly trained.'

And this, too, Tovstonogov concludes, 'is our own fault. We frequently treat the students as if they were small children. And in consequence they in turn behave like children—lazy, self-indulgent, and full of caprices.' The only remedy is to show full trust in the young. 'But after that', Tovstonogov winds up by saying, 'we should also seriously demand of them that they measure up to the very highest standard'.

As can be seen, Tovstonogov finds many things to criticise in the present state of the theatre. Nevertheless, his is a voice of great authority, and the very fact that he has devoted such careful scrutiny to the work of the younger directors confirms one's feeling that the salient they have established is of the greatest significance for the future. It is clearly much more, at any rate, than a passing phenomenon; indeed, the only question now is to what extent it will be further consolidated and extended during the coming season.

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OSKAR RABIN, PAINTER

Jacques Catteau

THE cold seeps through the steamy windows. Dark files of houses pass across a vague background of dirty snow and yellow-grey sky. The train has already stopped several times at little raised platforms, swept by a bitter wind from the flat suburban plain which makes the Moscow commuters dance like marionettes. Another stop: Lianozovo. Descending from the carriage into the icy wind, you see a desolate untidy landscape, shrivelling in the frost: little squat shanties crushed under the snow, black misshapen posts, the giant arms of motionless cranes, parallel layers of smoke across the sky, and everywhere a tangle of wires weighed down by snow. Black verticals, white horizontals—sullen suburban winter.

That is what you see when you come to Lianozovo on a winter day, and that is what you see in the paintings of Rabin—Oskar Yakovlevich Rabin, Russian painter. I first saw his work at the house of a friend, and in the warm and comfortable rooms of this art enthusiast it had seemed to me that Rabin was wantonly morose in his extreme distortions of line and his muddy expressionistic colour. Behind the forms and colours I seemed to discern an embittered spirit, an unhappy soul, withdrawn, rebellious, morbid. . . . Vaguely, I said to myself: 'That's a reaction against official Soviet painting, but it is too extreme. . . .' And yet, even in the snug surroundings of my friend's room, I sensed that I was missing something deeper, a harsher truth which shrank from appearing in our cosy lamp-lit circle. So I went to find out, to see.

Standing on the exposed platform, in the teeth of the wind, I tried to recognise from my pocket-map the jaundiced features of the scene before me. Dark houses among a network of little tracks of shiny trampled snow, trails of wind-blown smoke across a cold metallic sky. And suddenly I had the feeling of Rabin's painting, a brusque revelation only received by my too unadaptable mind thanks to this unforeseen vision of its source. Was I able to understand because I could now see this Russian painter's canvases in their own frame, in the world they derive from, or was it because they had prepared me for what I was seeing? According to Oscar Wilde's paradox, nature imitates art. In the same way, what had seemed to be the extravagant, morose, deformed and, frankly, too exaggerated quality of Rabin's work had taught me to see this bare and austere suburban winter landscape. The wintry suburb had suddenly begun to look like this painter's pictures just as, formerly, 'nature began to resemble the landscapes of Corot' (plate 1).

I walked through the snow to his house, a wooden hut like the others, set down unevenly on the uneven ground. On the way I recognised all the motifs of Rabin's paintings, but without being able to analyse

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them: the derisive black cat, walls scribbled with the clumsy poetic graffiti of children, ill-written sums and the inevitable heart pierced with an arrow, crazy roof-lines accentuated by the caprices of snow and ice, lights glittering in the cold evening, the glow from windows probing the shadows, a white lustreless moon looming over the roof-tops. I could no longer distinguish between reality and picture; they intermingled and I made no effort to separate them.

ONCE arrived, I met a man and a painter, and his art. Of the first I became a friend and of the second an admirer. He soon gave me his humble and pointedly unadorned autobiography—thus opening and quickly closing again a window into his life; a window like those extraordinary ones in several of his pictures, and like those which Baudelaire poetically described: 'There is no object more profound, mysterious, provocative and obscure than a candle-lit window. . . . Within that dark or luminous plot is life, living, dreaming, and suffering.' And it is living, dreaming and suffering that are the themes of this autobiography:

> I was born in Moscow in 1928.
> My parents quarrelled. I have no memory of my father; he died when I was five. My mother died during the war. As a child, I was for three years at a school of music and also attended a drawing school. The war broke out and the school was closed. It was then that I got to know the teacher of drawing, Evgeny Leonidovich Kropovnitsky, an artist and poet. I worked for three years under him. After the war I went to Riga. I entered the Academy of Fine Arts there. After three years of study I returned to Moscow and enrolled as a second-year student at the Institute of Fine Arts. Being accustomed to the free interpretation of nature, I was not happy there. I returned to my former master, Kropovnitsky. For eight years I worked as a railwayman, first as a labourer and later as a foreman. My spare time I devoted to painting. Up to 1956 I worked from nature, guided by the advice of Kropovnitsky. From 1956 onwards I moved away from nature, which gave me greater contentment and freedom.
> At that time I experienced two influences: first, that of modern painters (as regards line, rhythm, colour, composition, subject) and second, the poems of my master and of my poet friends.
> Latterly I have lived by my painting and the commissions I get (posters, advertisements).
> I am married to the daughter of my old master, Kropovnitsky. We have two children.
>
> *Oskar Yakovlevich Rabin*

A humble autobiography, as I have said, and in keeping with the writer's reticence and strength of purpose; and anyone familiar with the understatements of the Soviet intellectual *avant-garde* will easily see what lies behind the simple phrases.

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As for his painting, I shall try to give the most general and simple description, relying as much as possible upon the photographs which accompany this text.

The world exhibited in Rabin's pictures is a mixture of tragedy with an *intimisme* which I have elsewhere described as an '*intimisme* of outdoor scenes', and also an undeniable vein of humour. This world of black-outlined masses which seem to be in mourning, of warped planks, battered hovels, and cold twilight skies includes so much playfulness, comic fantasy, and inward gaiety that one is reminded, astonishingly, of a whole tradition of Central-European Jewish painting. The human distress which emanates from Rabin's canvases can be read more in the composition than in the actual themes.

The most striking theme is that of the human scene (suburb or town) without human beings. In these decaying or desolate landscapes there is not a living man to be seen, and yet it would be wrong to say that this world is without human life: there are signs everywhere of mankind, with its misery, its pain, its vices, and its humble pleasures. Apart from the houses, the natural symbols of man's presence and accurate images of the human condition, there are bottles of vodka with onions, symbolising the crude pleasure of drink and also the alcoholism of these impoverished suburbs, and the coins which purchase miserable joys, and a wind-blown candle on a snow-covered table, and a close-up of a lighted electric bulb, and the black neck of a water-tap rising out of the snow, and colours glowing like stained glass in cottage windows or flaming in illuminated signs and advertisements, and the innumerable wires connecting all the buildings. . . . But in the end this absence of man becomes excruciating. To ease our anguish, to conquer his own pain, Rabin calls up the fantastic goblins of his gritty humour—grimacing cats with luminous eyes sneering on the roof-tops (plate 2), women's bloomers fluttering against a delicate pale rose sky, misspelt graffiti of children's love on the walls, poetic graffiti on the surface of the moon. . . . Man hardly appears at all except in his pictures of the city; and even so, can they be called men, these tiny matchstick figures gesticulating in the street (plate 3)? Are they not rather units of an unnumbered and faceless crowd? But, to be fair, it must be noted that the city awakens in Rabin a less tragic and more intimate vision. The miracle-working saints, protectors of Moscow, bestow upon the urban world the myth of their icons, as we see in the magnificent canvas in which an old icon serves as background to an ecstatic bright bunch of abstract flowers. And the city also means weddings; lovers are guided by arrows to the registry office (ZAGS) alongside which a tree unexpectedly blooms in the snow (plate 4). After listing these themes one is left puzzled; where is the tragedy, the anguish? On looking closer one discerns that, although the absence of man gives an impression of anguish, all the other themes tend to counteract it. Man is present somewhere behind this weird and melancholy world and it is from him that the intimacy and humour are born which afford a two-fold

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protection, the two-fold power of life, against the tragedy of the quotidian.

BUT Rabin's drawing, his line, and his thick black outlines do unambiguously evoke the nostalgic atmosphere, the heavy depression, which weighs upon mankind, particularly in winter. And it is not simply the feeling of the Russian winter; Rabin's pictures suggest something far more than that. He evokes the same profound melancholy and human nostalgia that we find in the great Russian writers. A sombre and gentle sadness which oppresses the soul and which is continually challenged by humour and love, expressed through the gift of intimacy. Indeed, it is this sense of oppression which strikes one first of all: the enormous moons crushed into an oval shape, looming over the house tops, the roofs weighed down by thick snow, the wooden buildings crushed down on the uneven ground or scattered along the irregular horizon, the wires sagging under snow, and the whole picture crushed into a horizontal composition. In the city, however, the horizontal oppression is replaced by a vertical suffocation. This gives yet another sensation of a closed world, shut in between vertical walls whose steepness is accentuated by the angular geometrical form of the piled-up storeys (cover). But in city and suburb alike an enormous and shapeless moon always suspends its flattened ellipse in menace over the desolate urban scene. Sometimes, even, another moon descends into the street and encloses, like a medallion, secondary pictures which compose other worlds. A disturbing proliferation which serves to intensify a real feeling of tragic anguish.

The colour in itself conveys a sense of melancholy. Above the buildings, the sky is most often light and whitish, as at dawn and twilight, but higher up it becomes grey, cold and metallic, with hues of lead. The cottages repeat the tones of the earth they seem to rise out of—lemon ochre, mauve slate, green shale, brown rock. It is a mineral or almost a vegetable world, scarcely risen out of the mud, in which the only contrasting note is the strident, violently coloured, luminous advertisements, the crude posters, the traffic lights and railway signals; and the impression of grossness, of soil still clinging to the town, is accentuated by the thick heavy lines around the drawing. But since 1959 Rabin's quality of paint has gained notably in richness, breadth, and warmth. Photographs convey very inadequately this firmness of touch; but one can see how, on the surfaces of snow, the paint seems to be applied with a palette knife as colour becomes more dominant. In this respect, the development of a richer texture depends upon progress in the chemical industry. At present, colours are often inferior in the USSR; they soon begin to flake off the canvas and the indispensable white quickly turns yellow. So the development of the chemical industry which Khrushchev and his successors have called for may have good results in the sphere of painting technique. In any case, Rabin is evolving towards a richer texture which seems to give more foundation

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and also a greater naturalness to the urban world of his imagination, and thus to mitigate its severity.

To sum up, one may say that although Rabin's technique, or more exactly his way of putting on paint, is gradually evolving he remains nonetheless true to the spirit of the world he has created. For it is his own creation; his starting point was the intolerable schism, of which Camus writes, between man and his experience, and 'out of his nostalgia he has contrived a reconciliation' in an original world which mingles together melancholy, sadness, love, and humorous fantasy in an art which can legitimately be described as humane and humanist. I knew Rabin and admired his work long before I read anything by Solzhenitsyn, but it seems to me his pictures would make good illustrations for Solzhenitsyn's books. In the hearts of both these men, and in their art, there is a bitter truth which is also humane, being formed out of simple courage and love of life; and they both possess that real maturity which is produced only by grief and suffering that has been lived through. It is not the static maturity which ends in rigidity and innumerable unvarying repetitions, but the maturity born of an art which is struggling and by which reality is perennially refertilised.

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KAFKA RETURNS TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA

H. Politzer

ON 14 December 1963, the Prague weekly *Literarni noviny* carried the news that Edward Albee's *Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf?* was to be performed in the Czech capital under the title *Who's Afraid of Kafka?* (*Kdopak by se Kafky bal?*). This item, which was noted with some glee by the American press, is much less ludicrous than it may appear at first sight: the name Kafka (=kavka) means 'jackdaw', and a jackdaw in European folklore is a harbinger of doom. Thus the Czech translation is a very close approximation to Albee's pun. Indeed, the etymology of Kafka's name served to conceal the implications of the play's title from the Czech state authorities. To be sure, the lilt of the English original is lost, and so is the irony of the clash between the simplicity of a children's tale and the sophistication of the not-so-mature adults in Albee's play. Yet the basic idea is preserved: a literary name of universal renown is used as an image portending disaster.

The real piece of news in this press item, however, was that the Czechs had suddenly started to consider Kafka as a figure of both universal appeal and national importance, and this even though he had been decried by theoreticians everywhere in the communist bloc as a decadent petty-bourgeois whose pessimism made his works an obstacle in the path of proletarian culture.

To be sure, Kafka had not fared too badly in Czech left-wing circles. His friend Jarmila Jesenska, a liberal of pronounced socialist leanings, had translated *The Stoker* as early as 1920. She submitted the translation to Stanislav Neumann, who filled a whole issue of his literary magazine *Kmen* (*The Stem*) with the story, which he introduced as 'belonging to the best narratives in the German language'. After Kafka's death in 1924, Neumann published an obituary in the *Communist Review*, in which he called the dead writer 'a sensitive mind who glanced deeply into the organism of today's unjust society, who loved the exploited and inexorably punished the rich in an extremely complex and yet moving fashion'. The communist daily *Rude pravo* printed a similar eulogy on 17 August 1924. Moreover, Gustav Janouch remembers that Neumann interpreted *The Stoker*, whose continuation, *Amerika*, was still unknown, as 'the first real, altogether unconventional portrait of a modern worker who by his efforts actually sets the ship of our world in motion and keeps it moving'.[1] Thus the image of a left-wing Kafka made its appearance in his native city long before West German interpreters like Theodor Adorno, Klaus Wagenbach, and Wilhelm Emrich discovered in Kafka the ingenious critic of capitalist

[1] Gustav Janouch, 'Die Feuerprobe', *Prager Begegnungen* (Leipzig, 1959), 93–120.

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society. The Czechs must have preserved traces of this image all through the German occupation and the postwar troubles, so that in 1958, the year of the Pasternak scandal in Russia, Kafka's *Trial* could be published in Prague, translated by the ever-faithful Pavel Eisner. While the public was officially discouraged from reading this most hopeless and reactionary of all bourgeois writers, ten thousand copies of the novel were sold on the first day of its appearance.[2]

But in 1963, eighty years after Kafka's birth, even the official attitude seemed to change. Cedok, the State Travel Agency, began to arrange so-called 'Kafka Tours' and invited the international tourist trade to visit the local Kafka shrines. Kafka's tomb in the new Jewish cemetery in Olsany, which the French scholar Marthe Robert had discovered only with difficulty in the fall of 1962,[3] was restored and cleaned. The major development in 1963 was, however, a conference convened in May by the Committee of Czech Germanists. The meeting took place in the castle of Liblice—the property of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences—and was attended by seventy local critics and scholars in addition to fourteen guests from East and West Germany, France, Yugoslavia, Austria, Poland, Hungary, and the United States.

Emotions ran high in Liblice. 'Kafka lived also for us', the Warsaw literary historian Roman Karst exclaimed. 'His work speaks to us, too!'[4] And the Austrian critic Ernst Fischer, a man with a rich communist past, appealed to the intelligentsia of the Eastern countries: 'Let us get Kafka's works back from their involuntary exile! Grant him a permanent visa!'[5]

It is a matter of some doubt whether Kafka's exile would have been altogether involuntary. Acutely sensitive to the demands of any authority, this metaphysical anarchist would undoubtedly have taken to his heels before any totalitarian regime. But Fischer's pathos was at least honest: the world of socialism could not offer the exiled writer a homeland but only a residence. He was welcome not by right but on sufferance, a sufferance dictated by political opportunism. As all refugees know, there is nothing more transitory than a permanent visa, which can instantly be abrogated at the slightest whim of authority.

Nevertheless, the conference of Liblice was something new: for the first time an authoritarian state had sanctioned a full-scale discussion of this highly controversial writer. One would suspect that the Czechoslovak Government's wish to promote its tourist trade—and its good relations with the world in general—was an incentive to its participation in the general Kafka boom. Like all the Austrian successor states, Czechoslovakia had inherited a healthy interest in *Fremdenverkehr* and potent currency. At the same time the conference bore witness to Czech nationalism, the mystique of a small and repeatedly suppressed

[2] 'Prager Fruehling', *Der Spiegel*, XVII (1963), 66–7.
[3] 'Prager Tagebuch', *Monat*, XVI (1964), 36–7.
[4] Eduard Goldstücker et al., eds. *Franz Kafka. Liblicka Konference 1963* (hereafter quoted as LK).
[5] Ibid. p. 160.

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nation. Its Czech members catered unabashedly to this nationalism, although, strictly speaking, Kafka was neither a Czech nor a Bohemian but a German-speaking Jew from Prague. Still, the fact remains that the conference seems to have received *carte blanche* from the government to ventilate the problems of communist literature by grappling with the Kafka problem.

POLITICALLY, the conference of Liblice had been prepared by a speech on cultural disarmament that Jean-Paul Sartre had given in Moscow in 1962. To drive home the necessity for intellectual coexistence between East and West, Sartre had stressed Kafka's work, which he described as being universally valid and, at the same time, profoundly unique. The Prague writer was the example and test case of genuine cultural competition. 'I asked one of my Soviet friends', Sartre had said, '"Why don't you translate him?"' The friend answered:

> We shall soon start translating some of his shorter works, but you will understand that Western criticism has distorted him to such an extent that he appears to many among us as our sworn enemy. I replied: And why did you on your part not publish Marxist reviews and claim him for yourselves? Even in this field you would have been victorious, for your methods surpass those of the Western critics in the interpretation of facts. Or rather, you will surpass them when you have taken over from them the right among so much wrong. In short: genuine cultural competition consists in eliminating all barriers within culture and then challenging the other side peacefully with the question: To whom does Kafka belong, to you or to us—that is, who understands him best? Who profits most from him? [6]

Another, albeit less official, turning point in the relations between Czech communist criticism and Kafka's work dates farther back. A few months before his death in 1957, Louis Fürnberg, co-editor of the East German quarterly *Weimarer Beiträge*, sent a letter to the Prague critic Paul Reimann, in which he said:

> It is our task to define our position towards the Kafka problem clearly and unreservedly, concretely and dispassionately, and without failing to appreciate that Kafka was a great writer. This way we shall . . . do more to orient ourselves in the question of Kafka than by continuing in (1) the ignorant flat negation which so far we have allowed to guide us; and (2) the pseudo-objectivity that made us relinquish Kafka, to the benefit of those circles who faced us as mortal enemies.[7]

The author knew Louis Fürnberg well when Fürnberg spent the war years as a refugee in Palestine. He was a mediocre poet, an ardent communist, and a kindly human being. Hailing from Karlsbad, he had been touched by the civilisation of the Habsburg empire and had

[6] Jean-Paul Sartre, 'La démilitarisation de la culture', *France Observateur*, 17 July 1962.
[7] Quoted from Paul Reimann, 'Louis Fuernberg—Erinnerungen und Gedanken', *Von Herder bis Kisch* (Berlin, 1961), 204–5.

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enjoyed the atmosphere of Masaryk's first republic. He used to perform intellectual egg dances in honour of Rilke and Kafka among his Marxist friends.

His letter so impressed Reimann that he immediately wrote for the fourth issue of *Weimarer Beiträge* (1957) an essay entitled 'The Social Problems in Kafka's Novels'. This issue had been prepared by Fürnberg just before his death; he must have rejoiced to have found a communist brother-in-Kafka at long last.

Since, however, the principle of socialist realism was still being followed, Reimann remained intent on discovering it in Kafka's writings. He was less concerned with Kafka's stature as a writer than with his acceptability to socialist esthetics. He continued where Stanislav Neumann had left off. '*Amerika*', he said, 'is a social novel, transparently written, which, apart from some immaterial episodes, contains neither "puzzles" nor "secrets".' Among these 'immaterial episodes' is the last chapter of the fragment, a vision so mysteriously interwoven of miracle and parody that it could be interpreted both as the hero's confirmation into the Catholic Church and as his journey into the land of death. Neglecting these passages in a cavalier fashion, Reimann used *Amerika* to exemplify the futility of all attempts 'to exploit Kafka for the reactionary purposes of the imperialistic bourgeoisie'. For the publication of his essay in book form four years later, he added a significant sentence here: 'Kafka was not at all the spokesman of the imperialist bourgeoisie, he was their helpless victim'.[8] In calling Kafka the victim rather than the mouthpiece of bourgeois society, Reimann eliminated the question of socialist realism, or at least pushed it to the background. The work of the writer stood out in its uniqueness; nor did it matter much now that its author had been the employee of an insurance company, a sickly litterateur who had intended to seduce coming generations into wallowing masochistically in the ruin of their class. Reimann did not overlook the passivity of Kafka's heroes, their lack of resistance, and their lust for losing. But he had begun to distinguish between them and their creator. They were victims, while he pilloried their victimisation.

SOON Reimann received assistance from the Viennese critic Ernst Fischer, who warned his readers against disposing of Kafka by classifying him as the moribund offspring of a doomed society.[9] In 1962 he demolished the decadence theory in his weighty essay 'Alienation, Decadence, and Realism'. Using a comparative approach, and grouping him with Joyce as a 'master of fantastic satire' (and adding, for good measure, the names of such decadents as Marcel Proust, William Faulkner, Thomas Mann, and—of all writers—Herman Melville), he denied that decadence in literature was necessarily synonymous with the

[8] 'Die gesellschaftliche Problematik in Kafkas Romanen', *Von Herder bis Kisch*, 159.
[9] *Sinn und Form*, X (1958), 473.

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decline and decay of capitalism. 'Our time of world-historical transition', he said, 'is characterised by a variety of oscillations, partial decisions and experiments with regard both to the petty-bourgeois producer of art and to the dubiousness of the content and form of his production'. And he continued:

> In every declining society a new one ripens. There is no lack of antitoxins against decadence, either in the working classes or among the intellectuals. To be sure the writer, the artist, cannot completely escape the influence of his poisoned surroundings; he is not, however, abandoned to it defencelessly either. He may be corrupted; indeed often enough he *is* corrupted. But only rarely does he submit to the ruling classes lastingly and unconditionally. There is the artist's conscience, which cannot easily be paralysed: his experience of his surroundings is different from the experience of those in power; it is an experience that does not correspond to theirs.[10]

It was not by chance that, together with Fischer's essay, *Sinn und Form* published a translation of Sartre's 'Demilitarisation of Culture'. The thaw had set in. Yet Fischer leaves Sartre far behind when he admits the possibility that despair may take a sudden turn to political action. 'Kafka has created total negation', he says; 'but in it there is also hidden the negation of negation, the breakthrough from alienation to a decision which bestows upon existence a sudden meaning, and the sense of belonging'. By combining the Marxian concept of *Entfremdung* with the idea of *Durchbruch*, which permeates so pessimistic a work as Thomas Mann's *Doctor Faustus*, Fischer had moved close to the border beyond which the left wing of Western Kafka interpreters held sway. He undoubtedly profited from the air of neutrality prevailing in his native Austria, which rendered him less susceptible to the continuous vacillations undergone by the official party line towards literature since Stalin's death. In his interpretation Kafka was no longer a 'slave of circumstance' (Ludwig Börne) but a figure who, beyond the categories of historical materialism, lingered on in the 'no man's land between isolation and community'. This in itself was heresy. And yet the time seemed to have come to initiate, perhaps through the criticism of Kafka, a revision of communist esthetics in general.

THE Liblice conference appears to have been due to the initiative of one man, Eduard Goldstücker. Goldstücker had been jailed during the early fifties, when he was recalled as Minister to Israel and sentenced to life imprisonment on the charge of having participated in the Slansky conspiracy. After a few years he was quietly released and appointed Professor of German Language and Literature at the Charles University in Prague. Before Hitler, this chair had been occupied by the venerable Otakar Fischer, the translator into Czech of Heine and Kleist, and interpreter of Karl Kraus. At first, the inherited liberalism of his office seems

[10] Ibid. XIV (1962), 816–18.

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to have rubbed off on Goldstücker. His paper at Liblice included a lengthy comparison of Kafka and Kleist, a sociological complement to Max Brod's early juxtaposition of the two authors in psychological terms.[11] As a precondition of modern Kafka scholarship the Czech professor postulated the abandonment of the sociologising vulgarisims that had tended to reduce the authorised biography of any writer to a party certificate of good conduct. Yet Goldstücker took back with his left hand what he gave with his right: insisting on the sociological foundation and biographical nature of each work of art, he overstressed the importance of *The Stoker* and, following Wilhelm Emrich, read revolutionary motives even into the land-surveyorship of K. in *The Castle*. Like his Western predecessor, he neglected the textual evidence which indicates that K. is completely obsessed with his own ordeal and remains profoundly untouched by the sufferings of the proletarians in the village. Having been a victim of political terror, Goldstücker transmogrified Kafka, the visionary of universal pain, into a prophet of atrocities such as Goldstücker himself had endured. For him, Kafka's importance was to be found in his anticipation of Fascist outrages, an interpretation already given by Edwin Muir in 1938, as Peter Demetz has noted.[12] The Prague professor was and remains a stalwart Marxist even though he seems to subscribe to the doctrines of the non-Marxist Sartre concerning nationalism and the demilitarisation of culture. Thus he felt compelled to reiterate the words Sartre had spoken in Moscow (thereby connecting the two conferences for all to see): 'The profundity of every work springs from the national history, language and traditions, from the special, and in most cases tragic, questions put to the artist by his time and place through the living community of which he is an integral part'.[13]

In this attitude he was supported by Frantisek Kautman, who addressed the conference on the subject of Kafka and Czech literature. Kautman argued no point other than the intimate relationship of Kafka with the city of Prague: his presentation was honest and cautious, and he consistently refused to introduce any facile political premises and implications. Like Goldstücker before him, Kautman deflated the myth of Kafka's close personal relations with the Czech anarchists, a commonplace of Kafka interpretation East and West ever since Max Brod had alluded to it in his novel *Stefan Rott*. On the other hand, in establishing a correspondence between the work of Kafka and that of Richard Weiner, Kautman added new traits of the typology of the Jewish writers in Prague—whether their childhood language was German or, as with Weiner, Czech. He quoted two sentences from Weiner's *Lazebnik* (*The Barber*), a book written five years after Kafka's death, which in their evocation of loneliness as well as in their imagery reduplicate the world view of the older writer: 'Man never knows what is going to happen

[11] LK, 34–5.
[12] 'Ein Band Kafka gegen ein Moped', *Die Zeit*, 8 May 1964.
[13] LK, 25 (omitted from *France Observateur*).

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when the doorbell rings. Truly, the world is wide, so that he is the wisest who admits that he loses himself in it and, sticking out his head, listens only while shutting his eyes'. The emotions conveyed by this aphorism, and especially the cadence, seem to come straight out of Kafka's 'Country Doctor' and 'The Burrow'. In Weiner as in Hermann Grab—whose *Stadtpark* of 1935 was not mentioned by Kautman—Kafka appears indeed to have found followers who walked in his footsteps because they, too, had felt the impact of the 'clutches of little mother Prague'.

Nevertheless, Kautman all but failed to acknowledge any direct influence the older authors may have had on contemporary writing. It is true that he cited the claims made by the French surrealists that Kafka was their literary ancestor, claims that would relate their Czech followers, poets like Nezval, even more closely to the nightmares that had haunted Kafka half a century before. Had not Kafka himself produced a surrealist motto when he remarked to Gustav Janouch: 'Actual reality is always unrealistic'? Yet Kautman seems to be on the right path again when he points to Dostoevsky as the ancestor common to Kafka and the surrealists. At best they were relatives twice removed.

WHEN the two young philosophers Ivan Svitak and Alexei Kusak addressed the meeting, they left orthodox Marxism resolutely behind. Svitak, who later lost his chair and was expelled from the party, attempted an existentialist interpretation and quoted Hölderlin. To him creation was 'a tragic outcry about man in search of man'.[14] Kusak demanded a purely literary explication and denounced the preoccupation of the conference with Kafka's local and class origins. Although the names of Heidegger and of the new critics were passed over in silence, their ideas and methods must have penetrated some minds in Liblice.

Clearly, there was a revolt in the making. These young men turned to Kafka as a companion in their fight against their elders in much the same way as Kafka himself had once risen against the image of his own father. Their weapons resembled his: they were intellectual integrity and the courage to reject conventions when they had clearly become obsolete.

Paul Reimann retracted. He abandoned the position he had previously taken and deserted his dead friend Fürnberg by inveighing against Kafka. He blamed him for 'having hindered us in starting on the way Marx and Lenin had summoned us to go, the way to changing the world', and for having 'prevented us from solving what has become the life task of our generation: taking the laws of life into our own hands and organising the world so that people can live and produce'.[15] Reimann further compared Kafka with 'a mouse which happens to walk into a trap and, looking for an escape, helplessly runs to and fro, and

[14] Ibid 96.
[15] Ibid. 19.

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finally, exhausted, collapses'. Zoology generally played a prominent role in the conference and its aftermath. When people began to speak of the jackdaw as 'a swallow heralding spring', East Germany's *arbiter elegantiarum*, Alfred Kurella, leaped to his feet to announce that he for his part could see no swallows—only bats coming out at nightfall.[16]

Thus it is easy to understand why the East German delegation supported Reimann, adding to his indictment wherever possible. They were led not by the liberal Hans Mayer—at that time still a member of the faculty at Leipzig—but by his faithful student, Helmut Richter—faithful, that is, to the official party line. In Richter's view the German Kafka epigones—Hermann Kasack, Friedrich Dürrenmatt, Martin Walser, and Walter Jens, among others—were all children of the West, a decadent and yet aggressive lot who symbolised the inevitable decline of the civilisation they pretended to serve.[17] Eastern Germany, on the other hand, was free of jackdaws, mice, and bats. As a foil to the zealous young men from behind the Berlin wall there appeared the aristocratic profile of Anna Seghers, the veteran novelist. But she refrained from speaking, at least officially, still conscious, perhaps, that *Transit*, her story of 1954, had reminded the critics too strongly of Kafka.

The Hungarian Jenö Krammer spoke only briefly, and said next to nothing. The shadow of a greater man fell over him, and he knew it. But Georg Lukacs had not come to Liblice. Like the rest of the older communist critics, Lukacs had been haunted by the ghost of socialist realism. That this ghost is a subjective spectre can be seen from the way Lukacs treats Thomas Mann and Franz Kafka. Mann qualifies as a genuine realist 'who approaches the milieu of his life in a critical fashion', whereas Kafka is 'a classical case of a writer stopped on his way [to realism] by a blind and panic fear of reality'. The Hungarian philosopher seems to have forgotten that Mann, in his *Reflections of an Unpolitical Man*, approached 'the milieu of his life' by siding with the cannon of the Prussian Empire, whereas Kafka's diaries reveal the most rebellious sensitivity possible in the circumstances under which he was forced to live. (The anti-Semitic Lord Mayor of Vienna, Dr. Karl Lueger, when asked why he had Jewish friends, replied: 'I decide who is a Jew'; in the same way Lukacs decides who is a realist—arbitrarily and as a matter of personal preference.) Lukacs could have used the same arguments for Kafka as a realist as he did when discussing Thomas Mann. (After Russian intervention had ended the uprising in the fall of 1956, the Hungarians used to tell the story of his arrest. He was taken to Rumania and shut up in some sort of weird castle, where he and his fellow prisoners were treated sometimes like felons and sometimes like guests of honour. After a few days of this, Lukacs is supposed to have murmured to himself: 'So Kafka was a realist after all!') But Kafka remained for him the mouthpiece of the Western *avant-garde* to whom

[16] *Monat*, XVI (1964), 49.
[17] LK, 186.

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the world appeared as an 'allegory of transcendental nothingness'.[18] Kafka's books were anti-socialist and anti-realist, the self-indulgent exercises of a tormented and misguided mind. All this the philosopher had laid down with a maximum of learning and penetration. He did not have to visit Liblice. The man whose judgments determine who is orthodox and who revisionist could afford to remain invisible.

IN a paper, prudently not read at the conference, the Pole Roman Karst gives by far the best treatment so far undertaken of the time problem in Kafka. Speaking of the Prague writer as a contemporary and seeing in him a European phenomenon, Karst compares Kafka with Marcel Proust, the hands of whose clock go steadily back, 'moved by memory to bring back to us lost experience', and with James Joyce, the hands of whose clock 'go round as if crazed, for ever changing direction, since they are moved by the force of the writer's associations'.

> The hands on Kafka's clock, however, remain immovable. Proust sets out to regain the past with the help of memory; Kafka wants to efface this past. In one, the mechanism of recollection is at work; in the other, the mechanism of forgetting. In Kafka memory is an abyss devouring the past and with it the wealth of what has been experienced. Kafka's figures are men without a personal history, their life consisting only of the moment filled with unrest, because they struggle for a truth unattainable to them.[19]

Karst replaces interpretation through the use of biographical, topological, or sociological facts by exegesis couched in metaphors. He uses Kafka's own key to unlock his secret. A poetic rhapsody rather than a critical analysis, his essay attempts to decipher Kafka's text by using the language of images, opaque and yet precise. These were new tones, and Karst knew why he kept them to himself in Liblice. Poland had been uniquely successful in integrating Kafka. In 1958 *The Trial* was performed in the Warsaw Teatr Ateneum; a year before, the short novels of Bruno Schulz were republished in Cracow. Written in 1934, *The Cinnamon Stores* are, at least thematically, indebted to Kafka, whose *Trial* Schulz had translated in 1936. The world as a labyrinth presided over by a godlike father was the same in Prague and Drohobycz, where Schulz spent most of his life, and where he was shot in 1942 by the Gestapo. His style lacks the immediacy as well as the transparency of Kafka's; he displays a predilection for the abrupt and absurd which undoubtedly contributed to the renewed interest in his writings in the wake of Kafka's popularity in Poland.

Recent Polish writers in general seem to have subscribed to Camus' idea of seeing the protagonists of *The Castle* and especially of *The Trial* as absurd heroes.[20] Whereas the Czechs had tried to connect Kafka and

[18] *Wider den missverstandenen Realismus* (Hamburg, 1953), 56, 86.
[19] 'Unbewegliche Uhrzeiger', *Wort in der Zeit*, IX (1963), 9.
[20] Albert Camus, 'L'espoir et l'absurde dans l'oeuvre de Franz Kafka', *Le Mythe de Sisyphe* (Paris, 1942), 169 ff.

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surrealism, the Poles derived absurd theatre from the situations to which the bank clerk and the land surveyor are exposed in Kafka's novels. Sławomir Mrozek's metaphysical thriller, *Striptease*, for example, would be as unthinkable without Kafka's model as it would be without the influence of Sartre's *Huis Clos*. The two nondescript gentlemen who are plunged from a foggy street into a completely empty room play a variation on the theme of Josef K.'s arrest. The mystery of the door is repeated here in the form of theatrical magic: Kafka's mysterious doorkeeper is missing; instead, Mrozek's door shuts without being closed and opens again to let an enormous hand pass through. When one of the gentlemen says: 'The most we can do is to preserve our internal dignity and freedom', he is quoting almost word for word Josef K.'s reflexions on his way to execution. As K. lies half naked before his executioners, so the two Everymen in *Striptease* are gradually divested of all that is left to their humanity, their clothes. These men too must perish. Without having discovered the nature of their guilt, they are beckoned to death by a second mammoth hand covered by a red glove. Mrozek's theatrical imagination transposes Kafka's epic imagery into scenes that seem both to imitate and to parody their model. He does not dramatise Kafka as Jean-Louis Barrault, André Gide, and Max Brod have done; he rises to meet the challenge of Kafka's world. Black humour takes the place of his predecessor's iridescent irony: the condemned men, who at long last have been handcuffed, stumble and grope around the stage until they have found and picked up their briefcases, each one his own—but these, the last signs of their identity, are exactly the same. Yet tricks and gags notwithstanding, Mrozek's short scene also centres upon the freedom of man confronted by the inexpressible and visited by a second reality beyond all human reality. Multifaceted like a Kafka parable, the playlet reduces the older writer's paradox of existence to a metaphor of the absurdity of fate.

The example of the young Czechs as well as the Poles shows that Kafka's spirit seems to emerge wherever a crack opens in the walls of the communist system. Kafka, the most self-imprisoned of men, has become a harbinger of freedom: a fact that would have elicited a smile of pained understanding from him before he looked again with a tormented smile at the bars of his cage.

AFTER the conference was concluded, Roger Garaudy, a philosopher and a member of the Politbureau of the French Communist Party, gave an interview in which he violently attacked Stalin's *Dialectical and Historical Materialism* as obsolete, as a closed system of the laws of dialectics. Stalin's and Zhdanov's concept of realism, he said, started from a static definition of art abstracted from the practices of the nineteenth century. Lumping Kafka together with Picasso, of all people, he suggested that the works of neither artist fitted such a definition. 'Consequently', he concluded, 'either these works must be

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rejected, which is wrong and ridiculous, or else realism must be redefined to include [them] '.[21]

Garaudy applied the Marxian concept of *Entfremdung* not only to bourgeois society but to socialist society as well. With the words ' Kafka fought against alienation without being able to overcome it ', he summed up his interview.

> Therefore Kafka's work is of immediate interest for the capitalist world, in which people live in alienation. It is, however, also of immediate interest for the socialist world, because socialism is the beginning of the fight against alienation, for a total man, but it does not abolish all forms of estrangement. As long as the communist society has not been built, the roots of various forms of alienation continue to exist in socialism. The conference on Kafka presented evidence that literary criticism is ridding itself of dogmatic errors and is aware of the importance of the artistic work in itself. In this sense the conference had a wider and deeper significance and became, because of its clearly anti-dogmatic and anti-mechanistic tendency, a stage in the struggle for creative Marxism.

The dream was beautiful, but it would remain no more than a dream so long as the orthodox members of the conference could count on political support from the state authorities. Still, the results of Liblice were far-reaching, albeit in a less ideological way than Garaudy had suggested. In Prague, a number of official celebrations heralded and followed the conference. Preparations were begun to perform the dramatised versions of *The Trial* and *The Castle*, even though these plays were indeed artistic offences committed by the West in the wake of the Kafka boom. Popular lectures were given in the Czech capital to acquaint the people with the deliberations of the conference. Radio and television joined in to carry the often esoteric discussions into Czech homes, and on 3 July 1963, the eightieth anniversary of Kafka's birth, state officials spoke at and deposited flowers on his tomb. A year later Max Brod was to travel from Israel to open a Kafka exhibition in the Prague Museum of Czech Literature. A cartoon in the satirical weekly *Dikobraz* (*Porcupine*) showed a little man half hidden behind the giant pages of *Literarni casopis*, sighing, ' Kafka. Nothing but Kafka '. What had once been opium for the people had become their daily bread.

Further east, during an international conference at Leningrad, Ilya Ehrenburg had dwelt on the historical importance of the Prague writer in an address that was as magisterial as it was noncommittal.[22] Thereupon some Kafka stories—' The Metamorphosis ' and selected short pieces—were published in the January 1964 number of *Inostrannaya Literatura* in Moscow, accompanied by an essay of S. Knipovich. A month earlier the Ukrainian literary journal *Vsyesvit* had printed ' The Stoker ', ' The Metamorphosis ', ' The Bucket Rider ', ' Before the Law ',

[21] *Plamen*, V (1963), 1.
[22] ' Nicht auf Kafka schiessen!' *Der Spiegel*, XVII (1963), 74.

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and ' An Imperial Message '.[23] In Rumania, a young writer, S. Damian, praised Kafka, Proust, and Joyce publicly as ' explorers who contributed to a better understanding of man '. Even Lukacs seems to have relented. In his recently published study, *Aesthetics*, he compares Kafka with Charlie Chaplin, who, he says, has given an objective form to some of Kafka's ideas.[24] The only two countries of the bloc that failed to react favourably to the conference at Liblice were Albania and the German Democratic Republic.

To the eye of the Western observer the Czech convention offered the spectacle of the ' Pit of Babel ', an image coined by Kafka himself. Men of diverse opinions talked past each other in many languages; the orthodox and the liberals both dug in where even the unprejudiced could not hope to reach solid rock; the dust of doctrine rose blindingly; and the whole burrow was further undermined by the few young critics who insisted on following Kafka on his own meandering ways, wherever they might lead.

(This essay is based on a chapter in a study of Kafka to be published shortly by Cornell University Press.)

[23] Dieter Hasselblatt, *Zauber und Logik*. Eine Kafka-Studie (Cologne, 1964), 15. Hasselblatt adds a thorough analysis of Knipovich's essay; Hans Mayer und François Bondy, ' The Struggle for Kafka and Joyce ', *Encounter*, XXII (1964), 83 n.; and Dieter Hasselblatt, ' Kafka russisch ', *Monat*, XVI (1964), 84.

[24] *Aesthetik* I: 2 (Neuwied, 1963), 512.

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RUSSIANS AND THEIR CARS

Donald D. Barry

THE Soviet Union is beginning to face some of the problems connected with the automobile which have long plagued countries of the West, and it has some special difficulties of its own, arising from its system of resource allocation. The situation is severely taxing the ingenuity of economists, engineers, lawyers, and police, not to mention the highest political authorities, who are responsible for making decisions about the ways the Soviet passenger automobile will be used in the future. It should, however, be remembered that trucks constitute by far the majority of motor vehicles on Soviet roads.

Although the Soviet Union doesn't approach the United States (or, for that matter, West Germany, the United Kingdom, or France) in motor vehicle output, it is one of the world's major producers, and it holds the distinction of being one of the two countries (the other is Japan) that turns out more commercial vehicles than passenger cars. At the beginning of 1964 about 3·8 million or almost 80 per cent. of the Soviet Union's 4·7 million motor vehicles were trucks and buses. This proportion is approximately reversed in the United States and France, and in other major motor vehicle producing countries in the West the preponderance is also overwhelmingly on the side of passenger cars. As compared with one passenger car for fewer than three people in the United States and one for eight people in the United Kingdom, the ratio for the USSR for 1964 was one car for every 305 people. When one considers the large number of passenger cars operated by the state in the Soviet Union, it is clear that this ratio is really considerably greater.

The Soviet automobile industry produced 603,000 vehicles in 1964, including 185,000 passenger cars or just over 30 per cent of the total.[1] It does not appear likely that the industry will be able to meet the seven-year plan production target of 750,000–856,000 units for 1965. It should also be borne in mind that most cars and trucks are found in a few of the larger population centres, and that the lack of a good highway system prevents large-scale automobile travel over great parts of the country. At the beginning of 1963 the USSR had 330,000 kilometres of surfaced roads. This is less than the amount in the states of New York and Ohio. Even in the relatively developed Ukrainian Republic only 25 per cent of the road mileage is surfaced. Soviet experts estimate that in order to connect all regional centres of the country with the nearest railroad stations or river ports will require another 120,000 kilometres of roads, mostly in the RSFSR and Kazakhstan. They conclude that the inadequacy of the present road system accounts for losses in the economy of at least three and one half billion rubles per year. In 1960 trucks carried 5·2 per cent of Soviet commercial freight

[1] *Izvestiya*, 31 January 1965.

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(as compared with 25 per cent in the United States); by 1980 this percentage is to rise to 9, which may require speeding up the pace of road-building from the present level of about 20,000 kilometres per year.[2]

The motor vehicles that there are, then, are clustered in a few relatively small areas and, by Soviet standards, things are considerably more crowded than they used to be. In the past five years the number of motor vehicles in Moscow has more than doubled. While most of these vehicles are trucks and buses, there are just under 10,000 taxis and about 70,000 private cars.[3]

The increase in the number of vehicles has been accompanied by all the problems familiar to the West. The number of garages or places to park private cars overnight in Moscow is inadequate; in May 1963 a system of one-way streets was instituted for parts of downtown Moscow; pedestrian underpasses are being built in many sections of the city; a limited-access belt highway ninety-two kilometres long has recently been completed around the city.

Road accidents have maimed or killed several prominent Soviet citizens in recent years (only on such occasions does this kind of news get into the Soviet press), and the amount of legal literature on the subject indicates that road casualties are considered a serious problem. Concern is being expressed by Soviet scientists about air pollution caused by automobile exhaust fumes. Car theft has become common enough to warrant fairly frequent press coverage.

These are all matters with which the urban dweller of the West has long been familiar. Several other problems not normally experienced in the West in peacetime characterise the Soviet scene. While motor fuel may be somewhat less expensive than in Western Europe, filling stations are not easy to find. In 1960 in the city of Frunze there were 1,400 individual cars and 1,500 motorcycles but not one petrol station.[4] Late in 1963 there were 1,280 filling stations in the whole of the Russian Republic; this was estimated at one-fifth the number needed. As a result, a growing practice has been for desperate owners of private cars to buy petrol from truck drivers. Such illegal transactions benefit both sides for, as one Soviet official put it: 'The more [fuel] that is used up, the higher the percentage of plan fulfilment and, consequently, the higher the wages. Also, surpluses of gasoline and lubricants form as a result of padding the amounts of work performed in the trip reports. And this gasoline goes for a low price to citizens who have vehicles at their personal disposal.'[5]

Automobile repair facilities are in just as short supply. In 1963, for instance, the city of Moscow had 70,000 privately owned cars and

[2] Cf. *Ekonomicheskaia Gazeta* (hereafter cited as *Ek. Gaz.*), 20 April 1963 and 17 October 1964; *Automobile Facts and Figures*, 1964 ed., p. 62; *Avtomobilnye Dorogi*, 1964, No. 5.

[3] *Izvestiya*, 19 August 1964; *Ek. Gaz.*, 14 September 1963; *New York Times*, 24 August 1964. The present population of Moscow is about 6·3 million.

[4] *Izvestiya*, 20 April 1960, p. 3; quoted in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (hereafter cited as *CDSP*), vol. XII, No. 16, p. 25.

[5] *Pravda*, 6 September 1963; *CDSP*, vol. XV, No. 36, p. 24.

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eight repair garages. Even at these garages routine servicing and minor repairs are difficult to arrange, because plan fulfilment is more easily attained by major repairs and motor installations. Repair garages do not normally carry spare parts, which must be bought at special stores. Spare parts are quite expensive and in notoriously short supply.

THE two best-known and important automobile-making centres in the USSR are Moscow and Gorky. However, there are at least a dozen other motor vehicle production plants in the Soviet Union, most of them located in the western part of the country. Passenger cars are produced only in Moscow, Gorky, and the Ukrainian city of Zaporozhe. The three types of vehicles for sale to the public are, in descending order of size, the Volga from the Gorky factory, the Moskvich from the Moscow MZMA plant, and the Zaporozhets from the Kommunar factory in Zaporozhe.

The several models of the Volga, a five-passenger vehicle similar in size to a Ford Falcon or Consul, constitute somewhat less than half of the 185,000 Soviet passenger cars now produced annually. The Volga has a 75 horsepower, four-cylinder motor and a top listed speed of 130 kilometres per hour. In 1957 it replaced in production the less streamlined Pobeda, a significant number of which are still on the roads. The Volga and, to a lesser extent, the Pobeda make up the bulk of the taxi fleet.

The Moskvich is a smaller four-door, four-passenger car somewhat larger than a Volkswagen. It has a four-cylinder, 45 horsepower engine (the newest model, on which production is to begin in mid-1965, is to have a 50 horsepower engine) and a maximum speed of 120 kilometres per hour. It is widely used by various governmental bodies and is reported to be an important export item.

From several standpoints, the most interesting of the Soviet passenger vehicles is the Zaporozhets. The Kommunar factory in Zaporozhe, which originally made agricultural machinery, received permission in the late 1950s to produce a small, inexpensive-to-run car (a *mikrolitrazhny* or minimum petrol-using vehicle as distinguished from the *malolitrazhny* or little petrol-using Moskvich). The prototype appeared early in 1959, but actual production did not begin until late 1960 or early 1961. The new car was a two-door, four-seat vehicle comparable in size to the Italian Fiat and powered by a four-cylinder, 20–22 horsepower, air-cooled, rear-mounted engine.

Almost from the start there was considerable criticism both of the Zaporozhets and of the Kommunar car production operation. At a Central Committee meeting in March 1962 Khrushchev expressed regret that the initial production of the Zaporozhets had been permitted, stating that the country could do without such cars and that the production of agricultural equipment was suffering because of them (*Pravda*, 6 March 1962).

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A month later *Ekonomicheskaia Gazeta*, a weekly publication of the CPSU Central Committee, made an assessment of the Zaporozhets and the Kommunar factory. It reported that 8,297 automobiles were produced during the first year of production, of which 1,357 were sent back as defective. Losses due to poor workmanship totalled 419,000 rubles. The cost of production was much higher than planned, and the factory spent a million rubles more than planned in wages. As for the car's comfort and quality, *Ekonomicheskaia Gazeta* added, in an unusually severe criticism of a Soviet product, 'the automobile is very expensive, requires a great deal of metal, is uncomfortable to drive . . . is very crowded for passengers (especially in winter), is unfit for touring and long trips. . . . Finally, it is unreliable because of a long list of structural and production deficiencies'.[6] The inefficient operation of the agricultural machinery part of the plant was attributed to the factory's concentration on the higher-prestige automobile production.

It was thought at first that this high-level criticism would doom the Zaporozhets, but by mid-1962 the Kommunar factory had begun work on a completely new model. According to *Trud* (19 February 1965), it is to be roomier and have more window space than the old one, and is likely to compete with the Moskvich. It has a larger body than the old model, and the horsepower has been doubled to 40; its top speed will be 120 kilometres per hour. Two other Zaporozhets vehicles will be produced: a small van of the order of the Volkswagen microbus and a more rugged variant of the same vehicle for use in rural areas.

In addition to the three automobiles mentioned, there are other varieties of Soviet passenger cars, including two kinds of large, elegant limousines not available to the general public but limited to party and government use. These are the ZIL-111 produced at the Likhachev factory in Moscow, and the more streamlined Chaika from the Gorky plant. Two related matters which should be touched on are the practice of incorporating features of foreign automobiles in Soviet products and the fuel consumption of Soviet cars.

To even the casual observer, it has long been clear that many aspects of the design of Soviet automobiles are imitations of features found on cars produced earlier in the West. This continues to be a common practice. To cite one recent example, a new addition to the re-designed model of the Moskvich which will appear in 1965 is a system of back-up lights which will go on when the car is put in reverse gear—a feature of western cars for years. One need only scan the pages of *Ekonomicheskaia Gazeta* to see that a good bit of technological borrowing still goes on.

Soviet sources differ somewhat as to fuel consumption. Generally speaking, the popular publications,[7] which are usually uncritical in their descriptions, indicate that fuel consumption in highway driving should be about:

[6] *Ek. Gaz.*, 9 April 1962.

[7] See, for instance, *Avtomobilist*, No. 1, 1961, pp. 45, 49, 69.

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31·4 miles per gallon (26·1 miles per US gallon) for the Volga
43·5 miles per gallon (36·2 miles per US gallon) for the Moskvich
47·0 miles per gallon (39·2 miles per US gallon) for the Zaporozhets

However, results of tests published in an automobile engineering journal list much lower results. Under good conditions the Moskvich's performance was about 28·2 miles per gallon (23·5 miles per US gallon) while that of the Zaporozhets was about 37·7 miles per gallon (31·4 miles per US gallon).[8] The present writer's conversations with Moscow taxi drivers and with several private owners produced approximately the same figures for the Moskvich, and indicated a performance for the Volga of about 20·2 miles per gallon (16·8 miles per US gallon).

SINCE buying an automobile is quite a complicated process and since the Soviet authorities go to considerable lengths to discourage the private ownership of cars, this matter and the alternatives the authorities are attempting to promote require consideration.

Soviet law provides for several categories of private property (which is referred to as ' personal property '): ' earnings and savings, a home (or part thereof) and subsidiary household effects, articles of domestic equipment and utility, of personal consumption and convenience ' (article 25 of the Principles of Civil Law of the USSR and the Union Republics). It is as an article of personal convenience that an automobile may be owned by a Soviet citizen.

By far the greater number of passenger cars are used for official purposes or in the economy (taxis, etc.) or for export. The remainder available to would-be individual purchasers is much smaller than the demand. This has caused considerable difficulty for the government and has led to the adoption of several devices aimed at either discouraging demand or preventing improper activities stemming from the scarcity.

To buy a car, the individual must first get himself on a list of waiting buyers. This he does by signing up at the local outlet where cars are sold, but before getting his place on the list he must first pay the full purchase price of the car he wishes to buy. When his number comes up, he is informed by the automobile outlet and can then pick up his car.

In mid-1962 the writer visited the one automobile outlet in Moscow. Signs on the walls indicated that the waiting list for the Volga was 93,500 and for the Moskvich 22,750.[9] Another sign stated that the waiting list for the Volga and the Moskvich had been closed in March 1956, and that no later applications were being accepted; it added that those on the present list would receive their cars by mid-1963 or 1964, and that the time when applications would again be accepted would be announced sometime in the future. An observer on the scene in May 1963 stated that the waiting list which closed in March 1956 was still

[8] *Avtomobilnaia Promyshlennost*, 1963, No. 4, p. 27.
[9] Approximately the same figure is given for the Volga and 115,000 for the Moskvich, in A. Gudimov, ' Ya Kupil Avtomobil ', *Ek. Gaz*, 24 August 1963, p. 40.

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in effect. So it seems clear that some of those who have signed up and paid for automobiles have had to wait six or seven years for delivery.

In spite of the prospect of such a wait for an automobile, the lines are unmanageably long. To alleviate the situation, it appears that the authorities encouraged some people to drop off the lists. In April 1963 prices were raised on new cars by 25 to 35 per cent.[10] As an example of what this meant in concrete terms, the price of the Moskvich went up from 2,500 rubles to 3,400 rubles. Those on the list unwilling or unable to pay 900 more rubles would have been removed from the list.

Another method used was to review the lists and discourage or remove those 'who intended to acquire automobiles not for the satisfaction of their material or cultural desires, but for the sale or transfer to other persons'.[11] The volunteer public (*obshchestvenny*) commissions for watching the waiting lists to guard against improper practices were probably responsible in part for these reviews. These commissions were first set up in the 1950s, but they received renewed emphasis in the early 1960s.

As a result of such devices, by mid-1963 all those still on the lists had been able to get automobiles, and applications to get on new waiting lists were again accepted. Within a short period of time hundreds of thousands of Muscovites had signed up.[12]

This information makes at least one thing clear: a significant number of Soviet citizens have both a strong desire and the money to buy an automobile. Anyone who is willing to endure the delay and the arbitrary price rises is a hardy consumer indeed. The actual prices of the cars are another interesting matter. The old Zaporozhets at 2,200 rubles, the Moskvich at 3,400 rubles, and the Volga at 5,500 rubles are clearly much more expensive than their approximate equivalents in the West. A Western reporter has quoted officials at the Moskvich plant as saying that in addition to the securing of foreign exchange through exports, the Moskvich is built primarily to siphon off excess purchasing power from the Soviet population.[13] Significantly, the prices of Soviet cars exported outside the Soviet bloc have to be cut considerably in order to meet competition.

It is almost as difficult to get a used car as to buy a new one. Until early 1961 a privately owned automobile could be sold as a purely private matter between seller and buyer, the authorities intervening only when the State Automobile Inspection agency (GAI) effected the transfer of ownership papers for a fifty kopek fee. Given the scarcity of automobiles, this arrangement provided a way for speculators to ply their trade. As a result, in March 1961 the Council of Ministers adopted a resolution 'Concerning Measures for Combating Speculation in Automobiles', which prohibited the free sale of used cars between private individuals and directed that henceforth they be sold through commission

10 *New York Times*, 28 May 1963.
11 A. Stepanova in *Sovetskaia Yustitsiya*, July 1962, p. 24.
12 Gudimov, loc. cit.
13 *New York Times*, 12 January 1964.

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stores, shops where second-hand goods are sold with the commission going to the middleman, the state. The next month the RSFSR Ministry of Trade adopted rules setting down the procedure for such sales.[14]

When a used car is taken into a commission store for sale, the store examines it and, together with the owner, sets a price. In determining the price, the cost of a corresponding new car is taken into consideration. In the case of foreign used cars, the rules list an approximate Soviet equivalent to aid in deciding on prices. For instance, the Soviet counterpart to a used Buick, Mercedes, Opel, Skoda, or Tatra is considered to be the old ZIM automobile. The store keeps a commission of seven per cent of the sale price, but though it makes a judgment as to the condition of the car, helps set the price, and gains a return for its efforts, it gives no guarantee of quality and accepts no responsibility.

Once a used car is ready for sale an advertisement is posted in the commission store. If, after seven days, no-one on the list to buy a new car has come forward, the used car is offered for sale to others on a first come-first served basis. The store in Moscow visited by the writer in mid-1962 had a large bulletin board listing ninety to one hundred cars for sale on a commission basis. A typical entry was: '1959 Moskvich-407, 38,220 kilometres, 2,100 rubles.' The price of a new Moskvich at that time was only 400 rubles higher.

For the present, it appears that opportunities for private automobile ownership will continue to be limited. Nor are the prospects for improvement bright, as the state moves ahead with its planned comprehensive rental system (described below). It may be that opportunities to buy cars will be further limited by changes in the method of allocation. In the Azerbaidzhan Republic cars are sold not to individuals on a waiting list, but to individuals according to the *kollektiv* to which they belong. The individual apparently needs a recommendation from his *kollektiv*, and this arrangement obviously favours leading workers. It has been recommended that this system be put into general practice. As one advocate puts it: 'In present conditions the right to acquire an automobile should become one factor in the incentive system. . . . The best production workers, scholars, doctors, writers, agronomists, scientific workers should receive preference.'[15]

UNTIL recently, Soviet leaders made it clear that the period of the comprehensive building of communism would not bring widespread private automobile ownership. The possibility that this policy may be changing is considered at the end of this article. Former Premier Khrushchev said on a number of occasions that the Soviet

[14] Council of Ministers resolution No. 277 of 23 March 1961. The author can cite no printed source for this resolution because he saw it in unbound form in a library in Moscow. The same is true of the RSFSR Ministry of Trade rules mentioned above, which were published as an appendix to Decree No. 256 of that Ministry of 28 April 1961, 'O Dopolnitelnykh Merakh Borby so Spekuliatsiei Legkovymi Avtomobiliami'.

[15] Gudimov, loc. cit.

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Union does not intend to compete with the United States in the production of automobiles: it wants to handle its transportation problems more rationally. As he saw it, the problem was one to be stated strictly in terms of resource allocation and economic efficiency: 'You know, people are not vagabonds. They work. And when people work the automobile stands. But if it stands, it still gets old. Therefore we consider it unwise to have many unnecessary automobiles. The private ownership, capitalist orientation in the use of automobiles doesn't fit our situation. We will introduce a socialist method of serving the population' (*Pravda*, 2 April 1960).

This means, for one thing, greater emphasis on public transportation. But the scheme on which Soviet authorities are relying most—what they see as a real substitute for private ownership—is an extensive, nationwide system of automobile rental. Khrushchev suggested that such a system would require one-tenth to one-fifteenth the number of cars required if widespread private ownership were the goal, and this figure has been accepted without question by several Soviet writers.

In its present form, the car rental system dates from 1959, when Khrushchev first began discussing the subject and when the RSFSR Ministry of Automobile Transportation and Highways adopted rules for the use of rented automobiles. The Party programme mentions the large-scale development of automobile rental centres, and the Principles of Civil Law, which went into effect in 1962, have an article (Article 55) on the rental of durable consumer goods, including automobiles.

Some early statements seemed to suggest that any Soviet citizen with a driver's licence could simply go to a rental organisation and, if a car were available, hire it. This is not the case. To rent a car, an individual must have a 'subscription card' (*abonementnaia kartochka*). These cards are distributed by enterprises, organisations, and institutions to their 'best workers.'[16] They are issued annually to various organisations on the basis of the number of workers there; for instance, an organisation with a staff of up to one hundred receives one card, while an organisation of from 1,500 to 2,000 workers gets eight cards.

The holder of a subscription card may order a car by telephone, but this may be done no more than an hour in advance of the time he wants to use it. Otherwise he may go directly to the rental centre and hire a car if one is available. Thus little definite advance planning by the renter is possible. An automobile may be rented for periods of from three hours to thirty days, with payment in advance. The renter buys his own fuel and oil. When the driver takes a car out, he signs a pledge to take care of the car, to observe the traffic rules, and to bear liability in cases of damage to the car or to the property or person of third parties.

These provisions put the renter in a particularly difficult position and have been the cause of some complaint. According to rules established by the RSFSR Ministry of Automobile Transportation and High-

[16] *Prava i Obiazannosti Vladeltsa Avtomobilia* (Moscow, 1963), p. 36 (hereafter cited as *Prava i Obiazannosti . . .*).

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ways, if an automobile breaks down on the road, the renter has to have it repaired at his own expense. While this is being done (if not at the place of rental) the car is still considered as being rented, and if the time contracted for runs out, one and one-half times the regular rate is charged for each extra day of rental. As one critic put it: 'If someone wanted purposely to organise car rental so as to discredit the system, it is hard to imagine anything better than what is done at present.' [17]

As for liability to third parties, the rental agency is in a much better position than other governmental organisations or than a private car owner who allows someone else to use his car. Normally it is the governmental organisation, not the driver, that is liable for damages caused by the vehicle, and in the case of private cars it is the owner, not the borrower-driver, who bears full legal liability. In the case of the rented car, however, all liability is on the driver. Because of the financially vulnerable position of the renter, several Soviet writers have advocated that a system of liability insurance for those renting cars be instituted. So far, however, this has not been done.

There are several other shortcomings of the rental system as now set up. Since it has been in operation only a few years, it is acknowledged that the demand for cars and convenient rental centres far outreaches supply. In 1962 Moscow, a city of 6·3 million which certainly gets preferential treatment in many matters, had only four rental centres.[18]

A Soviet critic of the system offered the following information about its operation in Moscow in mid-1963. The city had only 868 cars for rent (only 632 of which were then in good enough repair to be rented) and it was therefore sometimes quite difficult, even for a person with a subscription card, to obtain a car. The paper work (*oformlenie*) involved was 'long and exhausting,' and the cost of rental high. To rent a Volga for a month cost 50 rubles plus four kopeks per kilometre, thus, to drive 1,000 kilometres during this period would cost 90 rubles or nine kopeks per kilometre, plus petrol and oil, which he figured at seven kopeks per kilometre. At this price, he concluded, 'it's simpler to use a taxi.' [19]

Undoubtedly as a result of these disadvantages, there has apparently been a sharp drop recently in the interest in and use of rented cars. The same critic wrote that 'in spite of the great demand for automobiles, half of the rental fleet [in Moscow] stands idle.' Consequently, the rental agencies, which are run on a cost-accounting (*khozraschet*) basis, have begun to operate in the red. The Moscow rental agency's losses for the first half of 1963 amounted to 158,000 rubles. In Leningrad, Tallin, and Riga, for the first five months of the same year, losses totalled 50,000, 52,000, and 15,000 rubles, respectively. Average income per rental automobile in the RSFSR in 1963 was down by over 20 per cent

[17] Gudimov, loc. cit.
[18] *Moskva 1962: Kratkaia Adresno-Spravochnaia Kniga*, Moscow, 1962, p. 315.
[19] Gudimov, loc. cit.

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over the previous year, and even in Moscow the drop was 13·6 per cent.[20]

THE governmental agency responsible for registration of motor vehicles is the State Automobile Inspection (GAI), an agency of the police. GAI also handles automobile inspections, administers drivers' tests, directs traffic, deals with traffic offenders, and acts as a research body for traffic planning and accident investigation.

In dealing with the traffic offender, GAI may resort to a series of measures, depending on the seriousness of the offence, ranging from a warning or small fine levied on the spot to cancellation of driving rights. All such measures can be taken administratively, without resort to the courts. The same is true of cancellation of the driver's permit for drunken driving, although in this case it is not GAI but a committee of the local soviet which exercises power. Driving while intoxicated appears to be a very prevalent offence in the Soviet Union. The intoxicated driver is said to be responsible for more than one-third of all accidents.[21]

For especially serious traffic offences, particularly those resulting in accidents, the criminal codes of the republics provide for varying degrees of punishment. Under the RSFSR Criminal Code (Articles 211 and 212), for example, a driver who, by the violation of driving rules, causes grave bodily injury or death to another person, may receive a prison sentence of up to ten years.

Statistics indicating the magnitude of the problem are not available, but the recent publication of a number of books, the mounting volume of material in the legal periodicals, and the fact that several Soviet law schools are carrying on special research projects on automobile accidents, make it clear that this is a matter of considerable concern.

The use of cars for speculation or illegal economic activity, such as hiring out one's private car as a taxi or for transporting goods, also comes under the criminal law; it has been prohibited by a USSR Council of Ministers decree since 1949,[22] but has received considerably greater attention in recent years. Several of the notorious 'anti-parasite laws' adopted by the republics in 1961 and thereafter specifically mention the use of private cars for gaining 'unearned income'. An adverse decision under the anti-parasite laws may result in 'resettlement' of the individual in distant parts of the land for a period of from two to five years.

If proceedings under an anti-parasite law are not taken against an individual caught using his automobile illegally, the matter may be handled by administrative sanction, which may amount to up to six months' loss of driving rights. A second violation brings the accused within the ambit of criminal liability; under Article 162 of the RSFSR

[20] A. Birkin in *Ek. Gaz.*, 5 September 1964. The same writer reports that there are about 10,000 rental cars in the Soviet Union at present.
[21] *Nedelya*, 8–14 March 1964, p. 10; *CDSP*, vol. XVI, No. 11, p. 16.
[22] See *Prava i Obiazannosti* . . ., p. 21.

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Criminal Code, he may be sentenced to up to one year correctional labour or fined up to 200 rubles. If such activities are conducted on a significant scale, the penalty may be up to four years in prison and confiscation of property, including the automobile.

Another legal problem associated with the use of automobiles is that of civil liability for damages caused by automobile accidents. The pertinent law on the subject is Article 90 of the Principles of Civil Law of the USSR and the Union Republics (the wording of Article 454 of the new RSFSR Civil Code is identical). According to this provision, the automobile, and other instruments employing mechanical, electrical, or chemical energy, are 'sources of increased danger'. When an accident involving a source of increased danger takes place, the possessor of that source is, with certain minor exceptions, considered strictly liable; that is, he is liable for the damage caused whether or not fault on his part has been proved. The test of liability in Soviet law where no source of increased danger is involved is stricter; in such cases liability to compensate for damages caused requires proof of fault. Thus, the driver of an automobile, but particularly the private owner or the renter, who does not have a state organisation behind him as possessor of the vehicle, is in a potentially unenviable position: no matter how carefully he drives, if he has an accident he will almost inevitably come out of it with some financial loss.[23]

Judgments in Soviet automobile accident cases are not as a rule as large as those in the West. For one thing, compensation for pain and suffering and other aspects of what the Soviets call 'moral injury' (*moralny vred*) is not allowed. Still, the size of damage awards, particularly when one considers the level of Soviet wages, is considerable. The potential loss is probably significant enough to make the responsible Soviet citizen think twice about the benefits of owning or renting an automobile.

The answer to this problem, of course, at least from the standpoint of the citizen car owner, would be some sort of liability insurance. So far this solution has not been adopted by the state, probably in part because it would make the concept of automobile ownership more attractive. But because of the increase in accidents there have been suggestions in recent years that such a liability insurance scheme be worked out.

Existing arrangements provide for a combination of obligatory and voluntary insurance for motor vehicles belonging to the state and to public organisations, while voluntary insurance is available for motor vehicles belonging to private persons. This latter insurance is not liability insurance, however, but insurance on the vehicle belonging to the insured. The 'Rules of Voluntary Insurance of Household Property and Means of Transportation Belonging to Citizens'[24] provide for up

[23] This conclusion does not necessarily follow from the law as stated, but on the basis of published judicial decisions it would appear to be a fair statement.

[24] These rules were adopted by the USSR Ministry of Finance on 8 September 1958 and may be found in *Sbornik Postanovlenii Prikazov i Instruktsii po Finansovo-Khoziastvennym Voprosam*, No. 4, April 1959.

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to 1,000 rubles insurance of automobiles against damage from fire, hurricane, storms, etc., and, if specially provided in the contract, against damage as a result of collision. But the possibilities of payment of a claim under such insurance appear dubious because of the exceedingly indefinite conditions set down in the rules. Even this type of insurance is not available to persons who want to rent automobiles.

More important is liability insurance. Several law journal articles in recent years have argued the pros and cons of such insurance. Those favouring liability insurance argue that it would protect both the state and private individuals with a claim against another driver which the latter could not pay; that it would protect the interests of the state as owner of the rented automobile; and that it would free from significant material losses both renters and individual owners of automobiles. The opposition argues that insurance would diminish the deterrent force of delictual liability and that, in effect, such insurance is 'unsocialist'. As one writer put it, 'the institution of liability insurance, so widespread in capitalist society, is in principle and categorically unacceptable to socialist society and law'.[25] Another writer noted that automobile liability insurance, however 'unsocialist', has been adopted by Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the German Democratic Republic.[26]

The logic in this argument would appear to be on the side of those who advocate liability insurance, but the question is unlikely to be determined on narrow logical grounds. The absence of such insurance serves to lessen the private individual's enthusiasm for operating an automobile, and this, in present circumstances, is desirable from the standpoint of the Soviet authorities. It is only reluctantly, therefore, that they would approve of change. But if an extensive rent-a-car system is really wanted, it seems certain that eventually some kind of insurance to protect both the renter and the rental organisation will have to be devised. This could be done without extending such insurance to private owners, thus making individual ownership even less attractive.

* * *

To sum up, the position of the car-fancier in the Soviet Union is not an enviable one. An extremely long and complicated purchase procedure awaits the buyer. The state authorities have encouraged some potential buyers to remove themselves from waiting lists that are embarrassingly long and have forced others off the lists by raising prices. The prospect that new criteria based on a work-incentive system will be introduced for determining who may purchase automobiles offers further possible limitations. The owner-driver or car renter, whose legal liability is greater than that of the driver of a state-owned automobile, cannot get the protection of liability insurance. None of these problems of automobile ownership or operation is substantially ameliorated by the designated

[25] V. Rakhmilovich in *Sovetskaia Yustitsiya*, 1962, No. 4, p. 21.
[26] N. Malein in *Sovetskaia Yustitsiya*, 1962, No. 11, p. 22.

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Soviet substitute—the car rental system—which has so many shortcomings and difficulties connected with it that it appears to have become both unpopular and unprofitable.

In spite of all the obstacles, it is clear that Soviet citizens still have a great desire to drive and own cars and that they will go to considerable lengths to satisfy these desires. This has no doubt turned out to be more of a problem than the Soviet authorities had bargained for. The new Soviet leaders appear already to have been persuaded that, as part of the planned increase in consumer goods production, more passenger cars should be produced. The next step may be to decide whether the all-out emphasis on automobile rental rather than private ownership—until now an almost unchallenged article of faith—really holds all the answers which the former leadership claimed it did.

A recent article in *Izvestia* (28 January 1965), suggests that this process of rethinking may already be under way. Among other things, the article asks: 'Is it really bad if thousands of workers and employees go to work in their own means of transportation, if an engineer carries his construction materials in his car, or a doctor behind the wheel hurries to the sick? I think that if a person spends his earnings to buy a car, all possible conditions for its use should be created. . . . In our opinion it would be wrong to view automobile rental as the only way for the use of the automobile to develop.' The article also makes a strong case for treating the purchase of a car as no different from the purchase of other consumer goods, rather than as a kind of remnant of capitalism.

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INDUSTRIAL GROWTH—WHERE NEXT?

David Hooson

WHATEVER place may eventually be accorded to communism in Lenin's famous equation,[1] there can be little doubt that the extent of Soviet power in the modern world bears a close relation to the degree of success which has attended its efforts at industrialisation. In little more than a quarter of a century (writing off the decade of the forties) the USSR has been transformed, albeit at enormous cost, from a largely agrarian, non-scientific, and militarily disorganised nation into an industrial and scientific power, universally acknowledged as the main counterpoise to the United States in the modern world.

The 'whole country' was not a mere afterthought to Lenin's dictum, since he held that the uneven development of the face of a country was an inevitable product of capitalism, whereas under communism population and wealth would eventually be evenly distributed. While the fatuity of such a literal forecast ensured its early abandonment, the fact remains that one of the major characteristics of the Soviet industrial revolution has been geographical dispersion within at least the triangle of tolerable farmland

Industrial dispersion in Russia had, of course, begun before the Soviet era. Before the eighteenth century everything was indeed confined to the river world of the Moscow region—still today called the 'Central Industrial District'—which was convenient for assembly of materials and distribution to markets. The personal influence of Peter the Great set in train the first dispersions from this region, to the metal-bearing Urals and to his own capital on the Baltic. In the late nineteenth century a radical shift to the south occurred, when Ukrainian iron ore and coking coal were combined with modern technology to supplant the charcoal-based Urals as the chief Russian metallurgical base, and Baku oil became the main fuel supplier for Russian industry as well as the chief factor in its exports.

However, the scale and scope of industrial dispersion has greatly expanded in the Soviet period, particularly over the past three decades or so. In 1913, and still as late as 1930, there was very little industry of national significance east of the river Volga. The most modern phase of dispersal dates from the decision, taken in 1930, to institute the so-called Urals-Kuzbas Combine, involving the resurrection of the Urals iron industry through the use of coke from the almost virgin Kuznetsk basin coalfields 1,500 miles away—the largest accessible reserves in the country. The full impact of the easterly displacement, however, came only after 1939, with the approach of war, and has clearly been slowing

1 'Communism is Soviet power plus electrification of the whole country. . . .'

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down within the last decade. Its scale has been greater than that of anything comparable in Russian history, and although its force may now largely be spent, a new type of region, authentically Soviet in its character and stage of development, has been created between the Volga and Lake Baikal—the main industrial reception area of the last quarter century.[2] So much so that, in place of the traditional but rather meaningless division along the crest of the Urals between Europe and Asia, one may propose a division into four 'worlds'.

First there is European Russia, between the northern coniferous forest and the Caucasus, and west of the Volga, whose agricultural and industrial foundations were laid before the Soviet time, and which is basically European in character. Then, between the Volga and Lake Baikal, wedged between the northern forests and the southern desert, lies what may be called 'American Russia'—the effective, viable part of the vast eastern regions, distinguished by its raw, pioneering 'frontier' character, with a mobility and an American scale of agricultural and industrial activity, populated, like America, almost exclusively by Europeans. This zone certainly has very little in common with the rest of Asia, if that word signifies anything more than an arbitrarily defined expanse of land. On the other hand, Soviet Middle Asia (Turkestan) and Transcaucasia, separated respectively by the Kazakh desert and the Caucasus range from the Russian world to the north, do bear truly Asian characteristics in their ethnic and economic structure, and in their colonial history, and should alone qualify as the Asian part of the USSR. Finally, there are the vast Northlands, in which the Soviet Far East may be included, which are largely unpopulated except where subsidised for special, often temporary reasons. Of these worlds, only the first two are fundamentally important from the industrial point of view—a Europe and a North America in symbiosis—but still recognisably set apart from each other. It will be these two which will therefore figure mainly in the discussion of Soviet industrial patterns which follows.

The new energy balance

The Soviet Union may well have greater total reserves—coal, oil, gas, and water—than any other country, but their location is by no means entirely favourable. At least two-thirds of the present population and industry are located in European Russia including the Urals, whereas about four-fifths of the estimated energy reserves are in Siberia. However, the significance of this geographical non-coincidence can be exaggerated. For one thing, a large portion of these technically available reserves, particularly of coal and water power, is in reality economically inaccessible because of handicaps such as distance, climate, or rugged and permanently frozen terrain, and will remain so for the foreseeable future. But an even more crucial qualification which needs to be made concerning the gross physical reserves is that oil and gas have recently become

[2] This zone has been discussed in some detail in the author's book *A New Soviet Heartland?* (London, 1964).

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

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the most-favoured types of energy, and the reserves of these are mainly in the European area. To understand the significance of this, it is necessary to mention the dramatic shifts in the balance between different types of energy in the Russian economy during this century, shifts which have, more often than not, been quite at variance with those in the world at large.

The strong tendency in the industrialised countries towards the substitution of oil and gas for coal has been proceeding steadily in the United States for several decades, to the point where oil and gas now account for two-thirds of the energy generated. This is the rough proportion to which the Soviet Union aspires by the early 1970s; in the mid-fifties it was about a quarter and is now about half of a greatly increased energy output. The need for such a rapid transformation of the country's energy structure stems from the fact that the economy had become exceptionally, and quite archaically, dependent on coal during the Stalin period. Although, paradoxically, the Russia of 1913 had a more 'modern' energy balance than the United States, with coal accounting for half the total in Russia compared with four-fifths in America, the clock was put back during the period of the five-year plans. The Soviet Union in the three decades before 1958 resembled, in its fuel structure, the United States in the three decades before the first world war—indeed these periods, in terms of stage of industrial development, have often been compared.

This concentration on coal and the relative neglect of oil and gas cost the hard-pressed Russians dear. The world average increase in the calorific value of a given weight of fuel, from the first world war to the mid-fifties, was about five times greater than that of the Soviet Union. Nor was this due to shortages in the Soviet Union or to ignorance of the possibilities—the presence of oil in the area between the Middle Volga and the Urals, soon to be dubbed the Second Baku, was known by the mid-thirties, but official support for its proper exploitation was lacking. At the same time the subsidised production of poor and expensive 'local' fuels, such as peat, brown coal, and oil shale was encouraged.[3] The cost, in terms not only of calorific output, but also of overloaded transport facilities and denial of valuable petrochemical by-products, was exorbitant.

The belated recasting of the country's energy structure since the mid-fifties has involved above all a massive infusion of oil and gas and the relative, though not absolute, decline of coal. Hydroelectric power has maintained a fairly constant, if relatively minor position, although explicit policy statements in recent years have tended to play it down, vis-à-vis thermally produced power.

All this has been reflected on the map in a spreading out of energy production compared with the Stalin era. The geographical change

[3] S. Lisichkin and L. Tomashpolsky. 'Nekotorye metodologicheskie voprosy toplivno-energeticheskikh balansov', *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, 1962, No. 11.

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has been particularly dramatic in the case of oil. When the Germans invaded in 1941 over four-fifths of Soviet oil came from the vulnerable Caucasus region. Now the same proportion of a vastly increased output comes from the extensive new fields between the Volga and the Urals, comparable in size and promise to the American mid-continent fields.

The recent expansion of natural gas has been even more startling than that of oil—a fifteen-fold increase in the last decade. Again, four-fifths of the output comes from European Russia—notably the North Caucasus, the Ukraine and the Volga—and much of it is absorbed by the Moscow region. About half the known national reserves is also located in these regions.[4] However, very large sources are also present in Central Asia and are piped to the furnaces of the Urals. More recently still, extensive reserves of both oil and gas have been discovered and exploitation begun in Western Siberia, which had long proved barren. The European supplies of gas, according to present rates of consumption, are likely to be exhausted in the next decade or two, when the Siberian reserves will apparently come into their own as the chief national suppliers.

Dispersal has also taken place in coal and hydro-electric power since the war, to accord rather more closely with the distribution of reserves. The Donets coal basin in the Ukraine, which was producing two-thirds of the national output when the Germans overran it in 1941, now accounts only for one-third—the difference being largely due to the development of other fields, notably the Kuznetsk basin, in Central Siberia. When Stalin died, virtually all the developed hydro-electric power was in European Russia, whereas now some of the largest dams in the world are operating (e.g. at Bratsk) or under construction (e.g. Krasnoyarsk) in the rocky upper reaches of some of the great rivers of Siberia, notably the Yenisei and the Angara. However, the economical disposal of much of the latter power, as well as of the very cheap opencast brown coal in the area, is partly contingent on the completion of the projected extra-high-voltage, long-distance electrical transmission lines, to link up the already established Central Siberian and European-Ural grids.

The accumulated geographical effect of this decentralisation of production has been that a new energy axis has developed. When the German invasion came in 1941 two-thirds of the Soviet Union's energy was generated within a belt of country joining the Donets coal basin with Baku on the Caspian. Now, three-quarters of output comes from a very much longer zone, stretching from the Donets basin and the North Caucasus gas fields through the Volga-Ural oilfields to Central Siberia. But although the orientation of the energy belt has been changed, it should be emphasised that the greater part of the energy is still both produced and consumed west of the Urals, and integrated into the

[4] Yu. I. Bokserman, *Puti razvitiya novoi tekhniki gazovoy promyshlennosti SSSR* (Moscow, 1964), p. 27.

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European electrical grid. Nevertheless, the greatest storehouse of long-term energy (black and brown coals and water) remains between the upper reaches of the Ob and Lake Baikal, and this has recently been galvanised in the Central Siberian grid. The eventual plan, probably for the early 1970s, is to join up these two grids, to make full use of the much cheaper Eastern energy, take advantage of the difference in time zones for peak-hours, reap the benefit of seasonal floods, and avoid transporting bulky solid fuels. When this is done, some four-fifths of the country's accessible energy and over three-quarters of its people will be welded into a formidably effective national territory.

Accompanying the change-over to oil and gas has been the equally belated increase in the relative importance of chemicals in the traditionally steel-heavy structure of Soviet industry, although Khrushchev's chemical crash programme has been toned down somewhat by his successors. The growing significance of oil and gas by-products as raw materials for the chemical industries (petrochemicals) has led to their rapid localisation in places like the Middle Volga about Kuibyshev, or in the Moscow region, at the hub of the pipeline network.

Manpower and the market

The majority of the Soviet people still live west of the Volga and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless a substantial easterly displacement of the population has been the most distinctive geographical phenomenon of this century—one which has broadened the whole base of the effective national territory. Its scale can be roughly demonstrated if we compare European Russia (north of the Caucasus and west of the Volga) with the chief eastern zone of increment between the Volga and Lake Baikal. During the half-century before 1911 the population of the European zone increased by about forty millions, compared with ten millions (about half of them after 1897) in the Volga-Baikal zone. However, during the half-century 1911–1961 the Volga-Baikal zone had added about twenty-five millions, or more than double the contemporaneous gains of the European zone. Of course, the catastrophic warfare over much of the European zone, with the corollary of the easterly evacuation, was mainly responsible for the speed, but the scale of the net redistribution is still remarkable, considering that the European zone had about four times the population of Volga-Baikal in 1911.[5] The cities of the latter zone easily outstripped those of all other Soviet regions between 1939 and 1959, but there has, of course, been a tendency towards more equal regional growth since the reconstruction and resumption of more normal conditions. However, even between 1959 and 1964 the Eastern cities seemed to be growing, if anything, slightly more quickly than the western; for instance (to take

[5] Soviet Middle Asia (Turkestan) has been ignored here: its very high population increase is attributable, as in many other parts of formerly colonial Asia, to a rapid reduction in the death rate.

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comparable pairs), Novosibirsk, Omsk, and Krasnoyarsk experienced faster rates than Gorky, Rostov-on-Don, and Voronezh respectively.

But herein lies a paradox, for it is becoming increasingly clear that much of Siberia has had for some time an acute labour shortage, and has actually suffered a net loss of migrants in the course of a disturbingly rapid turnover of recruited workers. Many factors are operative, such as poor living conditions, low real income, the shortage of jobs for women, and the severe climate. Thus, in spite of continuing disproportionate capital investment, Siberia is again getting the poor image which it had begun to lose in the eyes of the European population at the time of the great agricultural migration at the end of the nineteenth century. In the present conditions of exclusively voluntary migration, very special incentives and still more investment preference are clearly necessary, but whether, in view of the uncertain return, they will be forthcoming, remains to be seen.

Meanwhile, the continued growth of the East in the face of an adverse migration balance, obviously indicates an unusually high rate of natural increase, though how long this will continue remains uncertain. Siberia is relatively more urbanised than European Russia, which gives it a younger age-structure, with an absence of the top-heavy rural population which is still characteristic of much of the European area.

Notwithstanding the cumulative easterly shift of the Russian population in the last three-quarters of a century, the fact is that one cannot foresee a time when the European part of the country will have less than two-thirds of the total numbers. This obviously has fundamental implications for both the market and manpower factors in the long-term location of Soviet industry.

Transport problems

The transport system of the Soviet Union is probably more over-worked than that of any other important country, and its inadequacy has frequently proved to be a critical factor limiting industrial development. The ton-mileage of freight has increased more than fifteen-fold since the revolution, while the rail mileage has scarcely doubled. Capacity was stretched to the limit in the Stalin era but at the same time long hauls —often irrational cross-hauls—of unnecessarily bulky materials were made. The advent of the oil and gas pipeline and the high voltage electrical transmission line have made many of these hauls, especially of coal, redundant, but the pressure remains, since the increase in transport facilities has not kept pace with that of economic development, especially in some regions. The railway network, on which the Soviet economy is still heavily dependent (road transport remaining in quite a rudimentary state), is most adequate in European Russia, and least between the Urals and Lake Baikal. Consequently almost all of the railway building (and the Soviet Union is one of the very few advanced countries still actively extending its railways) done since the war has been in this

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Eastern zone. Early in 1965, for example, the 400-mile Abakan-Tayshet line, in Central Siberia, was opened after seven years' effort in difficult mountainous country, indicating the continuing importance placed upon opening up new resources and developing industry in this remote part of the country. However, a very real and continuing problem with regard to the Trans-Siberian and its flanking railways remains the procession of eastbound empty rolling-stock, which has been estimated at seventy million tons a year capacity in Western Siberia.[6] The cutting down of demand for Eastern coal in the Urals, the projected long-distance high voltage electrical transmission lines, and the increase of processing of products like timber at source, would go far towards reducing this waste, but at present it undoubtedly adds to the costs of industrial operations in the more remote eastern districts.

Generally speaking, the greatest density of freight-flows—largely on the railways—follows what may be called the 'economic spine' of the country, from the eastern Ukraine and North Caucasus to Moscow and thence eastward, through the Middle Volga and the Urals, to Central Siberia. Dominant directions of movement are northbound from the Ukraine, and westbound from Siberia and the Urals, which reveals the Moscow region in its historical role, like Paris or London, at the feed-in centre of a radiating system of rail, river, roads and, most recently, pipelines. This has basic implications for the character of industry and its regional growth.

The industrial regions

Sizeable industrial concentrations are rarely located anywhere in the world away from tolerably good farmland, and the Soviet Union is no exception. Therefore any survey of the location of Soviet industry must begin with the basic fact of the thin triangle of settled farmland bounded by a line joining Leningrad with Krasnoyarsk and thence to the North Caucasus. Within these bounds over four-fifths of the Soviet people are living on barely a quarter of the national area, and virtually all the nationally important industrial activity is carried on. Outside these bounds there are pockets of primary production, especially of certain metals, timber, and fish, and also some industries for local consumption, notably in Central Asia. They are, however, either special subsidised cases, in a chronically pioneering context, and therefore often temporary, or they make very little contribution outside the immediate region.

Thus we need to look along or near the 'economic spine', as outlined above, to discover the nationally significant concentrations of industry, always remembering, of course, the vast distances involved and therefore the considerable gaps between these concentrations. These can be grouped into at least three general categories (excluding industries of ubiquitous or purely local importance), based on function and stage of

[6] N. M. Budtolayev, V. P. Novikov and Yu. G. Saushkin, 'Problems of Economic Development of the West and East of the Soviet Union', *Soviet Geography: Review and Translation*, vol. 5, January 1964, p. 11.

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development. The first category—established centres of market-oriented, labour-intensive industries—is also the oldest, and the Moscow region, or the Central Industrial District, as it has long been known, stands out. Its admirable nodality with reference to the medieval river-routes gave it, in favourable historical circumstances, a head start and a precious reserve of experience, invested capital, skill, literacy, and political patronage. These ingredients provided a momentum which kept the region's industry reasonably viable during St. Petersburg's long 'usurpation' and has enabled it to blossom forth again in the Soviet era. As before, with hardly any local natural resources, it has depended on an inflow of energy and raw materials from other regions and on its own inherited intangible assets. The former has presented no particular problem under modern conditions—the gas pipeline has proved worthy heir to the coal train and the timber barge. The gas-revolution has been most spectacular in Moscow city itself, where it now supplies the great bulk of the energy needs, and in the surrounding region use of gas as a raw material has quickly reduced costs in the chemical industry, which is the most important concentration in the country. The resilience of the factor of skills, however, is more difficult to evaluate now that technical education has, for the first time, become diffused across the country. As in other metropolises, the attractions of the capital are very persuasive, and Moscow's unduly centralised role as a scientific and educational Mecca reinforces this attraction in the industrial field. Greater Moscow continues to grow rapidly, in spite of an elaborate system of restrictive work-permits and supposed prohibitions on expansion (echoes of London's problem!), and this inevitably enhances the already considerable market attractions of this region for a manufacturing industry which is becoming more consumer-centred.

Leningrad is in a weaker position than Moscow, since its situation away from the main stream of national development, without the former support of its imperial privileges, and without a hinterland of satellite towns, industrial or agricultural resources, means that it must depend more exclusively on the momentum of its past. Other cities of European Russia which fit into this industrial category, such as Riga, Minsk, Kiev, and Odessa have an advantage over Leningrad in the sense that, in addition to traditions and skills, they have the security of a well-populated regional hinterland. It should be noted here that the rate of growth of industrial production since 1958 (the year preceding the seven-year plan) has been faster in the Baltic Republics and Byelorussia than elsewhere, particularly in relation to expected plan fulfilments.[7]

The second category—the centres of heavy industry (iron and steel) —are, of course, poles apart from the regions of the first category in

[7] Where 100 indicates complete fulfilment of seven-year-plan target, the figures for 1963 were: Latvia 105, Lithuania 94, Estonia 84, Byelorussia 89, compared with the RSFSR 70 and the USSR 74·5. This may, of course, indicate an unrealistically low expectation; for instance, although Kazakhstan's fulfilment percentage was only 45, its actual rate of industrial growth between 1958 and 1963 was slightly higher than that of the four Baltic Republics. *SSSR v tsifrakh v 1963 godu* (Moscow, 1964), p. 77.

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their youth, historical development, and present industrial character, but together they may be said to be about as important. They have been fundamental to the rapid advances of the industrial revolution from the late Tsarist period on. The Eastern Ukraine takes pride of place, both chronologically in terms of modern steel development and, though only just, in terms of current output. Its core is the Donbas coalfield which, although a high-cost mining area, is well located near the rich iron ore fields of Krivoy Rog and in relation to the Eastern European market generally. Its dominance over other regions of heavy industry has been greatly reduced in the Soviet era, notably through the use—more accurately the resuscitation—of the Eastern Urals, which lay beyond the reach of the German armies, and has been able to make steel more cheaply. The main disadvantage of the Urals as a metallurgical centre has been a lack of nearby coking coal, which is still a problem, though the arrival of gas from Central Asia has mitigated this somewhat.

In fact the needs of the Urals for coal led directly to the creation of a third steel region, 1,500 miles away in the Kuznetsk basin of Central Siberia; their iron and coal respectively were joined in a massive shuttle-service from 1930. This was one of Stalin's brainwaves, carried through in the teeth of expert disapproval and rational counter-arguments, but which was, in the event, to save the day for the Soviet Union a decade later. Although the Kuznetsk basin in more recent times had continued to expand its industrial capacity, freed from dependence on Urals iron ore, and relying on its major asset—plentiful and cheap coking coal—the inexorable factor of great distance from the main markets will undoubtedly set clear limits to the scale of its operations in the foreseeable future.

Particularly has this become so since the beginning of the exploitation of the so-called Kursk Magnetic Anomaly in South-Central European Russia in 1959. Though known for nearly a century, these immense iron ore reserves, overlaid by water-logged strata, were technologically out of reach until recently. Now accessible, and with gas readily available, they are being made the basis for a very large iron and steel complex (particularly the integrated plant at Lipetsk) which is excellently located for the chief Soviet (and East European) markets.

All the industrial regions considered above (with the exception of the last-named) were founded before the war, and by any yardstick they still account for the bulk of the country's manufacturing industry. But there are several other regions whose industrial significance was very small before the war but which have since begun to emerge as industrial regions of national stature. In this third general category, which is related primarily to affluent energy resources, much the most important is the zone between the middle reaches of the river Volga and the crest of the Urals. This more or less coincides with the great oil-bearing zone, which is rapidly shaping the industrial character of the region. Before the war this region had a deficit of fuel and only locally significant

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industries. The southward-flowing Volga had long symbolised the boundary between 'civilization' and Siberia, the sown and the desert, Europe and Asia. The recent rapid exploitation of the oil fields and also the harnessing of the Volga for hydro-electricity, together with its situation near the centre of gravity of the Soviet population and well connected with other important parts of the country, have set the seal on the creation of a new industrial region. It is now the largest producer of energy of any Soviet region, contributing about a third of the total. It is very much a child of the post-Stalin era—as the Kuznetsk region was of the thirties—conceived in the new age of oil and gas, of the petrochemical industries, and of greater attention to the consumer.

Similar in its dependence on abundant energy is the mountainous region of Central Siberia between the Yenisei and Lake Baikal, where the great rivers of Siberia take their rise, and where the greater part of the country's accessible hydro-electric power and cheap brown coal is found. However, although some of the most powerful dams in the world have been, or are being built on the Angara and Yenisei rivers (the one at Bratsk, 4½ million kilowatt capacity, being the best-known to date), the future of this region is by no means as assured as that of the Volga oilfields. The chief handicaps are the great distance from the main markets of European Russia, the severe climate (it is the only part of the broadly settled territory of the Soviet Union which has patches of permanently frozen ground), and its raw pioneering character, with all that this means in terms of living conditions and amenities. Nevertheless the whole vast region is integrated in the Central Siberian grid, and various energy-intensive industries, such as aluminium, chemicals, and timber-processing, have taken root. In short, the capital investment in this region in the past decade has been too substantial to be neglected, and there is an urgent need even now for more industries to use up energy already being generated, not to mention all the rest which has been committed.

The region's share in the national generation of electricity is supposed to grow steadily in the next decade or two and eventually about 15 per cent of it is to be transmitted to European Russia. Whether this will materialise is a moot point, but it seems clear that industrial growth will be of an energy-intensive character, requiring a minimum of labour.

Outside the broadly settled triangle, or effective national territory, there are a number of islands of national significance amid an ocean of negativity. They are, as the Russians might say in other contexts, 'colonial-type' of one sort or another. Much the most important in population and agricultural terms are the lowlands of the Transcaucasus and the foothill and river oases of Middle Asia (Turkestan), but they have very little significance from the industrial point of view. Each of them accounts for only 3 per cent of the national fuel consumption, very much less than their population would warrant. Although Middle Asia has begun to exploit its rich store of gas, this is almost all sent to

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the furnaces of the Urals. The Transcaucasus was certainly in the economic mainstream of the country up to about 1950, when Baku was the main source of oil, but now that it is just a minor contributor (and oil and gas for general purposes are now even *imported* into the Transcaucasus) this seems no longer to be justified. The Far East, beyond Lake Baikal, is similarly a non-contributing area industrially from a national point of view, stranded in a poor environment with a crippling distance between it and European Russia, and stultified by the proximity of a potentially hostile China and a rather unresponsive Japan.

At isolated points through the great empty northern forests and southern deserts there are pioneer settlements, often ephemeral, concerned with exploiting metals or minerals much in demand, like nickel, gold, or diamonds. Such settlements, which only a short time ago were manned by forced labour, now have to provide expensive incentives, plus high transport costs, for their marooned communities, and thus can be expected to be subjected to increasingly critical scrutiny in the seemingly more hard-headed and calculating economy characterising the post-Khrushchev regime.

Where next?

The hazards of getting to know the facts, let alone correctly interpreting the economic and geographical trends, of the past are only slightly less acute than those which beset attempts to read the future. For instance, in the absence of migration statistics, and in the presence of apparently weighty circumstantial evidence, it seemed entirely justified to attribute at least in part, an increase in population in Siberia between 1939 and 1959, amounting to three times the national rate, to migration factors. However, a recent astounding statement in *Kommunist* asserts that studies have shown that there was 'no population increase resulting from migration in Siberia between 1939 and 1959'.[8] The fact that 'Siberia' as a geographical unit is basically unsatisfactory, since it excludes Northern Kazakhstan which is, in real economic and geographical terms, part of it (and where growth is admitted to be rapid), while at the same time lumping together large areas of former forced labour country with the southern industrial cities, may explain some of the implied discrepancy between myth and reality. This assertion may well be challenged later, as others have been, but such bald, undocumented, and yet apparently authoritative utterances illustrate the frustrations accompanying any attempt to identify processes and trends in the Soviet social scene. The ambiguous status of the forced labourers, who may have been counted in European Russia in 1939, while actually being in Siberia, may also confuse the situation. Another familiar phenomenon is the index number for growth of industrial production, so that increases for areas which had been devastated in war, or which

[8] V. Shubkin, 'On concrete studies of social processes', *Kommunist*, 1965, No. 3, p. 52.

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had had a very small industrial base, may well give an exaggerated impression, in the absence of the steadying check of absolute quantities.

With such *caveats* in mind then, we may suggest a few generalisations in conclusion. The outstanding fact about the distribution of industry, as of population, is that the bulk of it remains in European Russia—about half to the west of the Volga and about three-quarters if the whole Urals and Caucasus regions are included. This is still a notable concentration, comparable with the so-called manufacturing belt of the north-east quadrant of the United States. Equally outstanding, however, in the redistribution of industry in the Soviet planned era has been its expansion into the funnel of farmland east of the Volga; first through the Urals-Kuzbas combination and later to the west and east of it. Although this Volga-Baikal zone is certainly not dominant in itself (with barely a third of the country's industry), it indicates a new extension of the country's industrial base which may well be permanent.

This said, one must go on to add that the shift of the industrial centre of gravity to the east, and particularly east of the Urals, which has been a cumulative, though by no means steady, feature of the past few decades, seems to have come to an end for the time being. In an important respect it has been a beneficiary of the fear of military invasion, the war itself and its aftermath, just as, to a lesser extent and for less specific reasons, the war provided a fillip to industrial growth in the United States western region. If some of this peak capacity is, through force of normalising circumstances, 'put in mothballs', this does not necessarily mean a reversion to the *status quo ante*. There may well be some validity in the hypothesis that when the politico-economic atmosphere is one of aggressive, optimistic expansiveness and/or comparative affluence, there is a tendency to invest more in some of the eastern regions, even though the expectation of return may be very long-term and the yield less than might be obtained from a similar investment in places closer to home. The converse to this is, of course, that in a period of capital stringency and growing clamour for maximising short-run returns in a variety of overdue projects—which might be said to characterise the present phase—there is a strong temptation to a conservatism which favours established, reliable projects, other things being equal.[9]

Even if the east-west see-saw has begun to tip somewhat towards the west, it is likely to remain in a certain state of equilibrium, with a division of labour based on the recognition of their distinctive resource and locational advantages, and an increasing complementarity between the two ends. The advantages of the European core in the present phase of oil and gas, and the growing importance of people as skilled workers and consumers, are irresistible. However, the conservative and adventurous are to some extent blended in the development of the Middle

[9] This hypothesis was suggested by Professor Gregory Grossman, whose general criticism and encouragement is gratefully acknowledged.

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Volga, which is from many points of view the best located region in a national context; and also the North Caucasus and Southern Ukraine which, though no Californias, have a definite climatic and amenity advantage over Siberia, to say the least. As far as the scale of development is concerned, much depends on what will happen in the East European trading bloc.

Siberia west of Lake Baikal (including North Kazakhstan) will continue to develop its energy resources, which should (oil and gas as well as coal and water) become steadily more important nationally in the next phase after 1970, when the European supplies become exhausted or expensive. There should be an increase in the processing industries based on metals and timber particularly, and a gradual strengthening of the links with the west, leading to the filling in of the relative gap which still exists between Central Siberia and the Urals. But the malaise of Siberia in relation to recruitment of labour, which will not be overcome rapidly, will probably preclude the widespread establishment of labour-intensive industries, although for ideological or strategic reasons—which should not be ignored—they may be encouraged and subsidised up to a certain point.

In general, the Soviet Union is by no means an overcrowded country, and this gives the government considerable flexibility in its regional policies. The likelihood is that the economic spine, from the Ukraine to Lake Baikal, will increase still further its already overwhelming share of the effective population, wealth, and strength of the country. Much, perhaps most, of the Soviet Union will remain of very little value, agriculturally or industrially, but the maintenance of the country's superpower status, in an increasingly competitive world, necessitates as comprehensive use as possible of its really usable land, which covers an area and carries a population as large as that of the entire United States.

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THE ECONOMY AT THE CROSSROADS

Marshall I. Goldman

EASTERN Europe today is caught up in a unique sort of economic reform and experimentation. With little concern for injunctions and gospels hitherto sacred, most of the countries in the Soviet bloc seem to be turning their backs on what has always been regarded as the economics of communism. While the rest of the world looks on in amazement the communists seem to be abandoning some of the trappings of communism for some of the trimmings of capitalism.

However, it must be made clear at the outset that there is little reason to expect that these changes do in fact herald the advent of capitalism. This is a serious misinterpretation of what is actually happening. The Russians and their associates have no intention of abandoning state ownership of industry and business. At best they desire to improve the efficiency of an already existing state capitalism. Nonetheless the fact that some kind of radical economic reform is on the way in virtually every East European country, and that almost every one of these countries seems to be experiencing a sharp decline in its rate of economic growth, suggests that there are some important questions to be asked. These questions seek not only an explanation of why the traditional planning system is suddenly unable to prevent a fall in the rate of growth but also why it produced such high levels of economic growth in the 1930s, 1940s, and early 1950s. The answer to one question may also provide some insight into the other.

It may help to consider economic growth in Eastern Europe, and especially in the USSR, in two stages: a period of expansion or extensive growth, and a period of consolidation or intensive growth. In the first, the main emphasis was on industrialisation. The creation of heavy industry became the prime political and economic goal. To build its foundations in the underdeveloped economy, draconian measures were imposed and normal production stimuli were sharply altered. Management and work incentives were tied to production targets which were imposed from above by the central planning and administrative agencies. The needs of the industrial and household consumer were considered only indirectly. With time, however, the means tended to become the ends and the customer often found himself with goods that were not adapted to his changing requirements; volume of production became important in itself with little regard to final use. Such disparities were brought about because the success of the manufacturer was measured by how much he could produce of a certain item and not by whether the item was acceptable to the customer. Further adjusting or processing had to be undertaken by the buyer. This made it possible for the original manufacturer to avoid downtime, the period when the plant is closed

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down in order to readjust the gears and dies for different sizes and shapes of production. Instead, when the Russians wanted to produce something like steel, they set the rolling mill at a certain gauge and spewed out an endless stream of rolled steel of uniform width. This is one of the main explanations for the homogeneity of Soviet products; virtually all Russian men wear the same blue underwear, almost all Soviet trucks have one-and-a-half ton bodies.

For economic theorists, the potentialities of mass standardisation in production have always been regarded as a source of economic efficiency. It was assumed that under socialism resources would not have to be wasted on model change or tail fins on automobiles. Standardisation supposedly would permit the intensive development of economic efficiency. In economic terms, it would allow the given production function to be mastered. The engineers and scientists could devote their full attention to improving a particular method. It was not exactly surprising, therefore, to find that the Russians did in fact begin to excel in many fields of production and that output increased rapidly, especially in those areas like steel production to which they decided to devote their chief attention. Gardner Clark has described the astonishment of the executives of the Republic Steel Corporation in Chicago when a visiting Russian metallurgist was able to show the Americans how to increase the productivity of one of their most efficient blast furnaces by an additional 50 per cent.[1] The Soviets had set out to master this important production technique and they succeeded. It was because of such myopic concentration, plus an unprecedented rate of investment extracted from a fully mobilised economy, that indirect production in the USSR grew at a record pace. Occasionally there were some economic disturbances,[2] but to some extent it is fair to say that economic and political centralisation did make it possible to run the Soviet trains on time at an accelerated speed on a fixed length of track.

IN the late 1950s it gradually became apparent that conditions were changing and that it was no longer so important that the trains be on time, especially along a stretch of track that had been deserted by the inhabitants. What had in fact happened was that the Soviet production function which had been mastered so well had become obsolete and even inappropriate. Both without and within the country, the Soviet system seemed unable to contend with various changes that were rapidly taking place.

In their intense concentration on their existing production function, it was some time before the Russians realised what had happened. To many observers in both East and West, it looked as though the Russians

1 M. Gardner Clark, 'Economics and Technology: The Case of Soviet Steel', in Nicolas Spulber (ed.), *The Study of the Soviet Economy* (1961), p. 23.

2 In an unusually candid article, Josef Goldman, a Czech economist, reveals that there were various economic fluctuations in the years 1953–56. But this was due in part to political unrest and pressure. 'Fluctuations and Trend in the Rate of Economic Growth in some Socialist Countries', *Economics of Planning*, No. 2, 1964, p. 99.

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were about to win the race and to master their production function as no other country had done before. Soviet steel output actually exceeded American steel output during parts of 1960 and 1961. The Russians had been producing more coal for several years, and it looked as though they would indeed overtake and surpass the United States by 1970. Suddenly they discovered that it did not matter that much what they were doing with such products as steel and coal if they ignored everything else. The world's technology had changed. Several brand new production functions had been discovered, but the Soviet planning and incentive system was simply unable to switch gears and move in the new directions that were indicated. Just when they looked up and were about to declare themselves the winners, the Russians realised that the rest of the world was mastering new and more complicated kinds of production functions that were based on new and more radical types of technological innovation.

While the Russians had been concentrating on steel, manufacturers in the West had increasingly turned their attention to non-ferrous metals and plastics. The fuel balance had shifted from coal to petroleum and natural gas. Production and product innovations were being put into operation with incredible frequency in the post-war West. More and more, the focus of industrial growth was moving from the traditional industries like steel and coal to more exotic and productive areas. Even more unfortunate for the Russians, the new industrial fields like electronics and chemistry required sophisticated decision-making and quality control and the centralised planning techniques and incentive system prevailing in the USSR were simply not suited for such processes. It was no longer enough for an incentive system to assure the mastery of a given production function and an increase in the quantity produced; it was also necessary now to stimulate the conquest of new production functions and quality. It was this inability to cope with changes in the production function that Khrushchev had in mind when he said: 'The production of steel is like a well-travelled road with deep ruts: here even blind horses will not turn off because the wheels will break. Similarly some officials have put on steel blinkers; they do everything as they were taught in their day. A material appears which is superior to steel and is cheaper but they keep on shouting "Steel, Steel!"' (*Pravda,* 20 November 1962).

Changes were also taking place within the country which revealed further inadequacies in the traditional planning techniques. After the death of Stalin, the standard of living improved rapidly. While there were still periodic shortages of various foods, by and large the Soviet consumer no longer had to live on a hand-to-mouth basis. But this also meant that he could no longer be depended upon to buy up everything that was put out on the store counter. Once he had one radio, sewing machine, or bicycle, he was unlikely to buy a second, at least without a major model change. Accordingly, as the ownership of clothing and appliances increased, their sales began to fluctuate. This became

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especially noticeable when ownership of such goods was attained by 40 per cent of the population. Inevitably stocks began to accumulate. By early 1965, they rose to more than $3·3 milliard above and beyond normal needs,[3] and the production of certain items had to be cut. For example, sewing-machine production in 1963 was 25 per cent of what it was in 1962, but here, as for other items, the drop in production tends to lag as much as a year or two behind the drop in sales.[4]

To the more perceptive Soviet economists, the problem was no longer a simple one. At one time it was felt that all that was needed was more effective merchandising. This era saw the introduction of price cuts, advertising and hire-purchase. But this was not enough. Next it was decided to rely on market research. While merchandising techniques and market research in the Soviet Union still leave much to be desired, it is clear that even in their present state these operations will be of no avail unless the factory manager believes it is in his interest to respond rapidly. It was essential therefore to provide a better feed-back system, so that consumer reactions could be communicated from the retailer to the factory. This could be accomplished only by means of an overhaul of the existing planning and incentive system. As Professor Wiles has said, a centralised economy can make the trains run on time, but it certainly seems an inappropriate instrument for a system with a million automobiles and an infinitely varied and expanding system of production functions.

IT was at this stage that the Kharkov economist Professor Liberman appeared on the public scene. Actually, he had predicted what would eventually happen as early as 1948; he had even managed to publish articles in 1955 and 1956 in important Soviet economic journals, but it was only in 1962 that serious attention was paid to what he said. It was only then that the underlying problems were serious enough to warrant general concern.

Essentially, Liberman proposed that the existing incentive system in use for factory operations should be discarded. As he saw it, the old system forced the manufacturers to stress gross value of output rather than quality and suitability of assortment. In its place he advocated a system of incentives designed to stimulate the factory manager to respond more rapidly to changes in consumption. The best way to do this, he suggested, would be to increase the emphasis on profits. While the concept of profits had long existed in Soviet industry, it had always been subordinated to the fulfilment of the quantitative targets. Now Liberman proposed that profits be made the leading indicator and that the factory manager be permitted to determine the other targets himself.

After much debate, Liberman's proposals, with certain amendments, were introduced in two experimental factories. Both were freed from the

[3] *Sovetskaya Torgovlya*, March 1965, p. 3.
[4] M. I. Goldman, 'The Reluctant Consumer and Economic Fluctuation in the Soviet Union', *Journal of Political Economy*, August 1965.

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need to fulfil gross production targets and other success indicators which heretofore had been imposed from above. Instead, the factory manager himself was to determine what his production for the year would be. He would make this decision in the light of the contracts he was empowered to make with his customers, the retail store managers. The contracts in turn would serve as the basis for a delivery plan and a profit plan. The ability of the factory manager would then be measured solely by how large his profits were and how closely his deliveries to the retail outlets followed the delivery plan. Thus the factory manager would himself have a direct hand in determining his own production targets, as Liberman had advocated. Moreover, he would no longer have to accept the dictates of outside authorities about other production variables such as labour productivity, production costs, capital saving, and the number of workers. Such decisions could all be made within the factory itself. Decisions affecting the worker would have to be made in conjunction with the trade union officials, just as the retail store manager would have to agree to the quantity, quality, and price of the goods to be sold. While this meant that the factory manager did not have complete freedom of action, he certainly had a much greater measure than before.

The benefits of such a system are readily apparent. By basing factory output directly on retail requirements, it was hoped that production would follow consumption trends more closely. This would mean the transfer of demand forecasting and the planning of consumer goods production from the offices of the centralised planners (to the extent that they considered demand at all), and the assumption of this responsibility by the retail store. It was also hoped that such an incentive system would encourage experimentation. Since the factory manager was to be given new powers over pricing and hiring, it was expected that he would be more willing to take innovational risks. Presumably the obstacles to new production techniques and new products would be removed along with the horse blinkers that had so upset Khrushchev.

By November 1964, six months after the initial tests had begun, the decision was made to increase the number of firms in the experiment. The Economic Council of the USSR decided to convert approximately 400 clothing and shoe factories to the new planning system, the change to be completed by mid-1965. But there was more involved than just an increase in the number of participating firms. Appraising the experience of the first two, it was realised that it was not enough just to liberalise the operating conditions of the ultimate producer; it was also necessary to ensure greater flexibility at the supply end, that is, in the textile mills and leather tanneries. No matter how efficient the ready-to-wear manufacturer was, he found he could not produce the desired clothing if the fabric sold to him did not meet his specifications. So long as the textile mills and tanneries remained on the old planning basis, they cared only about quantity of production and not whether their

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product was appropriate. Stylish dresses, suits, and shoes could not be produced if the fabric or leather were of poor quality and design.

Looking ahead, the logic of this situation implied that the same changes would have to be made in industries which supplied the machinery used in the processing plants. Already there have been complaints that existing presses and sewing machines have not been capable of handling the new and improved materials like dacron.[5] Thus while the reforms were at first limited to light industry, it must be expected that there will be growing pressure to extend the system to heavy industry as well. This has already happened to some extent. In Lvov, a coal mine, a truck factory, and a television assembly plant have been converted to a profit-oriented system. However, these enterprises still have a production target to fulfil which is spelled out in units of production just as before. Nonetheless, there apparently is some merit in the new system because a second and larger coal mine in Lvov has also been converted to the new scheme.[6] Even more significant is the call for extensive utilisation of the new system in the machine tool industry by the newspaper *Trud* (8 July 1965). This plus the announcement that the profit method has also been adopted in several confectionery, dairy, and meat packing plants, along with most of the retail stores and restaurants in several major cities, highlights the growing momentum of the reform.

WHILE trends are never irreversible in the USSR, there seems little doubt that the present emphasis on the role of profits will continue to grow. Naturally, such a fundamental change in the orientation of the economy has important implications for the future. As the manufacturer begins to exercise his new powers and attempts to satisfy the changing demands of his customers, it seems inevitable than an increasing number of production adjustments and work cutbacks will be necessary. Not a great deal has yet been heard about such problems, but they have occurred and seem to be increasing even without the Liberman-type reforms. For example, both pocket watches and gramophones gradually became outmoded; the production of these items was curtailed and production resources had to be reshuffled. Unfortunately for the smooth allocation of the factors of production, such shifts in demand are not confined to outmoded goods. In several instances a glut has turned into a shortage.

Such sales and production cycles have occurred several times in recent years. For example, a rapid expansion of electric-iron production resulted in a record output of 5,300,000 irons in 1955. This flooded the market and in 1957 production was cut back to 1,700,000. This over-response shortly induced a shortage, so that by 1960 production was again increased to 5,300,000. Other goods which have undergone such cycles of glut and subsequent scarcity include wrist-watches, bicycles,

[5] *Ekonomicheskaia Gazeta*, 27 June 1964, p. 6.
[6] Ibid. 16 June 1965, p. 14.

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motor-scooters, meat grinders, some brands of cigarettes, aluminium dishware, bathing caps, ice skates, razor blades, toothbrushes, linen fabrics, ready-to-wear clothing, electric teapots, harmonicas, and electric floor waxers. For some goods like cameras, metal beds, clocks, and sewing machines, production of which fell more than 20 per cent in 1963, the demand has not picked up as yet, although it may do so in the future. In the meantime, factories or production lines have been closed and workers laid off. It has been acknowledged that this has already happened to firms which once made milk separators, meat grinders, sewing machines, kerosene lamps, electric irons, electric stoves, locks, and pitchforks. There may also have been similar shut-downs among firms making watches, bicycles, and cameras. There is every reason to expect that the Liberman reforms will intensify this process.

* * *

The experiments now being conducted in the USSR may well have far-reaching consequences. It is hoped that they will give the economy greater flexibility. They should also stimulate increased innovation, and bring about a revaluation of institutions once severely criticised. A new All-Union Advertising Agency has already been established, along with a more powerful market research bureau for the handling of consumer goods. There are even suggestions now that market research be utilised in heavy industry (*Pravda*, 23 June 1965).

But no matter what improvements are made, it would be unrealistic to assume that the changes will solve all the Soviet Union's economic problems. Without the Liberman type of reform, it seems fair to assume that inventory build-ups and quality shortcomings and factory shut-downs will grow in frequency, but the widespread adoption of the new reforms will not provide a comprehensive cure, any more than the use of such methods has eliminated economic problems in the Western world. If anything, it is to be expected that the Liberman-type reforms will increase the number of factories that are closed down and the resources which are displaced. It will be fascinating to see if the Russians can cope with what for them is an entirely new kind of problem, and if they can avoid the economic fluctuations which seem to be an inevitable by-product of economic flexibility and growth.

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STATISTICS IN THE USSR

Samuel Kotz

STATISTICS nowadays is utilised in almost all branches of the sciences and its methods provide one of the basic tools in scientific inquiry.

The central theme of modern statistics is *statistical inference*, which studies the methods and provides the procedures for drawing conclusions about a large number of events on the basis of observations of a portion of them. These conclusions are expressed in terms of probabilities, the theory of which serves as the foundation for statistical methodology and its applications.

The development of probability theory dates back to the seventeenth century; the pioneering work in this field was done by Pascal (1623–1662), Fermat (1601–1655), Huygens (1629–1695), and J. Bernoulli (1654–1704), to mention only the most famous. Significant progress was made in the early half of the nineteenth century when the celebrated work of Laplace (1749–1827) entitled *Théorie analytique des probabilités* was published in 1812. Laplace, Gauss (1777–1855), Poisson (1781–1840), and others laid the foundations of modern mathematical probability theory. At the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth, important contributions were made, among others, by a number of Russian mathematicians belonging to the so-called St. Petersburg School, especially by P. L. Chebyshev (1821–1894), A. A. Markov (1856–1922), and A. M. Lyapunov (1857–1918).

However, only at the end of the 1930s did classical probability theory become a genuine mathematical discipline standing firmly established on axiomatic foundations. This achievement was due to the work of the Russian School, above all to A. I. Khinchin (1894–1959) and A. N. Kolmogorov (1903—),[1] and to a number of French mathematicians headed by Paul Lévy (1886—).

Before the present century, statistics as such was mostly viewed as a science dealing with a collection of facts relating to human society (so-called descriptive statistics) and was closely associated with demography. The great advance in the last forty-five years has been due to the introduction of sound mathematical techniques based on the firm foundation of probability theory. Statistics became a self-contained independent scientific subject thanks mainly to the work of British and

[1] Khinchin was a brilliant creative mathematician, for many years a Professor at Moscow University. Among other contributions he developed the theory of stochastic processes, one of the most important fields of probability theory. Kolmogorov is among the most eminent and influential Soviet mathematicians. His most outstanding contributions are in the field of functional analysis and probability theory. He became an academician in 1939 and has been connected with Moscow University for many years. He is largely responsible for the flourishing state of Soviet mathematics and mathematical education.

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American statisticians, among whom the names of K. Pearson (1857–1936), R. A. Fisher (1890–1962), J. Neyman (1894–) and A. Wald (1902–1950) figure most prominently. (This is the conclusion reached by the eminent Polish mathematician and statistician, Marek Fisz, in the preface to his *Probability Theory and Mathematical Statistics* (1963).)

However, despite its being so deeply rooted in probability theory, statistics is still as a whole in a fairly weak state in the Soviet Union, and it is of interest to trace the reasons for such a discrepancy in the development of these two closely related fields.

First, it should be mentioned that in the nineteenth and early years of the twentieth century (until the beginning of the first world war), Russia, as compared with Western Europe and the USA, was backward in statistical theory and in the application of statistical methods. This generalisation is valid even though a number of talented statisticians, headed by A. A. Chuprov,[2] were active at the Polytechnic Institute in St. Petersburg and a number of important statistical investigations were being conducted by the Department of Agriculture.

As pointed out in H. Westergaard's *Contributions to the History of Statistics* (London, 1932), 'the first general population census in Russia was taken after many years of deliberation, in 1897'. (For comparison, we may note that in 1900, the twelfth decennial census was undertaken in the USA, and that in British India the first general census was taken in 1881 and was repeated at ten-year intervals.) 'During the Russian census there was a serious lack of properly qualified persons to act as enumerators. The process of compilation and the ensuing work was remarkably slow and the general results were not published until 1905.' The statistics of local self-government agencies, known as *Zemstvo* statistics, although on a higher level, was handled without sufficient coordination and much of the collected data was incomparable.[3]

During the first years after the revolution, there was substantial progress in the development of statistics. Even during the first world war and in the period immediately following it, intensive work was being done in the fields of sampling by N. Chetverikov[4] and Chuprov, in correlation theory by Chuprov and his school, and in research into the stability of statistical series. Chuprov's famous *Outlines of Statistical Theory* greatly influenced the development of statistical methods in Russia, even if for a relatively short period. A number of papers by Chuprov and his students appeared in *Biometrika* in the years 1919–21. A number of highly competent statisticians and some young, promising scholars were also active, among them A. A. Kaufman (1864–1919), professor of Economics and Statistics at the University of St. Petersburg,

[2] Alexander Chuprov (1874–1926) is the only pre-revolutionary Russian statistician of world renown. He was an Honorary Fellow of the Royal Statistical Society and made important contributions to the development of statistical methodology; he also established a system of statistical teaching in Russia.

[3] Cf. A. Yezhov, *Soviet Statistics* (Moscow, 1957) (in English).

[4] After the Revolution, N. Chetverikov was the first director of the Methodological Division at the newly established Central Statistical Board.

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an official in the Ministry of Agriculture collecting data on peasant life in Siberia and author of the comprehensive *Theory and Methodology of Statistics*, V. I. Romanovsky (1879–1954), who later became the founder and director of the Statistical Centre in Tashkent, E. E. Slutsky (1880–1948), a well-known mathematician-statistician and mathematical economist, and B. S. Yastremsky (1877–1962), who became the spokesman for 'Marxist statistics' and influenced the development of statistics in the USSR.

A BRIEF account of the development and status of statistics in Russia during the first two decades after the revolution is given in the article by S. S. Zharkovich in the *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society* (Series A, 1956, pp. 336–338).

> Judging from the publications, it appears that in the earlier period theoretical work was completely free. The problems which post-revolution statistical theory dealt with were those common to many countries at that time and were thus being widely studied. The methods used for solving practical problems were likewise those common to current statistical methodology.
>
> Another feature of Russian statistics in those days was the interest theoreticians took in practical questions and the effect it had on their intensive application of theory to the solution of practical problems. These Russian statisticians watched the development of statistical theory all over the world. They published translations of the most important foreign contributions and they reviewed for the benefit of their readers all important results, whatever country provided them. This keen activity supplied the base from which they sought solutions to their own practical problems. I would go so far as to say that, in consequence, Russian statistics in the early thirties was on a par with the best in other countries.
>
> A very detailed picture of all aspects of this statistical activity may be obtained by reading *Vestnik Statistiki*, the organ of the Central Statistical Administration which started publication in 1919. One section of the *Vestnik* was devoted to theory, another to reviews of statistical literature and accounts of the work on which different statistical agencies were engaged. There were also notes on statistically important events and facts. . . . A study of that publication and other available sources reveals that sampling methods, for example, were in practical use during the First World War and that their application was extensive thereafter.

From a report published in the 1935 issue of the *Journal of the American Statistical Association* by V. I. Romanovsky, we learn that mathematical statistics was applied in those days in a number of Soviet factories. From *Vestnik Statistiki* (1924), we obtain information about the application of mathematical statistics and the theory of probability in agriculture. Besides the central *Vestnik Statistiki*, a Ukrainian counterpart of this journal in Kiev published during the twenties a number of papers of theoretical interest.

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Commenting on the decline of statistical activities in the Soviet Union in the late thirties, Zharkovich continues in the article already quoted:

> In subsequent years, political considerations became an increasingly pronounced factor in the development of Russia's statistics. This brought about the gradual disappearance of the use of theory in the practical activity of the statistical administration. In the late thirties, *Vestnik Statistiki* began to close its pages to papers in which statistical problems were dealt with mathematically. At the end of the thirties, they disappeared completely and have not appeared since. The result of this trend was that statisticians abandoned practice to continue their work at the Universities and other scientific institutions where they pursued statistics under the name of some other subject. Officially, A. N. Kolmogorov, N. V. Smirnov,[5] V. I. Romanovsky and many others are mathematicians divorced from statistics. A very interesting example is E. E. Slutsky, who enjoyed worldwide renown as one of the forerunners of econometrics. He gave up statistics to embark on a new career in astronomy. Some distinguished names such as N. Tchetwerikov, A. M. Obukhov and a number of others appeared in meteorology. Many younger statisticians are working now as engineers, technicians, and so on. According to official views, statistics became an instrument for planning the national economy. Consequently it represents a social science or, in other words, a class science. The law of large numbers, the idea of random deviations, and everything else belonging to the mathematical theory of statistics were swept away as the constituent elements of the false universal theory of statistical science.

The idea that the methods of mathematical statistics should not be applied for statistical study of social phenomena, which prevailed from the late thirties until 1954, markedly influenced the development of statistical theory during that period. Statistics became again a descriptive subject, and the statistician a compiler of statistical tables. For some time, the idea that statistics would die out under socialism and be replaced by record-keeping and accounting, was very popular.

During the late forties, a number of papers appeared in *Vestnik Statistiki* and *Planovoe Khoziaistvo* strongly attacking those who claimed that statistics is a universal science, and that the law of large numbers and the idea of randomness has something to do with 'the real world under socialism'. Such an approach was labelled bourgeois. The official textbook written collectively by a group from the Central Statistical Board (*Teoriya Statistiki*, 1953), states that the law of large numbers is purely a mathematical law, which is correct 'in the realm of mathematical combinatorics', but has no place in social-economic reality. B. V. Gnedenko, Academician V. S. Nemchinov,[6] and others,

[5] Smirnov (1900–) is a well-known Soviet mathematician and statistician, and was co-author of the first Soviet text-books on mathematical statistics and its applications in technology. He has made significant contributions to statistical methodology, among them an important result obtained jointly with Kolmogorov.

[6] Gnedenko (1912–) is a student of Khinchin and Kolmogorov, member of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, and author of many important publications in the

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in writing on the history of Soviet mathematics and statistics, note that statistical theory lagged seriously behind the possibilities of its application in practice in the Soviet Union in those days. Particularly strong were the repercussions on the use of statistics in biology, arising partly from the earlier biological controversies. The number of papers devoted to statistics in various journals was very limited, even statistical yearbooks were not published. The economists were deprived of the possibility of using statistical data to study problems of the national economy and restrictions on the publication of social statistics were enforced.[7]

AT last, in 1954, a scientific conference on the problems of statistics was held jointly by the Academy of Sciences, the Central Statistical Bureau, and the Ministry of Higher Education, where a compromise concerning the status of statistics in the Soviet Union was reached. Statistics was officially declared to be an independent social science and given the following cumbersome definition: '. . . it studies the quantitative aspect of mass social phenomena in indissoluble connection with their qualitative aspect; it investigates the quantitative expression of laws governing social development in concrete conditions of space and time. Statistics studies the quantitative aspect of social production in its unity of productive forces and relations of production and the phenomena of the cultural and political life of society'.[8]

It was agreed that the methods of mathematical statistics, among them the important basic concepts of probability theory, can be used successfully in statistics, especially in connection with sampling problems. Regarding the law of large numbers, it was decided that although this law plays a secondary role in the real world, it nevertheless can be used as an instrument for practical applications and that its validity for a certain class of real phenomena should not be ignored.

This was accomplished only after Academician Kolmogorov, who took an active part in the discussions, explained jokingly that 'the fact that a lamp stands in its place and does not fly to the ceiling is a direct consequence of the law of large numbers'.[9]

He was, however, cautious enough to assert that in the social and social-economic sciences, the importance of mathematical statistics is quite negligible, although it does not vanish, and that while in 'planned

field of probability theory and its applications. He has also published a number of papers and a book on the history of the theory of probability and mathematical statistics in Russia and the Soviet Union. Nemchinov (1894–1964) was prominent in the field of mathematical economics. He promoted the application of statistical and mathematical methods in economics and planning. For fifteen years he headed the influential council on the Study of Manpower at the Academy of Sciences and was founder and for ten years chief editor of *Uchenye zapiski po statistike*. In April 1965 he was posthumously awarded a Lenin prize for his contributions to Soviet economics and statistics.

7 Cf. *Uchenye zapiski po statistike*, vol. 3 (1957), editorial note, and S. M. Gurevich, *Lenin i Statistika Sotsialisticheskovo Gosudarstva* (Moscow, 1963).

8 *Vestnik Statistiki*, No. 8, 1962, pp. 67–68.

9 *Uchenye zapiski po statistike*, 1955, pp. 153–65.

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society' the investigation of probabilistic random processes is not so important, there still exist certain areas where the random phenomena take place, for example in the insurance business and in serving the mass needs of the population.

After this conference, a new journal entitled *Uchenye zapiski po statistike* (Learned Notes on Statistics), edited by Nemchinov, began publication under the Academy of Sciences. With all its defects, it blew fresh air into the suffocating atmosphere in which statistics had existed for more than a decade. Although a great part of this journal is devoted to papers of a general character, especially to discussions of the ideological difficulties connected with the application of statistical methods, there are a number of papers in the seven or eight issues published so far which deal with various theoretical problems, and many review articles on the application of mathematical statistics and the theory of probability in industry and economics in the USSR as well as abroad.

Finally, in 1956, a quarterly journal, *Teoriya Veroyatnostei i ee Primeneniya* (The Theory of Probability and its Applications), made its appearance. From the first it was open to contributions from outside the Soviet Union. In fact, almost every issue contains papers by foreign mathematicians and statisticians. Since the middle fifties, translations of standard Western books on statistics have appeared in increasing numbers, and several books have been written by Soviet authors. (Until 1955, except for elementary books by A. Ya. Boyarsky, B. S. Yastremsky *et al.* published in the 1930s, which were introduced at that time as the first Marxist textbooks, the only book on the theory of mathematical statistics was one by Romanovsky.[10])

The period since 1956 has been highly significant in the establishment, development, and subsequent stabilisation of Russian statistical terminology. A number of new terms were hastily coined, in many cases violating the basic rules of the construction of scientific terminology by introducing a great number of duplicate terms. Here the historical tendency of the Russian language to adapt foreign words and simultaneously to construct genuine Russian terms for new concepts was strongly felt. From a sample of 2,000 terms frequently used in statistical literature, Professor W. Hoeffding and the author of this note [11] found approximately 1,200 nouns, 650 adjectives and 150 verbs. Of the 1,200 nouns, 800 were of foreign origin; of the 650 adjectives, 500 were of foreign origin; of the 150 verbs, only thirty-five had a foreign root. Moreover, of the 150 adjectives of Russian origin, about one-half had at least one equivalent term of foreign origin.

[10] The following selected headings of sections from Chap. 7 of the Boyarsky-Yastremsky *Teoriya Matematicheskoi Statistiki* illustrate the ideological tendency: The average as interpreted by idealists *vis-à-vis* our interpretations—The average as interpreted by Machists—The typical nature of averages for an idealist—The typical nature of averages in the Marxist sense.

[11] S. Kotz (with W. Hoeffding), *Russian-English Dictionary of Statistical Terms and Expressions* and *Russian Reader in Statistics* (Chapel Hill, 1964).

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IT seemed that a significant change in the Soviet attitude towards statistics was taking place after 1954, and a return to the position of the early twenties and thirties appeared to be on the horizon. However, among the applied statisticians, particularly those connected with the Central Statistical Bureau, the professors at the various institutes where Soviet statisticians are trained, and the compilers of official textbooks, the attitude towards statistics remains, at best, along the lines of the 1954 conference, and no further progress has been noticeable. *Vestnik Statistiki* has not changed significantly during the last few years and the few theoretical papers published in it deal mostly with index numbers. It continues to be devoted to problems connected with accounting and record-keeping, and recently to the discussion and intensive propagation of the mechanisation of statistical-accounting methods.

An example of the persistence of this conservative trend appears in a letter to the editor published in *Vestnik Statistiki* (1962, No. 8). In this letter I. Shutov criticised a definition of statistics given in a dictionary of economic terms published shortly before in the Soviet Union. It defined statistics as 'the science which studies quantitative changes in the development of society, the national economy and nature, and which analyses and generalises these changes for scientific and practical purposes'. Shutov protested against defining statistics as a universal science studying social as well as natural phenomena. He adopted the official line, that the laws of development in nature are completely different from those in society and therefore 'the phenomena of society and of public life should be investigated by entirely different methods from those used to analyse natural phenomena'.

The editors were in full agreement and replied that there is indeed 'no universal science which is able to study by the same methods, the quantitative changes in the development of society as well as nature'. Referring to mathematical statistics they added: 'Statistics is a social science. There also exists mathematical statistics, but it is a branch of mathematics. Moreover, the application of mathematical statistics for solving problems in technology and the natural sciences creates special independent disciplines. These disciplines, although containing in their name the word statistics, such as statistics of quality control, statistical physics, etc., nevertheless belong to the technical or natural sciences and not to statistics'. It is true, continued the editors, that 'some bourgeois statisticians interpret statistics as a universal science, but this position is, of course, completely unfounded. Soviet statisticians have a different opinion on this subject. They consider statistics as a social science'. An article in *Voprosy Filosofii* (1963, 5, p. 55) criticised the oversimplified attitude of Shutov and the *Vestnik* editors. It agreed that statistics was not a universal science, but argued that, since 'society is part of nature', the laws of nature can be investigated with the use of statistical methods provided that the existence of several types of statistics is acknowledged, each with 'its own specific means of

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investigating quantitative statistical laws governing the specific form of the motion of the matter'.

The journal *Learned Notes on Statistics* (on an intermediate level between *Vestnik Statistiki* and *Theory of Probability and its Applications*) which began publication after the 1954 conference, did not fully live up to expectations. The chief editor, Nemchinov, tried to raise the level of statistical education and practice. It was planned to publish two to three issues a year, but since 1954 only seven or eight issues have been published. Many long papers have been devoted to such problems as 'disharmonic theories of arithmetic mean' (which has scarcely any importance or interest in modern statistics); nearly the whole of the third issue of about 400 pages dealt with ideological difficulties in the interpretation of the law of large numbers. Vigorous protests are often raised against mathematical anti-statistical formalism in statistics, although this is not by any means the main problem handicapping the development of Soviet statistical sciences.[12]

It is not surprising, therefore, that the gap remains large between the mathematician dealing with problems of mathematical statistics and probability theory in such institutions as the Moscow University and other centres whose publishing outlets are the Academy of Sciences and the *Theory of Probability and its Applications*, and the group of Soviet statisticians at the Statistical Institutes and the Central Statistical Bureau (administratively the Bureau is under the Council of Ministers). There is no overlapping or even resemblance between the topics dealt with in *The Theory of Probability* on one side, and *Vestnik Statistiki*, the *Learned Notes* and non-mathematical journals where statistical applications are discussed on the other, except perhaps that papers dealing with applications of statistical methods to poetry (one of Kolmogorov's favourites) have recently appeared in *The Theory of Probability* as well as in the journal of the Academy of Sciences devoted to linguistics.

ALL this has had a tremendous effect on the development of terminology and the uneven development of different branches of statistics in the Soviet Union. Many statistical terms are as yet unavailable in Russian, and even more have several equivalents. Here the natural tendency to duplication, already mentioned, has been supplemented by non-uniformity in translation. It is the general practice of all Soviet review journals to give a Russian translation of the titles of the reviewed articles; there is extensive coverage of foreign papers in the Russian review journal for mathematics (including mathematical statistics), and for many statistical terms the only source of Russian terminology is the

[12] In this connection, however, mention must be made of the great advances in mathematical economics in general and in econometrics in particular which have taken place since 1958, largely as a result of the efforts of Nemchinov, Kantorovich and their colleagues in the Scientific Council of the Academy of Sciences for Application of Mathematical Methods and Computational Procedures in Economics and Planning, and at the newly-established (1963) Central Economic-Mathematical Institute of the Academy of Sciences.

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translated titles of the papers from the *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, *Annals of Mathematical Statistics*, *Technometrics*, and other Western statistical journals. These show the absence of a rigidly established Russian terminology in many fields of the statistical sciences. Moreover, in some fields where the development of a discipline in Russia was parallel and independent of the West, the Russian terminology bears little relation to the English. (Queueing theory, for example, is known as 'theory of mass service'.) Recently, however, there has been evidence of a tendency to bring uniformity and stability into the terminology; it is also noticeable that the word 'statistics' is now sometimes used without the formerly inevitable preface 'mathematical'. The June 1964 issue of *Theory of Probability* noted that A. M. Yaglom, a well-known mathematician who recently visited the USA, had delivered a report on the programmes of statistical training based on foreign material and publications. An increasingly large number of papers of an applied character, such as on design of experiments, inventory control, compilation of statistical tables, etc., is now being published and discussed.

There is an extremely competent group of young mathematical statisticians in the Soviet Union who combine great analytical ability with an interest in and an awareness of the possibilities of practical applications. This trend towards a more widespread use of statistical methods in all branches of technology and the sciences is particularly noticeable in the second volume of *Cybernetics in the Service of Communism*, containing twenty-five papers on problems of queueing theory and theory of reliability.[18]

It seems, therefore, that prospects for the development of mathematical statistics and, what is more urgent, the introduction of modern mathematical methods to many applied fields, especially to the social and biological sciences, are rather bright. This will bring additional problems with respect to terminology—for example, the terminology for psychological and educational statistics would have to be developed, and there is no question that the influence of the well-established English terminology would be strong. At present such simple terms as 'item analysis' or 'sympathy effect' have no single Russian equivalent but require a description and explanation (not to mention the difficulties of adaptation into Russian of such specific terms as 'jack-knife procedure', 'chunk sampling', etc.).

For a number of years the Central Statistical Administration and the publishing house of statistical literature have been engaged in the compilation of an explanatory Statistical Dictionary. Draft versions were circulated among various Soviet experts in the fields of statistics and economics as well as party ideologists; a number of conferences were held, devoted to a discussion of the scope and contents of this dictionary,

[18] *Kibernetika na Sluzhbu kommunizma*, vol. II, ed. by A. J. Berg, N. G. Bruevich, and B. V. Gnedenko (Moscow, 1964). See the article by Loren R. Graham entitled 'Cybernetics in the Soviet Union' in the July 1964 issue of *Survey*.

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and as a result publication was much delayed (even *Vestnik Statistiki* complained). Finally it was announced in January 1965 that this two-volume work would appear sometime during the year. Its content should show the direction in which Soviet statistics will now move. Undoubtedly, the recent trend towards liberalisation in various scientific fields (especially in biology) will have a positive effect on the future development of statistical sciences in the USSR.

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ON PHYSICAL IMMORTALITY, II

Peter Wiles

Soviet Medicine: Immortality

We now turn to a somewhat more scientific part of our subject, with the contrast between the Russian and other medical traditions.

Though less spectacular than Federov, Russian doctors prove still more conclusively the specifically Russian yen for immortality, because they were actually conducting experiments. None was mad, though some were quacks; so none actually promised eternal life in the foreseeable future. But they did experiments on the prolongation of life, and some of them asserted the possibility of eternal life. They also showed their emotional involvement by propounding some very unscientific panaceas. Curiously, many of the doctors were exiles from their native land, a fact which I find difficult to account for. But whatever the explanation, it certainly does not diminish their Russianness. The medical traditions of other countries, including that of France where most of them lived, appear to contain no such extravaganza as the literal search for eternal life.

There is a fairly extensive literature on the search of doctors, chemists, and biologists for eternal life. It gives one a fair statistical sense of the relative participation of various nationalities. In order to carry conviction we quote below the (seemingly irrelevant) names of non-Russians, and give a very bare account of their theories. Our criterion of selection is in all cases the same: people brought up in the Western medical tradition but who made unscientific claims that they could prolong life, or showed unusual emotional involvement with the subject. The preponderance of Russians is very striking indeed. It will be observed that our criterion excludes the rich fields of medieval alchemy, elixirs of life, fountains of youth, Ponce de Leon, Cagliostro, etc. We confine ourselves to recent, supposedly scientific work. Its psychological connexion with such earlier efforts is, of course, very close.

This section and the following section are not to be understood as attacks on the medical profession in general or Russian doctors in particular. Many of those named were great men and great scientists, and it would grotesquely misrepresent their total achievement to take as representative what they did in this field alone. Nor is the author in any way qualified to judge their scholarship. He can only relate their attitude to death.

A history of Russian gerontology is provided by V. N. Nikitin.[1] His very thorough work gives only one item of interest before Mechnikov:

> L. O. Vanotti, Professor of Anatomy and Physiology at Kharkov University, lectured in 1818 on the significance of public health in

[1] *Otechestvennye Raboty po Vozrastnoi Fiziologii, Biokhimii i Morfologii* (Kharkov, 1958). Page refs. here to the translation by the National Institute of Health, Bethesda, Maryland, 1961.

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> human longevity. The lecture was entitled 'The probable curability of almost all diseases'. In it, he points out that 'a long and healthy life is, beyond a doubt, the most necessary and desired of the gifts for which we pray to our most gracious Providence. But there are so few who are granted this highest boon, as we learn from our everyday experience of the usual mortality rate among human beings'. Vanotti advanced a view that anticipated by a half century a similar statement advanced by I. I. Mechnikov: 'Life is always too short to attain the goals set for it by nature; it is interrupted violently by illnesses. . . . Extreme old age is very often nothing other than a prolonged and incurable disease.' . . . In particular, Vanotti stressed the possibility of artificial strengthening of the regeneration phenomena in the organism, and hence of a complete restoration of health after any illness. He further emphasised the fact that 'all diseases are curable, and only the physician's lack of knowledge of the cause is at fault if patients die' (p. 2).

Vanotti evidently was a 'death-obsessed doctor'. But his name is Italian and he may well have been a recent immigrant (I have been unable to identify him further). Nor did he attempt any specific cure. He can thus scarcely be used as evidence for our thesis. Still less can the great M. V. Lomonosov (1711–65), or S. G. Zybelin (1735–1802), whose publications Nikitin somewhat irrelevantly quotes.

The first nineteenth-century doctor who seriously worked in this field seems to have been Charles-Édouard Brown-Séquard (1817–94), of American origin, but a French professor of physiology [2]; he injected himself with a mixture of salt water and the testicles of dogs and guinea-pigs, and claimed in 1889 before a learned audience to have been rejuvenated. He was laughed to scorn and afterwards almost admitted he had been wrong.

But he had started something. Head and shoulders above the rest of our company, and sure of a mention in the slightest treatment of the subject, stands the Nobel prize-winner Ilya Mechnikov (1845–1916).[3] He lived most of his adult life in Paris at the Pasteur Institute, but remained profoundly Russian (his literary and personal references are largely Russian), visited his native land often, and was held there in much honour.

The *B.S.E.* is, as usual in these matters, succinct and correct: 'in the last years of his scientific activity Mechnikov devoted himself to work on the problem of old age and death. He suggested that premature old age is a disease, which must be overcome like any other disease. In his opinion the basic cause of premature old age is that the intestine of man is populated by a large quantity of bacteria which cause a

[2] Robert S. de Ropp, *Man Against Aging*, New York 1960, pp. 7, 105–08.

[3] W. Horsley Gantt, *Russian Medicine* (New York, 1937), pp. 120–23; *Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopedia* (*B.S.E.*), 1954, vol. 27; de Ropp, op. cit., pp. 150–57; and the following works by himself: *Etudes sur la Nature Humaine* (Paris, 1903); *Essais Optimistes*, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1914; the English translation of this was called *The Prolongation of Life*); *Stranitsy Vospominanii* (Moscow, 1946). Many library catalogues use the French spelling: Metchnikoff, Élie.

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putrefactive fermentation and the formation of toxins. These poisons weaken the cells of various tissues, which atrophy. In this connexion Mechnikov worked out methods of rational nutrition, recommending their use in food as antagonists of the putrefactive microbes'. These were not themselves 'phagocytes', a term invented by Mechnikov for body cells (not bacteria) that scavenge away the debris of the body. Mechnikov's explanation for aging was, then, that the over-stimulated phagocytes destroy the nervous system, which is weakened by poison from the large intestine.

MECHNIKOV never actually aimed at human immortality, and criticised the Americans for entitling his French *Essais Optimistes*, *The Prolongation of Life* in translation. Yet he certainly thought eternal life possible, saying: 'I am inclined to share the opinion of Oscar Bloch, who doubts the existence of natural death in the human species'.[4] In his serious writings Mechnikov insists on a concept that occurs again and again in our sources: normal old age. The diseases of old age are unnecessary; there should instead be a slow harmonious decline of all organs and faculties. This is, of course, what in fact distinguishes a healthy centenarian.

Mechnikov limits himself to the possibility of immortality for other things. He claimed that unicellular organisms, which reproduce by division and leave no corpse, may be called immortal; and, more significantly, that certain large trees are virtually immortal, suffering only from fatal accidents. In his sixties he drank a great deal of lactic acid in order to prolong his own life.[5] But science has confirmed his views neither on phagocytes nor on lactic acid. The whole thing was a baseless speculation, sparked merely by the observation that Bulgarian peasants drank yogurt (lactic acid) and lived long. Had he not been emotionally involved, surely a Nobel prize-winner would have paid greater attention to the laws of evidence. In Russia, however, lactic acid is still recommended and widely drunk for the prolongation of life. The continued popularity of yogurt as a health food in the West also must be traced back to Mechnikov. Characteristically, however, we earthbound non-Russians have forgotten that it is supposed to prolong life.

On the ideology of all this it is most convenient and convincing to let Mechnikov speak for himself, as he has happily done so in a brief popularising way and in a most pregnant context. At the end of May 1909 he visited Tolstoy at Yasnaya Polyana:

> The moment we had passed the gates of the garden he made a speech he had clearly thought up beforehand: 'I am wrongly accused', he began, 'of being an opponent of religion and science. I am neither the one nor the other. On the contrary I am a strong believer; but

[4] *Annales de l'Institut Pasteur*, vol. 29, 1915, p. 479. He is quoting, he says, Bloch's *Von Tode*, vol. A, p. 202. I have only been able to find Oscar Bloch (*Om Doden*; Copenhagen, 1903) in the original. If his views did not subsequently change, Mechnikov is grossly misquoting him.

[5] Boris Sokoloff, *Vitality* (New York, 1934) p. 25.

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I am against the church and its deviation from true religion. And the same goes for science. I value true science highly, i.e. that which concerns itself with man, with his fortune and his fate, but I am an enemy of that false science which imagines it has done something especially important and useful when it has distinguished all the satellites of Saturn or something like that. True science ties up very well with true religion'. Developing this theme further, Tolstoy recalled that before he had worked out his present final *Weltanschauung* he had been afraid of death, but he had subdued this fear by his faith.

When he had finished I said to him that science certainly does not turn away from the questions he thought most important but tries to solve them as best it may. In a few words I explained my view, which is based on the fact that man is a living being who has inherited some features of organisation which are the source of his unhappiness. This causes the brevity of human life and the fear of death that results from that brevity. When in the course of time science raises man to the point where he can rationally live out his full cycle, then the instinctive fear of death yields its place to the equally instinctive desire for annihilation. When humanity reaches that stage there will be indifference to diseases, old age, and death; everything connected with them will come to an end, and people will be able to give themselves more fully and peacefully to art and pure science.

Tolstoy listened to me with attention and observed that in the last resort our views coincided, but with this difference, that he took a spiritualistic and I a materialistic standpoint. (*Stranitsy* . . . pp. 150–1).

This must surely be the locus classicus for the state of the pre-revolutionary Russian mind on this topic. A great writer and a great scientist meet, and all liberal Russia hangs upon the event with bated breath. In the words of Herman Bernstein[6]: 'When it was learned that the great student of the human body had decided upon a pilgrimage to the great student of the human soul, Tolstoy, the press was occupied almost exclusively with the meeting of the two monarchs of universal literature and science, Leo I and Elie I, Tolstoy and Metchnikoff. The little village in the government of Tula, Yasnaya Polyana, and not the *Standart*, the imperial yacht on which the Kaiser and the Czar [were meeting simultaneously] held the center of the stage in Russia'. And what did they talk about? Death.

We further perceive that Russian Orthodoxy has, at least at higher levels, less conflict with science than other forms of Christianity. Tolstoy sees no conflict between religion and science if they both in their different ways tend to the solution of this problem; the other (Mechnikov, whose writings are studded with little digs at Christianity) has, to be sure, a whole morality and *Weltanschauung* based on a purely scientific solution for the same problem, but in so far as he succeeds in his purely empirical work he is forwarding the aims of religion. How different

[6] *Celebrities of Our Time* (New York, 1924), p. 57.

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is, for instance, Britain. Here there was (rather before the meeting at Yasnaya Polyana) a conflict between religion and science, but it was about facts! Was the Bible true or not? those earthbound empiricists Thomas Huxley and Bishop Wilberforce asked each other (at the British Association meeting in June 1860). *Their* interest was in the truth or falsehood of Anglican theology and Darwinism; the Russian scientist and the Russian believer, both running far ahead of any conceivable fact, were competing to see who could most completely revolutionise the whole *condition humaine*.

In Britain, too, there have been 'scientific moralities', i.e. ethical injunctions which it is believed can be rigorously deduced from laboratory observations alone. The most famous of them comes from another Huxley, Sir Julian.[7] But it is by no means concerned with death, which it rather takes for granted: man is to be perfected by evolution; we rely upon Darwinism, not microbiology.

Mechnikov *did* have influence in Britain, however: on an Irishman. His phagocytes are basic to G. B. Shaw's *Doctor's Dilemma* (1906), and he receives a mention in the preface; Shaw had heard of them through a British doctor, Sir Almroth Wright. But the *Doctor's Dilemma* has nothing about eternal life; this theme began to worry Shaw—indeed as it began to worry Mechnikov—only as he grew old. *Back to Methuselah* (1920), is very explicitly about eternal life. It might then seem to have been very much influenced by Mechnikov, but on closer inspection this is not so. The Ancients are in fact immortal and await their fatal accident like Mechnikov's trees, not his men; and their immortality is achieved by willpower not medicine, let alone phagocytes. The basic thought is Lamarckian, while Mechnikov was a convinced Darwinian. The preface is a Lamarckian rodomontade which does not mention Mechnikov once; indeed he would have deeply disapproved of it. However, *Back to Methuselah* is an exceedingly popular play in Russia!

Quite apart from Mechnikov's great personal influence, in his day medical speculation about immortality was very fashionable. There is a whole shelf of such books in the Harvard College Library (NH 3059–3078); they range from Spain to the USA. The books themselves are, Mechnikov's apart, by obvious crackpots, and have been omitted from this essay on that account. Clearly all the world over there are many people obsessed with immortality, who neither pursue it by experiment nor base religion upon it. But such works, the rag-tag and bobtail of our procession, nevertheless muster some very definite quotations of the great and respectable in medical science, admitting that man may be made immortal: e.g. Weissmann and T. Brailsford Robertson.

STEPPING for the moment out of chronological order, Mechnikov's most typical and orthodox pupil appears to have been S. Metalnikov (died 1937). Like his mentor, Metalnikov grew up in Russia, making

[7] *Evolutionary Ethics* (the Romanes Lecture, Oxford 1943), sec. 6; *Man in the Modern World* (London, 1947), pp. 21, 47, 173–74.

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biological experiments.[8] He moved to the Pasteur Institute in about 1920, and continued in the same line of research. He is in one way better than Mechnikov in that he proposes no panacea for death; on the other hand he is clearly not so great a man. His theory of death may be given in his own words:

> A terrible evil for the individual, death for the species appears as a blessing because thanks to it the species can unceasingly renew itself by younger and stronger individuals. In occupying the place of the weaker, the old and decrepit constitute without doubt a terrible burden for the life of the species. In effect, if one could present two groups or species of animal, the one formed of immortal individuals and the other of old individuals who would be replaced by young individuals, it is beyond doubt that the second group would be livelier and stronger. That is why death has only developed ex post facto, by way of [natural] selection as a useful adaptation for the species (*La Lutte* . . . p. 72).

Unicellular organisms propagate by division indefinitely[9]: therefore death through wear and tear is not inevitable. But the individual cells of multi-cellular organisms propagate in the same manner, so the death of the whole organism is not obvious but requires some explanation:

> And if our hypothesis is well founded that the old age and death of superior organisms are not an inevitable consequence of the wear of a mechanism living by work, as used to be believed, but rather a particular adaptation useful to the species, then we must recognise as wholly natural and scientific every attempt to find a remedy against old age and death. Without doubt we have no practical method yet of treating old age which could be within reach of everybody. The problem is as yet only at a certain stage of development. It embraces such a crowd of questions touching the life of cells and the mutual relations of the different organs of the living organism that much time and much effort will be required to solve them all. In this interesting field we lack a special establishment, *an institute of experimental research on old age and death*, where all these questions could be resolved by the collective efforts of numerous scientists. At present it is already clear that a great result has been attained, that this problem is not a fantasy problem but a genuinely scientific problem.
>
> Is the fight against death possible? It is already well established by recent work that immortality is the fundamental property of living organisms. Life and the reproduction of living organs only take place thanks to the immortal sexual and bodily cells. Each living cell in the present conditions of terrestrial existence can divide and multiply to infinity (ibid. p. 230).

[8] S. Metalnikov, *La Lutte Contre La Mort* (Paris, 1937). Cf. Nikitin, op. cit. p. 13; Boris Sokoloff, *The White Nights* (London, 1956), pp. 42–43.

[9] This point is disputed by many biologists. It is safest to assert that the senescence of the, so to speak, single organism propagating itself by division can be postponed for fantastic periods in a laboratory. In the end the alternative method of conjugation, open to all unicellular organisms, must be turned to, or the strain will die.

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These would appear to be views quite acceptable to modern biologists. But the philosophy behind his preoccupation with this subject is specifically Russian: 'Man cannot reconcile himself to death as the end of all life. If death really puts an end to our life, if it destroys and disaggregates our body, if after our decease there remain only microbes and putrefaction, then our life has no sense, no raison d'être' (p. 10). This is the remark not only of an irreligious man, but of one irreligious in a very specific way. The view is exactly Tolstoy's.

Next, in the United States, the whole of our present syndrome—religious materialism, denial of God, a desire to put man in his place, vaulting scientific ambition—occurs with peculiar clarity in C. A. Stephens, M.D., who propounded the doctrine of Natural Salvation in the 1890s.[10]

A minor figure in the Russian medical tradition is Serge Voronoff (1866–1951). Born in Voronezh, he studied and graduated in Paris, thereafter rising to a high position in the French medical world, like Mechnikov. One can but regret that death, their common enemy, prevented Mechnikov—obviously, even to the layman, a great man—from commenting on Voronoff's main work. For in 1919, having studied a number of Egyptian eunuchs, he claimed to be able to prolong life in the human male by grafting upon the existing testicle a part of the testicle of the ape. The operation, with its stated direct connexion between longevity and sexual virility, naturally became very fashionable and was for a time the subject of international celebrity. W. B. Yeats, notorious for his interest in both longevity and sexual activity, was one among Voronoff's many distinguished patients.

The philosophy of Voronoff's approach may be studied in his *The Conquest of Old Age*[11]: he simply believed, on the basis of the evidence, that the testicles are the master gland, controlling the whole tone of body and mind with their newly discovered internal secretions. He goes on to say that old age is very unpleasant, and the usual consolations false:

> We cannot avoid death, but we can nevertheless stave it off to the extreme limit of the possible; to do this, however, we must suppress old age, in much the same way as we can cure a disease. By the grafting of interstitial glands, to which may be added, according to the individual indications, that of the thyroid gland and the pituitary body, we may be saved from old age and we can be given the joy of dying young at an age which is not at present reached even by very old men . . . . [describes an experiment on a ram]. The case of this ram indicates to us the course to be pursued, the ideal to be attained: the prolongation of the length of life and the shortening of the period of old age, thanks to gland grafting.

What an attractive view for the Bright Young Things of the 1920s, and how perfectly he hit off the Zeitgeist!

[10] *Long Life* (Maine, 1896); *Natural Life* (5th ed., Maine, 1909).

[11] An essay in *Sidelights from the Surgery*, ed. A. Forbath (London, 1939). Cf. de Ropp, op. cit. pp. 115–21. Voronoff is the Spelyeev in Colette's *Chéri*.

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Voronoff died in 1951. He is no longer honoured in his native land: the *B.S.E.* (*Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopedia*) omits him, and so does the second edition of the *Bolshaya Meditsinskaya Entsiklopedia* (1955). V. N. Nikitin (op. cit. p. 20) treats him as a foreigner, like Steinach (below), and dismisses them both in one and the same sentence. However, in his admirable bibliography there appear no fewer than eight works by Voronoff in the Russian language. The first two items came out in 1923. The translator was V. N. Nikitin. Another had a preface by the great A. A. Bogomolets (below). The first (1926) edition of the *Bolshaya Meditsinskaya Entsiklopedia* gives Voronoff several inches. So he was evidently the Mechnikov of his day: the great Russian doctor, living abroad but struggling against death for the honour of his country. His claims for testicular grafting are now rejected by virtually the entire medical profession of the world. In particular, of course, the graft always died, since it did not come from another part of the same organism, as grafts had to until immunology had much further developed. Voronoff's treatment of this simple fact seems to the layman decidedly oblique.

WITH Voronoff we touch a separate root of the desire for eternal life: *not life-prolongation but rejuvenation*, not the materialistically pious or piously materialist wish to deify man on earth, but the mere vulgar antipathy to sexual debility. Not, then, eternal life but eternal youth. This is of course a universal fantasy, strong in the medieval idea of the Fountain of Youth, and strong to this day in Indian medical practice. Such notions have not the sweep and ethical grandeur of the 'Russo-Marxist syndrome', but after all eternal youth logically entails eternal life, and those who wish to enjoy sexual intercourse for ever must by definition avoid death for ever. Therefore such notions add to the drive for immortality.

They do so even in the modified form in which Voronoff presented them. For he, as we have seen, wanted merely to prolong the period of sexual activity at the expense of old age. His attack was on old age, not death. Man was to go on and on unchanged, a one-hoss shay, and then collapse at once. But it is vastly improbable that rejuvenation can be separated from geriatrics, and such attempts must in practice prolong life as well as youth.

These hedonistic views are of course very individualistic. But that is true also for the more 'ethical' Mechnikov. The emphasis in both is on what each individual will get out of it. This is in contrast to Federov, for whom it is a collective achievement, inextricable from patriarchalism and *sobornost*. But characteristically he does not explain how resuscitation can be other than of individuals, or how it will help the individual to be subsumed into a greater whole. Communists, balancing as always between science and *sobornost*, would presumably take an intermediate stand: resuscitation or any other form of eternal life would be a collective achievement only in the technical sense that you would need a Full Communist society to achieve it. There is no *mystical* hostility to

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individuals in communism; collectivism is merely the indispensable means to individual happiness. Indeed, how could eternal life on earth, rationally considered, be other than an individualist doctrine and aim? Your true mystical collectivist, say a Nazi, should be indifferent to the death of individuals, so long as nature has provided the means of reproducing the preferred group. To such philosophies death might seem a positive advantage, since it rejuvenates the group and permits its biological improvement.

Voronoff may for all I know have originally been a serious and respectable Russian, but as a doctor selling his services in Paris and Bucarest, he naturally had to fall in with his environment. There is however a much purer representative of the tradition of mere sexual prolongation. This is Aldous Huxley in his *Brave New World* (1932), which, since it is a work of the imagination, must not be held to commit its author. Here too eternal life is not promised, but free sex is a main constituent of the Utopia, and a vivid picture is drawn of the collapse of the one-hoss shay man in an institute of euthanasia. Old age is a galloping disease, taking only a few days.

Indeed, the one-hoss shay man is at least as old as Mechnikov, who said: 'Everything which we have learned about natural death puts us in the position to recognise that the butterfly . . . represents the archetype of an animal with an integral, achieved cycle of normal life. Though he reacts to stimuli up to the last moment [i.e. conserves his vitality, P.W.], we must believe that he dies of self-poisoning, without suffering, without consciousness of death. We must hope that this same death which the butterfly reaches naturally will be also in future that of man.'[12] Again, he gives a description of a male tortoise which had lived 87 years without trace of senility. This he said was typical of reptiles.

CONTEMPORARY with Voronoff, who first published on this subject in 1919, was Eugen Steinach, an Austrian professor of physiology.[13] Steinach first revealed his panacea in 1920: he did not graft a new testicle but re-invigorated the existing one. By inhibiting the sperm-producing part of the testicle and rendering a man sterile, he claimed to rejuvenate its hormone-producing part. Science has rejected this claim too.

Yet another exiled Russian doctor in the Mechnikov tradition was Victor Vasilievich Bogomolets (1895–?). Having graduated in medicine at Kiev, he left his country in 1920, and subsequently lived in Bucarest, Berlin, Paris, Lisbon, Cairo, and Paris again. His attitude to eternal life is conveniently summarised by Claude-Henri Leconte, the French journalist who helped him write his book on the subject.[14] It is not clear to what extent his ideas had developed before 1944, but in that year they crystallised. In Cairo,

[12] 'La Mort du Papillon du Murier', *Annales de l'Institut Pasteur*, Vol. 29, 1915.
[13] de Ropp, op cit., pp. 108–15.
[14] V. Bogomoletz, *Vivre Jeune* (Paris, 1951). M. Leconte wrote the introduction over his own name.

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> In the course of a brilliant political and social reception given in the Egyptian capital, Dr. V. Bogomolets met again a Frenchwoman of international reputation whom he had known and admired in Paris between the wars. Time and, in a word, age, had subjected this beauty to outrages which struck the doctor dumb. To stupefaction there succeeded a sort of sadness, a real melancholia.
>
> 'I never felt so deeply as on that day', says the creator of *The External*, 'how horrifying is the dilapidation of a great feminine beauty, and how inadmissible. I then set myself to work with a fervour and an obstinacy which are now yielding their first results.'
>
> It is not difficult to see that Dr. V. Bogomolets feels a real idolatry for women. A witty Italian journalist delivered himself on this subject in a bold and elegant image: 'He contemplates pretty women with great biological ardour.'
>
> Nevertheless he does not turn away from old or ugly women, considering them 'patients' to be healed and saved (op. cit., p. 16).

This section is headed 'I feel fraternity for living matter'—how Russian! We may say it is *sobornost* come to the laboratory.

Bogomolets seems to have perceived in the 'shock of Cairo' the key to the prolongation of life (we may note in passing that nearly everyone in this field seems to have a single key). It is the skin, and his new particular science is Externotherapy: 'the royal road of Externotherapy: the Skin' (p. 241). Nevertheless he insists that there is no one medicine for the skin:

> It is useless to look for any secret or mystery in this fight against aging. Through the derma, so rich in conjunctive tissue, we are able to stimulate the body's vital sources (cellular and humoral). This is the 'biological truth' which animates both my researches and those of my collaborators, and we owe it to Alexander Bogomolets [15] (p. 243).

And even at that the skin is only the first step, because there are many influences, especially psychic ones, that do not enter by the skin. We must be treated 'from the skin to the soul' (p. 35). Hence the general science of life prolongation, Externalism:

> Men battle on several fronts, and every day new ones begin! Organic wear, psychic wear, moral wear, and even, lastly, social wear. Externalism and its methods of application take all that in hand, and from the variations of climate down to the people who surround us ('from the skin to the soul') it proposes to lay down the rules for defence against the different forms of 'wear' that attack us every day more quickly (p. 210).

We may return to the introduction to sum up:

> Old age is a pathological state. Ugliness is often only a disease . . . It is not presumptuous to hope to live 100 years. It is not mad to propose to live 150 years. When we really want it a woman of 60 will be a young woman.

[15] This is the Alexander Bogomolets treated in the following section. Victor constantly acknowledges his debt to him. He mentions no blood relationship.

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> This is the train of new 'ideas' which Victor Bogomolets unrolls in this book. To set the train going, he unfurls at large the flag of 'biological liberation'. For there is a biological prison.
>
> Let us pursue to its end this very exact image of 'prison' and 'liberation'. From the beginning of this century, from 1900 and even before, from the dawn of the era of Pasteur, men of long patience or of brilliant genius have succeeded in finding the 'lock' of this biological prison. They have even found the 'key'.
>
> Then why is the door not already wide open?
>
> Because for reasons which we shall see it is as if for the last 50 or 60 years people were endlessly turning and returning the key in the lock, without finally moving the hasp.
>
> And then the bars of the prison have been found to be very solid. They are made of the toughest metal: certain old habits of official science (pp. 13–14).

If only to show the strength of the tradition, we mention also Boris Sokoloff (1893–).[16] He was another pupil of Mechnikov, and also spent his youth in Russia, working under Metalnikov just before the Revolution. He moved in 1920, via Brussels, Paris, and Prague, to the USA (1928). *His* life secret was the pituitary and adrenal glands, but he seems to have invented no special treatment.

IT is no accident, as *Pravda* would have put it, that the splendid tradition of Russian emigré science remains faithful to immortality, even down to the most recent times. At the Harvard Russian Research Center, on 25 April 1958, Professor John Turkevich, a distinguished chemist from Princeton, gave a seminar on 'Soviet Science—An Evaluation'. The introduction deals with world science in general, and says inter alia:

> Just as machines have replaced manual labour, biochemistry is making tremendous strides. It is conceivable that the next generation is going to live to the point where bodily decomposition will follow fairly closely that of the mind [i.e. the body will not be an autonomous factor in death, but we shall die only when our brains die: P.W.]. It is also possible that within several generations too, man may attain immortality. These fantastic perspectives are appearing on the distant horizon.

Our final Russian emigré may well not be a doctor. In February 1964 Mr. A. Savitski addressed a Russian exiles' old people's home in Paris on the theme 'There is No Old Age'. His speech began with the mythical attempts at immortality of past centuries. Then, passing to modern science, he asserted that 'the question of immortality will certainly be decided in the very near future . . . the battle for immortality cannot but be decided, the only thing is to live until that blessed

[16] *Bio-dynamics, The Battle for Youth* (1930); *Vitality* (New York, 1934); *Science and the Purpose of Life* (New York, 1950); *The White Nights* (London, 1956), passim but especially pp. 41–43, 125–28, 188–90. In 1964 Dr Sokoloff was director of the Bio-Research Laboratory, Florida Southern College.

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day '.[17] He ended with practical advice on the prolongation of life: be inquisitive about the modern world and the future, love each other. He received a prolonged ovation.

In making these pronouncements Savitski and Turkevich were not hopelessly ahead of events in the USA. The Washington international conference on immortality in December 1963 had been preceded by 'discussions' in winter 1962. Its main concern was with the freezing and storing of corpses here and now, in the hope that science will one day make resuscitation possible.

> Do you think that men will ever alter their burial habits in this direction? Would you be willing to have your body frozen at death? If frozen burials or storage became popular, how might it be arranged so no one could ever be taken in by unscrupulous profiteers? Could this area of life be made non-profit and supervised by the UN? Do you think scientists have an obligation to inform those who might be in danger of death of this new possibility? [18]

Notwithstanding the Mitford-cum-Wall-Street appearance of this conference, the organisers could quote some fairly scientific literature, recently written in the USA. Mr. D. K. C. MacDonald, in his *Near Zero* (1963), points to the near possibility of human 'hibernation' for 1,000 years. Other serious works are R. C. W. Ettinger's *The Prospect of Immortality*, and Nathan Dubring's document *Immortality, Physically, Scientifically, Now*.

Thus the USA may yet 'catch up and surpass' the USSR, not only in fantasy but also in hard fact. And finally, honour-bound to mention every possible non-Russian, we introduce Dr. Paul Niehans, of Switzerland, who injected cells from an unborn lamb into Pope Pius XII and other aging celebrities. This treatment was still fashionable as late as 1959.[19] We can also scarcely pass over the single doctor who so far appears to have genuinely prolonged the life-span, by purely objective and scientific experiment: C. M. McCay.[20] If a rat is given as much vitamins, proteins, and minerals as it needs, but not enough calories to grow with, it remains biologically young for a very long time. Most but not all of its organs remain young together and its life-span is doubled. Here at least is a beginning for those who are seriously concerned with these things.

Soviet Medicine: Longevity

With this subject of all others the writer is least competent to deal. It is also least necessary, since many articles by Western doctors describe Soviet gerontology.[21] What these articles miss, however, is the passions

[17] *Russkaya Mysl*, Paris, 11 February 1964. I quote the reporter's oratio obliqua.
[18] From the notice of the conference, mailed by Twentieth Century Books, Washington, D.C. Cf. *Der Spiegel*, 22/1964; Frederic Pohl, *Playboy*, June 1964.
[19] de Ropp, op. cit., p. 8. [20] Ibid. pp. 165–70.
[21] A particularly good one, because minimally critical, is by Josef Brozek and Ernst Simonson in *Geriatrics*, July 1962. Cf. also Heinrich Schulz, op. cit.; Heinrich Schulz,

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that drive some Soviet gerontologists. They also refrain from pointing out the innumerable low-level, and fairly common high-level, quackeries. The ideal of physical immortality has continued to dominate Russian doctors, often at the expense of their good sense, always with governmental support. In addition to our old friend, the prolongation of life, we note also *resuscitation* and the *creation of life* from lifeless matter, in a separate section.

The grand old man of Soviet gerontology was A. A. Bogomolets of Kiev (1881–1946). He too, like so many of his predecessors, had a single key: the connective tissue. One is as young as one's connective tissue; the aging body accumulates degenerate colloid particles, resistant to the autolytic enzymes. By blood transfusions and by the ' antireticular cytotoxic serum ' the particles are made accessible and the organism is cleared of them. This treatment has been tried in many countries, with, say Brozek and Simonson, disappointing results.

In 1938 Bogomolets organised in Kiev a conference on ' Questions of Old Age and the Struggle for Longevity '. The title is very indicative: what in the West is called geriatrics, i.e. the medical care of those who happen to be old, was until recently in Russia called the prolongation of life. There may be very little difference in results, but intentions certainly differ. The very words geriatrics and gerontology appear first only in 1957, it seems, at least eleven years later than in the West. The titles and contents of publications continue to stress the prolongation of life.

No continuing organisation followed the 1938 conference, surprisingly enough. Indeed there was no institute of gerontology at all until 1956, despite a flood of individual researches and publications. Thus Western gerontology actually developed as an organised branch of medicine before Russian.

Next must come Dr Anna Aslan (1899–) who, though a Rumanian citizen, is undoubtedly part of the Soviet longevity enterprise. She works at the Parhon Institute in Bucarest, a well-endowed geriatrical centre more than 50 years old. Her cure is to inject procaine between the muscles. Western experts find that some improvement results, but very much less than Dr Aslan claims.[22] She is criticised for failing to use placebos with control groups in her experiments, and for not knowing the chemical composition of what she injects. Nevertheless for popularity she is the Voronoff of today, particularly in the USSR. There follows a description of her Moscow polyclinic in 1960:

> For 60 cents in Moscow one can buy a ' liquid of youth ' that some Russian physicians hope might take years off one's face. Many physicians here and abroad are doubtful. But nonetheless Russian women—and many foreign women who hear about it—are eager

Zur Entwicklung der Gerontologie in der UdSSR (Hamburg, 1961; a longer version of the above). The first and last have extensive bibliographies, but Nikitin, op cit., is far more extensive.

22 Brozek and Simonson, op. cit.; *Die Therapiewoche* (East Germany), 1956–57; Olga Franklin, *H. 3* (London, 1963).

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customers at Polyclinic No. 6 on Herzen Street. The elixir actually is a solution of '2 per cent Novocain', says the box, borrowing a Western brand name for the drug procaine, the local anesthetic one takes in a dentist's chair.

This is one invention the Russians take no credit for. A 61-year-old Rumanian professor, Anna Aslan, began using the drug nine years ago in Bucharest to 'rejuvenate' patients. European and American physicians issued medical reports saying they had no proof that H3, as the drug is called, is other than a good anesthetic. But physicians still give the H3 shots here and look for some results.

A Western woman correspondent recently visited the 'fountain of youth' polyclinic with the wife of an Italian diplomat who was a patient. 'I heard about this from an Intourist guide', the diplomat's wife explained. 'Many embassy wives are going.'

The polyclinic is housed in a simple yellow-and-white building on a busy business street. Only a small black plaque saying Polyclinic No. 6 distinguished it from surrounding shops and offices. Inside a few young girls in white uniforms clustered around a reception table. They directed visitors to a cloakroom to check their coats. Then the visitors were led down a hall to a physician's office.

A woman physician with a white kerchief over her hair and a white uniform over her print dress tested the blood pressure of the Italian diplomat's wife, took a blood test and gave her a prescription for H3. One can purchase the capsules at any pharmacy for 6 rubles, or 60 cents on the tourist exchange rate. One takes the capsules to a hospital to be given injections. The hospital visits are free, even for foreigners.

'We've been giving these shots since 1953', the physician said. 'Frankly, we haven't received as good results as we hoped. But blood pressure, circulation and skin tone improves. Many Chinese women come here the minute they get off the plane from Peiping', she added (*New York Times*, 18 August 1960).

The superior attraction for women is easily explained. The Aslan process is especially good for the skin. We may risk a generalisation: Women prefer rejuvenation, a longer sex-life, the one-hoss shay; life-prolongation is for men. Dr Aslan offers both.

As to serious work in this field, it is as usual impossible for this writer to judge. This section closes with the latest organisational changes. In 1956 local institutes and research groups on longevity began to be formed, and in 1958 in—of course—Kiev there was founded a central institute: the Scientific Research Institute for Gerontology and Experimental Pathology, of the Academy of Medical Sciences.

Soviet Medicine: Other Aspects

Except in this section we deal almost alone with life-prolongation, under which we have subsumed rejuvenation. Resuscitation we define as the making alive again by medical means of dead bodies—recently-dead bodies in practice, though long-dead bodies in Federov's case and in

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Mr MacDonald's deep-freeze suggestion. Resurrection is the same by miraculous or religious means, and falls outside our purview. Life-creation is the making of living things in laboratories.

Now to resuscitate is of course to prolong life, but first the patient must die—an uncomfortable and risky interlude. The process of death and resuscitation might just possibly improve general health, and it cannot be ruled out a priori that repeated resuscitation could be the way to eternal life. The more likely view, however, is that death and resuscitation do not improve health. How, for instance, would Federov have kept his resuscitated Patriarchs alive? Would they have even wished to be resuscitated into extreme old age? As the Russians now see it, and as common sense also indicates, resuscitation is aimed at untimely fatal accidents alone. It should by rights form an orthodox part of very ordinary medicine. Life-creation, again, is by definition no part of the physical immortality of the individual; it merely creates another individual. Nevertheless both these arts represent direct victories over death; they should, and do, appeal especially to Russians.

Unscientific views about the creation of life were regularly expressed by Olga B. Lepeshinskaya at (1871–1962), who had the distinction of joining the Party in 1898 and knowing Lenin in exile. She published *Voinstvuyushchii Vitalizm* (Militant Vitalism) in Vologda in 1926, and from 1949 on headed her own new Department of the Development of Living Matter in the All-Union Institute of Experimental Medicine. This department was in the late 1950s demoted to a laboratory—a decision at which she never ceased to grumble. Her *idée fixe* was the development of cellular out of non-cellular living matter. I have not been able to confirm the rumour that she ran a small clinic in the Kremlin, where she prolonged Stalin's life with soda baths.

As to the great and genuinely scientific interest of Russian biology and medicine in resuscitation and the creation of life, it is a fact well established in the technical literature. This work is a good deal more basic and imaginative than Western work, even if not more successful. The Russians, for instance, use the blood of recently dead corpses for transfusion more widely than others. We may also instance the fantastic efforts of the Russian scientific Establishment to resuscitate the physicist Lev Landau after his motor accident.[23] Landau 'died' four times but made a very striking recovery of nearly all his faculties. The exceptional medical care, including foreign specialists, was mobilised by his scientific friends.

Thus we seem to notice in the USSR a deep freeze of thought and activity in this as in other fields, from the late twenties until the early fifties—the period of Stalin's power. The failure to build upon the work of A. A. Bogomolets, who was surely one of the most powerful and enthusiastic gerontologists in the world, is particularly striking. Released from Stalinism, the Russian genius is now flowing in old courses again. Geriatrics has become a very big subject indeed, in sharp contrast to

[23] *New York Times*, 13 November, 5 December 1962.

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Britain, where, I am informed,[24] the best medical minds are not attracted to it since there is no promise of excitement or break-throughs. Nuffield grants, advertised in this field, have gone unallocated year after year for lack of worthy applicants.

Popular medical thought

It is of course at the sub-scientific level that the Russian people as a whole think whatever thoughts they think about physical immortality; and that goes for the apparatchik in charge of ideology as much as for the superstitious peasant woman.

As to the apparatchiki, one of the most amazing documents comes from the pages of *Foundations of Marxism-Leninism*,[25] a super-official textbook of communist party thought on all subjects, whose concluding section is headed: Further Perspectives of Communism.

> Science, which takes a prominent place in communist society, finds itself faced with ever new problems. It is already clear today that their magnitude is truly grandiose. The well-known Soviet scholar Academician V. A. Obruchev, imagining what people rightly expect of science, has written: 'They demand that the life of man be prolonged to 150–200 years on the average, infectious diseases be abolished, non-infectious ones be reduced to a minimum, old age and fatigue be conquered, and we learn to restore life in cases of untimely, accidental death; the wind, the sun, and atomic energy be harnessed; natural disasters be prevented; better artificial materials of all kinds take the place of natural; etc., etc.'

After Obruchev's list of 'demands' the quotation ends and in four sentences the whole book ends. Thus his views receive by their placing the utmost emphasis. Not only that, but he is done a signal honour by being quoted at all. Of about 310 footnote references in the textbook, this, the last, is the only one to a living Soviet citizen, apart from Khrushchev.

Turning from ideology to popular science, a small symptom is the way in which ordinary, unconvinced Russian scientists feel obliged to write. Thus Professor V. V. Aplatov, in a three-page article entitled 'On Old Age' in *Nauka i Zhizn*, a popular scientific magazine (1960, 2), finds space for a sub-heading 'Does Immortality Exist?' He comes to the conclusion that 'death is the inevitable result of life'; but what is relevant for our purposes is that in so short an article Aplatov feels compelled to deal with physical immortality at all. Physical immortality is simply not an issue in other cultures. (Soviet literature, and especially Mayakovsky, is replete with medical and non-medical references to physical immortality. But this must be another's study.)

At a still more popular level are Soviet watering-places. Mr Bert Todd, of Indiana University, informs me that before the revolution popular superstition attributed to many of these waters the qualities of

[24] By Dr G. S. Dawes, in conversation.
[25] *Osnovy Marksizma-Leninizma*, ed. O. Kuusinen (Moscow, 1959), pp. 751–53.

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an elixir of life; and that now local scientists are in the habit of writing very suspicious little brochures about these same waters. In language reminiscent of a Catholic doctor at Lourdes, the waters are chemically analysed into substances that cannot be shown not to prolong life.

Stalin

The treatment of Stalin is less indicative than that of Lenin, dealt with in the first part of this essay. For the notion is prevalent in many primitive cultures of the great king who may return: think of Arthur, the Once and Future King, biding his time on the Isle of Avalon, or of Frederick Barbarossa, growing his red beard under the Kyffhäusser. And though both these men were Good Kings, there is nothing specially imaginative in weaving a similar myth about a Bad King.

Nevertheless a few details in the treatment of Stalin are specifically Russian, and contribute to our thesis. The fact that Stalin was himself a Georgian is of course neither here nor there: we are interested in how Russians treat him. The first point, then, is that another country full of imaginative people has recently had a Bad King, indeed a Worse King, who towers over the dreams and consciences of his subjects in very much the same way. Yet this is the middle of the twentieth century, and his countrymen have not substituted Hitler for Barbarossa; indeed both are now quite dead, as dead as Arthur. There is speculation, of course, as to the whereabouts of his body, and the usual crop of jokes about Hitler and St. Peter, Hitler coming back to earth, etc. There are even rumours that he is alive, but *older*; i.e. quite rational rumours that since we have no *corpus delicti* perhaps he is living on in a normal manner, as might any top Nazi on the run.

The Stalin jokes and poems are very different, e.g.:

(i) Stalin collapses at a Presidium meeting. Beria goes up to the body; there is no breath. He dances a wild jig, crying 'Comrades, the tyrant is dead, our day has come'. Stalin opens one eye and looks at him. Beria prostrates himself: he didn't really mean it, remember his past services, it was only a joke. . . . Then Stalin really dies, and Beria has disgraced himself. The story is attributed to Khrushchev personally, and is meant to be about Beria, but it is incidentally most illuminating.

(ii) Where shall we re-inter Stalin, now we have exhumed him? The French comrades come forward: give him to us, we'll put him in les Invalides under a huge slab of granite[26]—no, too much glory. The Indian comrades come forward: give him to us, we'll put him on a Parsee tower and the vultures will pick him clean—no, too messy. Finally the Israeli comrades make their proposal: give him to us, we'll hide him in a cave in the desert—fear and indignation sweep the Presidium; certainly not, that way lies Resurrection.

[26] It is worth noting that this highly rationalistic people never had a Barbarossa myth about Napoleon. They restored his *family* to power, but the man himself is not even on view. The notion of immortality conveyed by les Invalides lies in the masonry.

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(iii) And then there is Yevtushenko's poem [27]:

The Heirs of Stalin

Mute was the marble.
Mutely glimmered the glass.
Mute stood the sentries,
bronzed by the breeze.
Thin wisps of smoke curled over the coffin.
And breath seeped through the chinks
as they bore him out the mausoleum doors.
Slowly the coffin floated,
grazing the fixed bayonets.
He also was mute—
he also!—
mute and dead.
Grimly clenching
his embalmed fists,
just pretending to be dead,
he watched from inside.
He wished to fix each pallbearer
in his memory:
young recruits from Ryazan and Kursk,
so that later he might
collect enough strength for a sortie,
rise from the grave,
and reach these unreflecting youths.
He was scheming.
Had merely dozed off.
And I, appealing to our government,
petition them
to double,
and treble,
the sentries guarding this slab,
and stop Stalin from ever rising again.

All this adds up to a fundamental doubt: is he really dead? Does anyone really die? In particular there is extreme danger in preserving his physical body. The actual treatment of it is as significant as any story. Stalin's body has received almost the vampire treatment: in its new resting place he is not embalmed, and he will peacefully rot away.

Conclusion

I claim to have shown the existence in the USSR of an inordinate interest in physical immortality on earth: much deeper in both theory and practice than elsewhere. Its origins are Russian, not communist, but it fits ideally into communism. Could such immortality be achieved, and has the whole subject much importance?

[27] The translation given here is by George Reavey, in Priscilla Johnson, *Khrushchev and the Arts* (M.I.T. Press, 1965).

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One could no more strictly prove a man immortal than measure an infinite distance. Any allegedly immortal person may die tomorrow. But one can do the next best thing: establish clinically a stable state of health, and show that there is no reason other than exogenous accident why this state should change. This is immortality in Shaw's *Back to Methuselah*, where the Ancients are essentially middle-aged (their further physical development is at their own whim), and in Jonathan Swift's *Gulliver's Travels*, where the Struldbrugs are stable in extreme old age, in a state asymptotic to death.

This stable state could be defined in many ways. (i) The organs with which we are born might simply, owing to medication and diet, not decay. (ii) Certain prostheses, such as wigs and false teeth, might be admitted; and these might be very intimate, e.g. the intestine might have to be replaced by some artificial material. (iii) It might become possible to graft from bodies other than those of identical twins; in which case a ' body '—if that is not a question-begging word now—could roll down through the ages, cannibalising spare parts for ever. One would retain one's legal identity by mere continuity, like a board of trustees: the majority of organs at any moment coopting new members in place of those who retire. (iv) It might prove impossible to save or graft some particular organ, notably the brain; but possible to transfer memory and personality into another brain. This would lead to still greater problems of identity, soluble no doubt in law at least by the passing of a standard psychological test before and after transference. (v) Men might be made or bred who could re-grow excised organs, like the lower orders of creation.

Of these solutions (iii) and (iv) require death in other human beings, so that only some could be immortal. The others naturally raise a Malthusian problem already referred to. (So do (iii) and (iv), if spare parts are taken only from the victims of fatal accidents. For then, the number of fatal accidents remaining the same, the number of deaths decreases.) It is very certain, too, that this list of solutions is not exhaustive, and it is no part of the writer's function to pass upon their attainability. He would point out however, with Federov, that it is arrogant to say man cannot attain this end; but add that it would probably be very expensive and lead to grave social complications.

Now whether or not such immortality is achieved, life must necessarily be prolonged by aiming at it. It is highly improbable that the CPSU will shortly declare physical immortality to be among its goals, when mankind is so very far indeed away. No doubt many, perhaps a large majority of, Russian communists never give the matter a thought. But everybody wants medical progress, so an imaginative pursuit of this, with special emphasis on the prolongation of life, will surely satisfy all parties. For those, communist or merely Russian, who want more, the pious periphrasis and the vague sublimity are not forbidden. Death is not, then, contrary to the Party line, but it is ' bad Party manners '.

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Finally, does this subject matter? I cannot think it does. Nothing serious is going to happen because many Russians want to make physical immortality practicable. Curious phrases will appear in certain works of literature, the structure and volume of medical research will seem a little odd to Western eyes, political embalmments and exhumations will happen at longish intervals. Other advances in medicine will surely benefit humanity more, and give more leverage in the cold war: astro-medicine, hypnosis, eugenics, even such old stand-bys as curing cancer.

We may divide medical advances into three: capacity-enhancing, life-preserving, and life-prolonging. To 'enhance capacity' is to make men better in some way—stronger, cleverer, better able to survive in some hostile environment, perhaps merely more docile. We may instance astro-medicine, hypnosis, eugenics, brain-washing. Life-preserving medicine is more usual; it is the curing of the wounds and diseases of the young and middle-aged. Such medicine tends to prolong the average of human life greatly, but by raising the minimum. Only in so far as the old succumb to ordinary diseases and wounds does it also raise the maximum length of life.

Immortality-oriented research is concerned with resuscitation and life-prolongation. The first of these concerns only an insignificant number of cases, but it too is in fact only life-preserving. The deliberate prolongation of life, on the other hand, i.e. the raising of the maximum span, is to my mind a questionable good. The social, economic, psychological and even political consequences go far beyond the scope of this paper, but the writer permits himself to repeat Metalnikov's warning: death is a form of evolutionary adjustment. A species whose individuals die is more adaptable than a species of immortals. Even from the personal point of view, Mechnikov's aim was surely better: to make death the natural and acceptable end of a long life.

(*The first part of this essay appeared in the preceding issue of Survey.*)

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VIEWS AND REVIEWS

THE NEW PARTY HISTORY

George Fletcher

IN THE SOVIET UNION the writing of party history has been for many years a highly specialised branch of occult learning, far removed from the generally accepted aims and methods of historiography. Its purpose is not the search for the truth about the past, not the collection, analysis, selection, and presentation of the facts, but the formulation of a body of doctrine to be assimilated intact by the right-thinking citizen. Its content was therefore determined not by 'how it really was', but by the nature and demands of party policy at a given moment.

The importance of the official Soviet version for all students of communist party history is thus not as a source of historical information, but as a reflection of party policy and even of the state of Soviet society at the time of writing. The study of the development of official party historiography offers valuable insights into the development of the party itself—though hardly in the sense originally meant.

The first party histories to be published after the revolution, written by Zinoviev, Liadov, Nevsky, Baturin, were more in the nature of brief factual descriptions of the principal stages in the development of the new ruling party, which, for the public at large, and even for most of its members, had suddenly emerged from almost total obscurity. At that early stage the party had hardly any trained historians available for writing its history, and therefore preferred to discharge its task of enlightenment by the publication of a vast body of documentary records, memoirs, verbatim transcripts and the like, thus providing a mine of facts for the Sovietologist of the future.

The first in the line of official collective histories appeared in 1928–30 under the general supervision of Emelian Yaroslavsky. Only four of the six or seven massive volumes originally planned were ever published; wading through the nearly 2,000 large pages of turgid prose requires a high degree of concentration, but is occasionally rewarded by stumbling over a nugget of hard fact not easily accessible elsewhere. Yaroslavsky's opus also constituted the first ambitious attempt to remould the party's past in accordance with the political exigencies of the present: it was devoted in large part to unmasking the sinister role played by Trotsky since the very foundation of the party, if not before that. Whatever the authors' intentions, however, they were not good enough: in his celebrated letter to the journal *Proletarskaya revolyutsiya* Stalin, while not actually accusing Yaroslavsky of purveying 'Trotskyite contraband', nevertheless implied that he had shown a sad lack of ideological vigilance.

The unfinished project was dropped, and the publications of the next few years, among them Yaroslavsky's revised two-volume version, are remarkable chiefly for the skill with which they avoid the issues, the personalities, and the facts of party history. This attitude of wait-and-see was only natural, since the portentous events of the 1930s were

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plainly re-shaping not only the country's present and future, but its past as well. It was no mere coincidence that the autumn of 1938, which marked the end of the great purge, also saw the publication of the most famous of all official party histories: the *Short Course of the History of the CPSU*.

We shall probably never know how much of the *Short Course* was Stalin's personal handiwork. Practically every page shows the authentic touch: the pithy maxims, the maddening but strangely hypnotic reiteration, the convenient breaking up of complex ideas into groups of numbered postulates simple enough to be learnt by rote, the unexpected flashes of a mordant and somewhat vulgar wit.

For twenty years the *Short Course* reigned supreme. Generations of university students, millions of long-suffering pupils of 'political self-education circles', were taught to extract the last ounce of wisdom from its hallowed paragraphs. The appearance of a work of such perfection naturally made any further exploration of party history redundant. Even the voluminous commentaries to the *Short Course* that were prepared by the Moscow Higher Party School were treated as confidential and restricted to a small circle of the initiated.

THE TWENTIETH CPSU CONGRESS cast Stalin from the heights and sent the *Short Course* tumbling after. A new history of the CPSU was hurriedly compiled. It was not a great success. The structure, the methods, the political judgments, and the attitudes of the *Short Course* were taken over wholesale, but this colourless and insipid tome showed no trace of its predecessor's daemonic gusto. The abuse was toned down, the sharp edges rounded a little, the 'cult of personality' attacked; but in denying Stalin his leading role, in transforming inconvenient events like the Moscow trials into non-facts without at the same time restoring an iota of the long-suppressed truth, the new party history was, if anything, an even more flagrant travesty than the *Short Course* had been. It was, in short, a mirror of the Khrushchev era: unsure of itself, fumblingly getting rid of the worst excesses of the Stalinism that had been its parent, torn between destalinisation and fear of its consequences, tinkering about with the mechanism it had inherited, patching it up a bit here, reforming it slightly there—to little avail. And, most important difference of all, only a Stalin, god-like and all-powerful, could magically transform a farrago of absurdity and falsehood into Holy Writ. The myth was now demolished; no aura of sanctity surrounded this new revelation. Something different was obviously needed to restore party history to its previous imposing position, and today we can savour the first fruit of this new venture.

The first volume of the new *History of the CPSU* (Istoriya Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, tom 1. Moscow, 1964, liii + 632 pp.), to be completed in six volumes in time for the fiftieth anniversary of the October Revolution, appeared about a fortnight before the deposition of Khrushchev. The timing was entirely fortuitous, so much so that the book had to be speedily withdrawn from circulation because of the repeated flattering references in its Introduction to the fallen leader. (Not even Khrushchev, to the last busily building up his own incipient cult of personality, could have decently demanded inclusion in the main body of the work, which covers the

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years 1883–1903.) After the skilful excision of the offending passages the volume is now on sale again.

A few words about the authors. When one thinks of the multitudinous perils that have surrounded the Soviet party historian, one cannot but be impressed by the extraordinary staying power of these hardy souls. The familiar names of Pospelov, Ponomarev, Karpinsky, and Petrov crop up once again. The champion's laurels, however, should beyond question go to the redoubtable Mints, veteran of practically every party-historical undertaking from Yaroslavsky's on. At the same time it seems fairly safe to prophesy that Ilyichev and Satyukov will be missing from the editorial board of the remaining volumes. As for the rest, the inclusion of Bugayev (of anti-Burdzhalov fame) is not the most promising of omens.

To say that the first volume of the new official history is a great improvement on its predecessors is not really to say much. Where previous efforts consisted of almost pure flights of fancy, untrammelled save by the political requirements of the moment, hardly trying to keep up even the pretence of veracity, almost completely de-personalised and with endless pages of regurgitated quotations in place of facts, the volume under review, for all its manifest faults, is the first official party history that should properly be judged by generally accepted standards of scholarship. Not only is it equipped with such unusual features as footnotes, bibliography, and (inadequate) index, but—of far greater importance—instead of providing the traditional running commentary to Lenin's writings, its authors have drawn for their narrative on an extensive range of published and unpublished sources. They are surprisingly catholic in their choice of source material, going so far as to quote Valentinov and other emigré writers, and relying heavily on Martov's memoirs. In what must be an even more striking innovation in a work of this kind, they actually mention Western 'bourgeois' writings on communist party history, and bestow a limited cachet of approval on Mr Richard Kindersley's *The First Russian Revisionists*, which, 'in contrast to deliberate falsifiers . . . shows a certain tendency towards the objective presentation of historical facts, although in a number of cases it commits serious errors' (p. lii). Professor Leonard Schapiro, however, remains an unregenerate 'bourgeois falsifier of history' (p. 359).

The use of unpublished archives is all to the good, but, apart from their symbolic value, they are a disappointment. They consist in large part of Krupskaya's letters and the unpublished post-revolutionary reminiscences of a few old Bolsheviks; though quoted fairly often, they are used only to illuminate minor points of detail, and the actual textual quotations consist, as a rule, of only a few words, adding nothing of substance to what has already long been known. Fundamentally, the book is based on published sources. It should therefore be made quite clear that in praising the wealth of factual material, however one-sided, contained in the volume, this reviewer has in mind its beneficial effects on the Soviet reader, long deprived of the facts, and not its value for the Western student, for whom it can hardly contain revelations—except the considerable revelation that Soviet party history today is different from the black art practised for thirty-odd years.

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The treatment, for example, of the pre-Leninist stage in the development of the Russian revolutionary movement, almost entirely omitted from previous histories, now shows signs of a return to the attitudes of the 1920s. The communist movement once again includes among its Russian ideological forerunners the long neglected names of Lavrov, Tkachev, and even Bakunin. In place of the sneers of the recent past, revolutionary populism is once again an object of reverence, although its treatment certainly leaves much to be desired—it is, for instance, in the best traditions of Leninist factionalism that the book lays such great stress on the 'ideological hostility' between the People's Will and the Black Repartition (p. 62).

When the beginnings of the working-class movement are reached, Blagoev, Tochissky, and Brusnev are all given their due, as is Warynski. Neither are the later populists and the 'legal Marxists' accused, as they were in the 1959 *History*, of having been nothing but overt or disguised enemies of Marxism—even though Lenin's joint activities with the latter are still described as a temporary tactical measure (p. 207). The fact that the Manifesto of the first congress of the RSDLP was drawn up by Struve is unequivocally stated (p. 265). The list of well-known facts finally rehabilitated and restored to the pages of history could easily be prolonged.

THE TREATMENT OF PERSONALITIES, the classification of names mentioned or omitted, has always been a valuable touchstone for testing Soviet party histories. The 1959 version had practically done away with them altogether, leaving only an arid waste of print, where nothing stirred save for vast, impersonal Moving Forces of History, grinding inexorably forward towards the Joyous Future of Mankind. The first volume of the new *History* presents a picture of considerably greater variety. Names abound, many of them resuscitated after decades in limbo. It is when one looks closer that the sharp practice becomes evident.

Admittedly this volume presented a lesser job in the way of name-dropping than the following ones will: most of the really big names are still to come. Yet a number of tough problems had to be solved. What was to be done about Stalin? After all, the man had been active, far more so than dozens of others given prominent mention, over a period covered by almost two-thirds of the book. The solution is simple: apart from the Introduction, where his 'cult of personality' is held up as a horrendous example, there is not one mention of Stalin's name. And with him disappears our old friend, the Batum demonstration of 1902. Trotsky, too, gets short shrift. Nothing is said about his work for *Iskra*, and, since he is made to appear first at the second congress, he can conveniently be assailed as the vilest of Mensheviks. Inextricably tied to Stalin in death as in life, Trotsky also receives his full measure of abuse in the Introduction.

Most tortuous of all is the treatment of Martov. Although—it is admitted—he embarked on a revolutionary career at almost the same time as Lenin, the seeds of his future mistakes were there from the start (p. 219). He did work alongside Lenin in the Union of Struggle for the Liberation of the Working Class, but not a word about his having actually established the organisation after Lenin's arrest. His work on *Iskra* is praised (p. 368), but from the second congress on Martov is

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once again the villain familiar to us from previous party histories. There is still no question of a Menshevik possessing any redeeming qualities whatsoever.

The few other Mensheviks who make an appearance fare considerably worse. Dan is never mentioned in connection with *Iskra*, and therefore the name of the delegate who achieved such valuable results at the Belostok conference of 1902 remains shrouded in anonymity (p. 439). Strangest of all is the omission of Potresov's name from the list of members of the Union of Struggle, in which he was generously included even by the 1959 *History*. As for Jordania, as far as the book is concerned he simply did not exist. Neither did any other of the Georgian Mensheviks, and this, of course, makes nonsense of everything written here about the social-democratic movement in the Caucasus.

In the Soviet Union history is still very much the handmaiden of politics, and thus the composition of the pre-1904 Bolshevik movement is determined by the erratic course of rehabilitation. Many are the names returned to history, but even more significant are the omissions. Ryazanov and Steklov are apparently still in disfavour, since their leading role in the Odessa Marxist circles of the 1890s is passed over in silence, and indeed the only thing the reader is permitted to know about them is that they 'engaged in disorganising activities' and 'opposed the Leninist organisational principles of the party' (p. 422). And what is one to say about the following footnote to a list of members of the Bureau of Committees of the Majority: 'The Northern conference also elected A. I. Rykov to the Bureau, but he took no practical part in its work' (p. 515)?

To mention only a few of the more important Bolshevik organisers and leaders of the pre-1904 social-democratic movement missing from the pages of a volume that 'considers one of its most important tasks to be the presentation of facts and events in strict conformity with the historical truth . . . and the overcoming of all the offshoots of the cult of personality' (p. vii): Avdeyev, Avilov, Bazarov, Briukhanov, Khinchuk, Meshcheriakov, Nevsky, A. P. Smirnov, I. N. Smirnov, Teodorovich.

It is not merely a question of the continuing puerile proscription of people long dead by the present 'creators of history'. Of far greater consequence from the point of view of the general trustworthiness of the book is the calculated shunting around of certain *categories* of individuals, measuring out the exact amount of glory accruing to each, subjecting some to the full glare of the limelight while consigning others to nicely graded degrees of darkness—all this without the slightest reference to the 'facts and events'. Perhaps most conspicuous in this respect is the book's treatment of the Jewish revolutionaries who once played such an outstanding part in the Russian social-democratic movement. Given the scale of the work, there could be no question of eliminating them entirely, but wherever possible, Jewish names—often important and politically unblemished names—are dropped in favour of hitherto completely unknown and patently insignificant Russian workers and representatives of the national

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minorities (whereas in the memoirs and documentary publications of the 1920s Jewish names often predominate).

The sharp downgrading of the Jewish contribution to the Russian revolutionary movement is merely one aspect of the book's general approach to the highly inflammable Jewish question. There is only the briefest of references to the existence of anti-semitism, and no mention of the Kishinev pogrom of 1903 or of the other pogroms in which the period abounded. This attitude is seen at its most distinctive in the case of the Bund. Of 500-odd pages only a few paragraphs, barely two whole pages in all (pp. 254, 285–286), are devoted to this important organisation. It is a hostile and spiteful picture, a sarcastic compendium of the anti-Jewish gibes that have latterly become so familiar. In this version the Bund conducted its agitation exclusively for 'economic demands', and its main activity was the collection of money for strike pay; the Bund's obsession with money is not surprising, since it was no more than a 'peculiar bourgeois nationalist organisation' that consisted 'mainly of petty artisans and handicraftsmen'. 'Nationalist and opportunist tendencies appeared within the Bund from its very inception'; its principal aim was the 'imposition of national aloofness and nationalist narrow-mindedness'. The thoughtful Soviet reader must be considerably perplexed as to how this money-grubbing crew of bigoted Jewish petit-bourgeois ever managed to penetrate the party to begin with!

This belittling of the contribution of Jewish revolutionaries is only partly motivated by the general anti-Jewish line of present-day Soviet propaganda; it is also an essential concomitant of the re-writing of history that makes for a gross exaggeration of the role of working-class revolutionaries. The records are painstakingly searched for the names of even the most transient working-class members of short-lived Marxist circles, which are then solemnly inscribed in the book. But there is no getting around the deplorable fact that all the members of the Union of Struggle and all the delegates to the first congress of the RSDLP, to say nothing of the Liberation of Labour and similar groups, were intellectuals. The authors of the volume try to draw a veil over this shortcoming by simply omitting all references to social background or occupation except in the case of manual workers (or where the biographical facts are widely known, as with Lenin and Plekhanov), and using the terms 'intellectual' or 'petit-bourgeois' in the pejorative sense only, as self-evident explanation of the heinous behaviour of Mensheviks, Economists, and their like.

THAT THIS PROBLEM OF THE overwhelmingly intellectual composition of the early Russian social-democratic movement and of the scarcity of actual manual workers is one of prime importance can be seen by the authors' touchiness on the subject. This is the only question over which they lose their usually Olympian air of unassailable certitude and actually deign to enter into controversy with 'Menshevik and bourgeois falsifiers of history' (pp. 234, 424, 540). Towards the end of this running argument, however, they have to admit the facts, and justify them, rather lamely, by remarking that 'the relative predominance of intellectuals at the early stages of the working-class movement can be seen in every country' (p. 540).

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The attempt to show that Lenin's party was from its very beginnings a working-class organisation represents one of the main strands in the book. It is dictated not by fleeting political considerations, or what the Russians call *konyunktura*, but by a deeply ingrained attitude towards the presentation of historical facts. These are selected and described in such a way as to produce a slanted and in many respects incorrect picture of the historical development of Russia and the Russian revolutionary movement from the 1870s to 1904, a picture warped by dogma and preconceived ideas. Behind the names and dates, under the footnotes and the bibliography, the Old Adam of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy is still very much alive and kicking.

This arbitrary selection and slanting of the facts—executed, be it said, far more subtly than in any previous version—in order to arrive at a predetermined conclusion, is achieved in a number of ways. One of these has already been described. Another is the unqualified adoption of certain unproved and highly questionable postulates that in the past twenty years have acquired the force of Scripture among Soviet historians, such as the existence of ' revolutionary situations ' in 1859–61 and 1879–81, or the *ex post facto* ' abolition ' of Westerners and Slavophiles and their substitution by the fictitious categories of Liberals and Revolutionary Democrats.

More far-reaching in its consequences is the necessity to adapt the facts to full conformity with Lenin's writings. The authors carry their filial piety to ridiculous lengths, as when they base their quite detailed account of post-1861 economic development almost exclusively on data collected by Lenin nearly seventy years ago. Without disputing the value of Lenin's pioneering work, it is not unreasonable to assume that the research undertaken since then has provided additional information. In fact, in those rare cases when Lenin's figures are supplemented by the results of more recent enquiry, complete confusion ensues (cf. p. 184).

Perhaps worst of all in this respect is the fact that the history of the social-democratic movement—and actually not even of that, but only of its Leninist faction—is treated as if it were taking place in an almost total vacuum, in the bright-lit centre of a stage on which hardly anything else is happening, and only a few dim figures shuffle in the rear. This can hardly contribute to a balanced picture of events in a period when the Bolsheviks were still very far from being the ruling party. It is as if Shakespeare, secure in the knowledge that the Earl of Richmond represented the wave of the future, had built Henry VI (Part 3) and Richard III around his figure, eliminating almost all the other actors and relegating the remaining few to a shadowy background. A few examples should suffice. *Seven lines* is all the Social-Revolutionary Party gets at its formation (p. 358); after that not a word about its rather conspicuous activities. Zubatov and his organisations are allotted about the same amount of attention as in the *Short Course*, although the present volume, while twice the size, covers the ground of only the first two of its distinguished predecessor's twelve chapters. As for the government—excepting the police—it might very well not have existed, for all we hear about it. Such not unimportant figures as Pobedonostsev and Witte are each mentioned once—as sources of useful quotations.

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Within the working-class movement itself only those who followed Lenin's lead have virtue—and then only while they were actually treading the straight and narrow path. All the rest were fundamentally No Good. While no longer simply agents of the capitalist class, their 'objective' aims remain unchanged. Intolerance is still the order of the day. The reader would not get the impression that the non-Leninists were also underground revolutionary groups carrying out their work amid considerable hardship and constant danger (and, in the case of the S-Rs, with the prospect of far harsher punishment). The Economists, for example, are said to have had as their sole aim the 'diversion of the working-class movement into the bog of bourgeois reformism' (p. 281).

BY THESE MEANS A basically misleading picture is given of the strength, importance, and relative weight of the Leninist faction. From its first appearance it is presented as the dominant force within the working-class movement and, by implication, in the country's political life. Not only is the relative importance at that early date of the Leninist groups, and the personal influence enjoyed by Lenin and his ideas inflated out of all proportion to the facts, but the nascent social-democratic movement is quite anachronistically described in terms of the democratic centralism and iron discipline of the then still distant future. Thus, 'at the end of August 1893, Lenin arrived in the capital and assumed the leadership of the St Petersburg social-democrats' (p. 191). The Union of Struggle for the Liberation of the Working Class is described as a massive, well organised, and strictly disciplined body, based on the principles of democratic centralism, with regular and frequent meetings and elections at all levels, with the centre receiving weekly reports from every branch—and branches existing in practically all the more important factories of the capital (p. 225). In short, not merely a prototype, but a replica of the smoothly-functioning ideal party organisation of today. And this was not just an isolated case, since from the mid-1890s similar Unions existed in most of the important cities, all in constant contact with St Petersburg and with each other. All this, of course, was largely Lenin's doing (p. 235).

Some of the observations are frankly ludicrous. When, in reply to a 1903 Manifesto of the Tsar, Lenin published an article in *Iskra* repeating the long-established demands of every Russian revolutionary party (freedom of the press, a general political amnesty, a Constituent Assembly, etc.), the authors exclaim rapturously: 'Thus, by utilising Tsarism's own manoeuvre, the complex political problem of leading the masses up to the slogan "Down with autocracy!" was solved' (p. 396). Referring to 1902–3, the *History* speaks of 'the Russian working class, united in its independent revolutionary party' (p. 400).

The incontestable and considerable improvement on its predecessors should not blind the reader to the book's bias; at the same time the value of the facts here put together (in a Soviet publication) for the first time must on no account be ignored. Some of the crucial moments in the party's history are described with an impressive wealth of detail, and this inevitably creates a picture that is much closer to the truth than the authors probably intended.

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PERHAPS MOST INTERESTING OF ALL is the account of the immediate aftermath of the second congress. Responsibility for the split is, of course, placed without reservations on the Mensheviks (not very convincingly even on the basis of the facts here cited). The dearth of actual proof of the Mensheviks' splitting activities is explained by their extreme cunning, since they knew full well that 'an open break with the party(!) would have immediately swung the workers away from the splitters' (p. 486). The only Menshevik 'splitting activity' discovered by the authors and presented with a great show of indignation is a perfectly legitimate decision to permit *Iskra* to send representatives directly to local party committees (p. 495).

The split became irrevocable at the congress of the Emigré League of Russian Revolutionary Social-Democracy in October 1903. Lenin, according to the book, was conciliatory, calm, impeccably polite, eager to restore unity, whereas Martov 'ignored all questions of principle and concentrated instead on rude outbursts, insults, and slanderous fabrications' (p. 488). From what we know of the two men, this account—so reminiscent of one of *Pravda's* spicier descriptions of a Security Council meeting—seems hardly credible, to put it no stronger. This picture of Lenin as the epitome of long-suffering patience and sweet reasonableness must be hard for even the Soviet reader to take in, since it is interspersed by some really choice samples of his invective.

In fact, regardless of its intentions, the book presents a fascinating, detailed, and unambiguous picture of Lenin's unflagging campaign for a party moulded in his own image and subservient to his will—however high the price, whatever the methods. True, it fails to mention some of his more extreme plans, such as that for seizing control of *Iskra* by a coup d'état in November 1903 (cf. *Leninskii Sbornik*, VII, pp. 277–78). Yaroslavsky said of this: 'Partly under the pressure of the conciliatory central committee, but mainly in view of the insufficient preparedness of the party and even of some of its leading Bolshevik cadres for such a coup d'état, Lenin decided to replace this method by one that was more protracted and cautious and that abided by the Statute and the existing central bodies of the party' (*Istoriya VKP (b)*, vol. 2. Moscow, 1930, p. 89). This revealing episode is no longer recorded, but even without it we can clearly see the growing anxiety of many of Lenin's closest comrades regarding his methods and the course he was setting. While disagreeing with the Mensheviks, very few of them cared to follow Lenin the whole way towards establishing what was in effect a completely independent party of his own.

The devoted Krzhizhanovsky refused to support Lenin over his break with *Iskra* and Plekhanov (p. 490). Shortly afterwards the hitherto faithful central committee rejected Lenin's proposal for the convocation of a breakaway congress, and in July 1904 openly repudiated him by coming out for a reconciliation with the Mensheviks (p. 509). The book heaps opprobrium on these 'hypocrites', 'chatterboxes', and 'capitulationists', but the facts are all there, and it is now fairly easy for the reader to pass judgment on the rights and wrongs of the historic split.

Apparently the authors themselves feel that Lenin's intrigues have been exposed far too explicitly, and therefore at this crucial point they falsify the evidence. In order to show up the baseness of the central

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committee's treachery, they quote a CC resolution demanding the 'censorship' of Lenin's writings by the central committee (ibid.). A key phrase, however, is omitted from this quotation: namely, that Lenin's writings have to have a preliminary clearance 'as do the writings of the other collaborators of the central committee' (*Leninskii Sbornik*, XV, p. 125). This puts a somewhat different complexion on the matter, and also shows that the particular depravity of these erstwhile Leninists, which sixty years later can still shock hardened Marxist historians, consisted in their taking the principle of centralism seriously enough to expect its application to Lenin himself!

THE SUMMER OF 1904 MARKED the lowest ebb in Lenin's fortunes. His isolation appeared complete. In the words of the *History*, 'it seemed as if the Mensheviks could celebrate their victory: all the central party bodies had passed under their control' (p. 510). But the Mensheviks had not yet taken Lenin's measure. Cast out from positions of power, deprived of any influential support, he set about indefatigably building up a 'party of a new type'. The first mile-post on this road was the 'Conference of 22 (actually 19) Bolsheviks': a cosy family affair, consisting of Lenin, his wife and sister, two more husband-and-wife teams, and twelve other previously practically unknown followers. This conference saw the establishment of the first Bolshevik leadership in the form of the 'Bureau of Committees of the Majority'. To the credit of the present volume's authors, they make it quite clear that this Bureau was simply appointed by Lenin, without, apparently, even being subsequently approved by the regional conferences—the word 'elected' is used casually only in the previously quoted footnote on Rykov (p. 514). There still seems to be considerable confusion, however, regarding the actual composition of the Bureau: the list on p. 515 is different in several respects from either the one in Lenin's Works (*Sochineniya*, 3rd ed., vol. VI, p. 446) or in Yaroslavsky (op. cit., p. 122).

The same odd and basically self-defeating method of combining a comparatively straightforward if one-sided presentation of the facts with, here and there, half-hearted attempts to distort their significance, is used in describing Lenin's efforts to convene a schismatic Bolshevik congress. Here, in its final pages, the book succeeds in further bedevilling what has long been one of the minor mysteries of communist party history: the question of how many party organisations actually supported the convocation of a congress and how many were legally entitled to do so. According to the present *History*, twenty party committees had the right to vote on this issue, and of these thirteen favoured a congress (p. 512). This, of course, would have made the decision legal, since under the Statute 50 per cent of the votes of recognised party committees was sufficient. But every other authority gives its own set of figures. Yaroslavsky makes Lenin's case even stronger by saying that the congress was supported by 21 of the 28 committees entitled to vote (op. cit., p. 122). Lenin himself, in a letter written early in 1905, also speaks of 28 party committees—of which, however, only 14 (including one waverer) had voted for the congress. *Iskra* had set the quorum at 19 votes (meaning a total of 38 committees) and Lenin, while rejecting this demand, seems half-convinced of its justice (*Sochineniya*, 3rd ed., vol. XXVIII, p. 464). Finally, the recent edition of the protocols of the

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third congress contains the text of the March 1905 agreement between the Bolshevik Bureau and the Central Committee, which recognised 34 committees as having the right to vote on the issue (*Tretii syezd RSDRP. Protokoly*. Moscow, 1959, p. 684).

It is doubtful whether this question can ever be satisfactorily cleared up. A minor issue, certainly, but one that is of considerable relevance to the methods and the very nature of the party that, from 1904 on, Lenin was tirelessly constructing.

It was to be a long and complicated process before the communist movement as we know it today came into being. Yet the most significant of its distinguishing features were there from the start. On this one can agree with the authors of the present *History*, if not quite in the same sense. Commenting on the split at the second congress they state: 'The Mensheviks could not and would not understand that Lenin's organisational plan arose not out of the usual ideas on the party then held by many social-democrats, but out of the necessity for a party of revolutionary action. Not everyone understood the significance of the struggle over organisational questions that took place at the congress' (p. 479). But surely the authors are wrong in charging the *Mensheviks* with incomprehension. It was the Mensheviks, led by Martov, who, however imperfectly, understood the nature and the consequences of 'Lenin's organisational plan'—perhaps even better than Lenin himself. This was what the split was about. The Bolsheviks were the ones who—tragically—laboured under a total misapprehension. The whole future history of the communist movement, both inside and outside Russia, was to be in large part the story of a long succession of communists having finally to face up to the true meaning of the Leninist organisational principles.

WRITERS AND THEIR BOOKS

Martin Dewhirst

FOR SEVERAL YEARS after the Second World War the USSR was cut off from the West perhaps even more effectively than in the 1930s. Although a few writers, such as Solzhenitsyn and Bondarev, have now published convincing descriptions of the atmosphere which prevailed during the post-war years, it is still difficult for the outside observer to compare and contrast the moods of various sections of the Soviet population in the second half of the 1940s and the second half of the 1930s. It would appear, however, that by the end of Stalin's lifetime a conscious distinction was beginning to be made by a good many Soviet people between their country and the regime which controlled it. It would indeed be surprising if this were not so in view of the treatment awarded to both the intelligentsia and the *narod* immediately after their valiant performance during the war. Although Zhdanov and Zhdanovism are even today rarely criticised in public in the Soviet Union, it is widely admitted that most of the writing of those years was boring and unrealistic. Moreover, one of the chief lessons to be drawn from a study of Soviet literature

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—the more the Party tries to control and interfere with the arts the lower the quality of the works produced—is by now generally accepted. Of course, even in this very barren period some works of quite high literary merit by such writers as Platonov, Prishvin, Paustovsky, Panova, and Nekrasov were being published, and Pasternak was not the only person to continue writing, although there was no hope of publication in the immediate future.

Since 1953, or perhaps even 1952, the literary situation has improved, and an unstable equilibrium, apparent in the succession of 'thaws' and 'freezes', has obtained ever since, with the Party leadership acting as the fulcrum and trying to prevent the imbalance which would result if either the 'dogmatists' or the 'liberals' became the unchallenged pace-setters in the arts.

This has not meant the arrival of anything remotely resembling a Golden Age in Russian literature. There is still very little good dramatic writing, virtually no tragedy, extremely few gifted works longer than a *povest*, and a serious lack of stimulating literary criticism on post-revolutionary writers. Most of the better quality work has been done in the minor genres, although there have also been some very worthwhile *ocherki* and memoirs. The Russian language seems to be coming alive again, with a certain amount of stylistic experimentation in evidence, and it is not difficult to find traces of surrealism. It is clear that many contemporary Russian writers are influenced not only by Turgenev, Chekhov, and Bunin, not only by the literature of the twenties, but also by the 'decadent', 'modernistic', 'symbolist' and other writers of the beginning of the century. Numerous pre- and post-revolutionary writers have been rehabilitated, and although the publication or republication of their works is going ahead more slowly, a good deal of emigré and internal emigré writing is now available to the Soviet reader. A certain amount of modern foreign literature has also been made obtainable, Hemingway, Salinger, Remarque, Böll, and Faulkner appearing to be particularly popular—but little if any Kafka, Proust, Joyce, Genet, Ionesco, Camus or Beckett is known to the Soviet reading public as a whole. As for present-day Soviet authors, so often divided into 'Westerners' and 'Slavophiles', or, rather differently, into 'liberals' and 'conservatives'/'reactionaries'/'Stalinists', or even into 'softs' and 'hards', one striking feature is the apparent dearth of good writers in the 45–65 age group. Perhaps the most important factor in the make-up of younger writers is whether or not they remember the war. All in all, the position of the Soviet writer now is no easier and no less responsible but at least less precarious than for the last thirty years. There is of course still a severe censorship, or Party control—call it what you will—over the arts in the USSR, so it is not surprising that the regime is so perturbed by the growth in the past few years of underground literature, a little of which has been published abroad.

WHAT SEEM TO BE the chief themes of Soviet literature since the death of Stalin?

Not surprisingly the last war proved to be a rich source of material for Soviet novelists. Many large-scale works still come out, Simonov's

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being the most widely read, with each successive volume giving a picture somewhat closer to the facts than did its predecessor. The trend now, however, seems to be towards shorter, more intimate and personal works, which, without heroics, present a picture of the war in microcosm—the reader senses the extent and horror of the whole through the minute, individual, detailed part. It is rather sad to learn that writers such as Nekrasov, Baklanov, and Okudzhava have been attacked by some Soviet critics for displaying 'all-human' (*obshchechelovecheskie*) feelings by, for instance, not hating the Germans vehemently enough and by appearing to be opposed to war as such.

Much fiction has been written in recent years on agricultural themes and rural life in the Soviet Union—we so often forget that half the Soviet population still lives in the countryside. On the one hand there is fiction disguised as *ocherki* by Dorosh, Soloukhin, Ovechkin, and others, and on the other there are stories by, for instance, Paustovsky, Nagibin, Kazakov, and Tendryakov, who write both on country people and on city-dwellers visiting the remoter parts of the country, especially the Far North and the central Russian districts south of Moscow. In a number of these works one senses a certain mistrust for 'civilisation' as such, a longing to escape from the pressures of modern city life and an appreciation of the vast difference in the USSR between town and country, sometimes juxtaposed as bureaucracy and freedom.

One problem which has been much discussed in recent Soviet writing, even though officially it does not exist, is the conflict of generations. Anticipated before Stalin's death in Leonov's *Russian Forest*, it has become a matter of both literary and political importance, and the writers who give most attention to it, notably Aksenov and Rozov, enjoy extraordinary popularity in the USSR. The death of Stalin, the twentieth congress, and the 1957 world youth festival in Moscow have all had an incalculable effect on young Soviet people, who see in their elders the products of a system which instilled fear into everybody and demanded blind obedience to any command given by those in authority. The damage inflicted by the belief that there was no need to question the official view on anything has led many younger Russians to adopt a critical, sometimes sceptical or cynical attitude to Soviet reality, and to demand of others, if not always of themselves, very high standards of moral and ethical conduct. It is not therefore surprising that one so frequently finds such words as '*chestny*' and '*sovest*' in recent Soviet writings; belonging to the Party does not necessarily mean one is 'honest', nor does obeying Party commands ensure that one's 'conscience' will not subsequently give trouble. The young generation perceives the over-riding value of complete trust and real friendship between people, and in their search for positive answers to the problems that beset them and their country, as well as in their desire for mental independence, they sometimes find they have more in common with their grandfathers than with their parents. They are convinced that it is necessary for every responsible individual to be able to think for himself. They feel a certain desire to start everything afresh, unsullied by the crimes of the past, and are vaguely aware that this is at present out of the question.

A good deal of recent Soviet fiction touches implicitly, and sometimes

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even explicitly, on political subjects (as opposed to merely repeating Party slogans and decisions). Some of it concerns and has been published in conjunction with the so-called destalinisation campaign. Although more or less everything which Stalin did and tolerated from the time of collectivisation onwards has been subjected to censure or at least question, this is quite naturally still a sensitive and tricky subject, as is clear from the content and manner of publication of Ehrenburg's memoirs alone. However, the extent of the recent reappraisal of values is apparent in a number of novels in which a character who a few years before would have been presented as a New Soviet Man is now depicted as anything but a positive hero worthy of emulation. Such characters are portrayed, sometimes more in sorrow than in anger, not just as lingering, impotent survivals of the past, but as still enjoying a good deal of influence, exercising a considerable measure of authority, and exerting their power to make it very difficult for gifted individuals to achieve recognition. Is the political system justified, then, by the type of man who generally prospers under it and rises to the top? Is it the system itself which so often brings out the worst in people, including those who were filled with the highest motives when they began their career? Antagonistic classes there may not be, but conflicts within society can still sustain a long novel, and there clearly is something like an 'establishment' (often epitomising *meshchanstvo*) even if not, strictly speaking, a new class.

Thus the reader is given to understand that something is wrong with the methods being used to achieve communism, even if little doubt is cast on the desirability of communism as such; but will not the means now being applied result eventually in a society which is structurally very different from the one envisaged in the current blueprints? That this question cannot be raised explicitly in printed works is obvious, but, posed in these general terms, it might not greatly concern Soviet writers anyway; their attention seems to be concentrated on the present rather than the future. What is unjust, inefficient, time-wasting, unproductive, should be remedied straight away, not justified by reference to the possibility that changes, now apparently beneficial, might in the long term lead in 'unleninist' directions. Thus it is that much new writing in the USSR is more in the 'critical-realist' than 'socialist-realist' tradition.

NOT SURPRISINGLY, A GREAT DEAL of recent Soviet writing touches on the role of the artist or writer—and sometimes also the scientist—in society. There would appear to be a growing feeling that much so-called socialist-realist writing is not in fact realistic at all, that the artist's primary duty should be to art, not politics, and that, like the scientist, the writer ought to enjoy both the right to experiment and, in consequence, the right to err. All this implies the freedom to choose without outside interference one's themes and also the style in which one works. Life should be shown in all its aspects and complexities, and the search for truth should replace the proclamation of what the Party says is truth. Therefore there is a trend among the more interesting Soviet writers not to point the moral—if there is one—too clearly, not to assign blame too explicitly, and not to answer all the questions raised in their

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works. Many short stories, in particular, are open-ended, and more and more writers are beginning to respect their readers sufficiently to allow them to think for themselves and form their own conclusions about what they have read. *Partiinost* and *ideinost*, at any rate in their customary narrow meanings, are somewhat on the wane.

Greater interest is now being shown in the individual (rather than the 'hero' or 'type'), in his moral, ethical, and psychological problems, in his private preoccupations and his unique personality. A sympathetic portrayal of ordinary Soviet people facing the worries of everyday life, an understanding approach to those who are at first sight 'superfluous' in Soviet society, an awareness of the loneliness and difficulties of communication experienced by so many Russians in spite of (or because of) the collective system in which they live, an admission that in any society personal relationships are often of a complex and unsatisfactory nature—all this is giving Soviet literature a tone of uncertainty which was rare in the writing of the Stalin period, when authors and their characters appeared to be quite sure of the meaning of life and did not need to seek or to understand their own, individual place in the world. More attention, then, has been given of late to the private, off-duty side of man's existence, as though his hours at work were in fact the less important part of his life: failure in one's career is of far less importance than failure in one's relationships with other people. This has led to more subtle character drawing, and it is often impossible to say whether a given protagonist is supposed to be a 'positive' or a 'negative' example to us—indeed, even to think of literary figures in these terms is becoming rather outdated.

These are some of the trends in recent Russian writing, to judge from the five books on Soviet literature about which a few words must now be said. Almost half the symposium edited by Hayward and Labedz is on the post-Stalin period, but it does provide a compact and clear account of the literary situation during the entire Soviet period. The collection of essays which Hayward and Crowley have edited deals, despite its title, with the fifties as much as the sixties; it has particularly worthwhile articles, each containing a mass of out-of-the-way information, by Leonid Rzhevsky (on features of the Russian literary language of the present day), Anthony Adamovich (on recent Soviet literature in languages other than Russian), and Maurice Friedberg (on Soviet publishing policies, controls and achievements). A more co-ordinated survey of recent Soviet writing can be found in *Der Aufstand der Person*, an excellent account of post-Stalin Russian literature with special emphasis on the younger writers. Helen von Ssachno's book is very much better than *Letteratura Sovietica 1953–1963*, which is a collection of rather tedious articles written by Vittorio Strada between 1956 and 1964. Relatively few of the pages actually deal with the subject suggested by the title, and it is interesting that the author, who appears to be very sympathetic to the political system within which Soviet writers have to operate, devotes even less study to the relevant works *as literature* than do those cold-warriors so often accused of using Soviet literature for political purposes. Priscilla Johnson's book covers a much shorter period, 1963 and a month or two on either side. The most useful section is a well-written, lucid, and carefully documented account

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of the *zazhim* which began at the end of 1962. One's only criticism would be that Miss Johnson fails to make it sufficiently clear that Khrushchev and many if not all of his collaborators were really protesting against two quite different sorts of art—against 'abstract' works *and* against truthful, realistic writing on everyday matters.

It is clear from these five books that the Party is, and for a long time has been, extremely concerned about and even frightened of literature, both domestic and foreign. Outside observers of the USSR have of late been taking almost as much interest in Soviet writing as has the CPSU itself. One is left wondering whether it might not be better for Soviet literature and Soviet writers if foreign Sovietologists as well as Party leaders paid a little less attention to the Soviet literary scene.

Literature and Revolution in Soviet Russia. A Symposium edited by Max Hayward and Leopold Labedz. London, Oxford University Press, 1963. 25/-.

Soviet Literature in the Sixties. An International Symposium. Edited by Max Hayward and Edward L. Crowley. London, Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1965. 30/-.

Der Aufstand der Person. Sowjetliteratur seit Stalins Tod. Helen von Ssachno. Berlin, Argon Verlag, 1965.

Letteratura Sovietica 1953–1963. Vittorio Strada. Rome, Editori Riuniti, 1964. L.3,200.

Khrushchev and the Arts. The Politics of Soviet Culture, 1962–1964. Text by Priscilla Johnson. Documents selected and edited by Priscilla Johnson and Leopold Labedz. Cambridge, Massachusetts, The M.I.T. Press, 1965. $7.50.

MERCHANT OF REVOLUTION

Peter Nettl

FOLLOWING THE TORRENT of accounts (of events, of people, of oneself), the era of new facts about the October revolution—as well as its smaller February twin—has more or less come to an end. There are few participants left, at any rate of those who are likely to write their memoirs. Even if they did, their memory is likely to require the professional services of corrective historians—just as historians have already been needed increasingly to correct some of the heavier distortions in the accounts in the last twenty-five years, and provide a perspective for those works usually entitled 'I was Stalin's . . .' Contemporary published material has largely been sifted through for nuggets—over and over again as befits a gold rush. This source too is largely exhausted. There remain the archives of party and state—the penultimate key to truth (the ultimate being time). Tantalising bits have been used by Soviet historians: the process of exploitation begins at the grass roots and moves ponderously and slowly towards the centre of power. But

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full access is as remote as ever. For the time being seekers after fact must be content with such items as are cited in Soviet works, and such additions as are made to the large collections like the fifth edition of Lenin's *Sochineniya*.

For this reason—and also because historiography moves in cycles, even if history does not—we are now in the era of interpretation. The known material is being rearranged into new patterns. The current general trend towards more sociologically oriented history has given this tendency a great fillip.

So much for the general tendency; now to the exceptions. Here and there seekers of facts still exist—and the Russian scholars of St Antony's College will, I hope, not be offended by being included in this category. Here is a school or group of historians who continue to value the exact identification of who was where and on what day. Their interpretations —for no-one can work without any—are concerned more with individuals than with collectivities, emphasise personal responsibility instead of social causality, and introduce into the current study of the Soviet Union and its history a (perhaps necessary?) dose of 'if only, then perhaps', and 'it happened that . . .' It is a style more usual in the study of the lives of medieval saints and sinners than in the analysis of the greatest social upheaval of the century, but still . . .

Such diligence does not go unrewarded by the occasional coup. The last world war added appreciably to the flow of published 'secret' official documents, which are the very backbone of this type of history. In 1958 Dr Zeman published a collection of German Foreign Office documents relating to German official activities in connexion with the Russian revolution. More specifically, the precise role of the German government in financing the Tsar's most effective enemy, Lenin, was examined by Dr Katkov. This is the archival womb from which, among other offspring, *The Merchant of Revolution* * originated. Dr Zeman and his colleague have written the biography of one of history's great secret go-betweens, Alexander Helphand, known as Parvus.

This is at one and the same time the great merit and the shortcoming of their book. Methodologically, it bursts into life on p. 132, when the first of the documents is produced. (One might have expected just the opposite; documents are usually considered a source of tedium.) From then onwards we have a fascinating detective story, written with all the loving sceptical care and surgical precision of two extremely shrewd and professional historians. The story of Helphand's activities from the end of 1914 to December 1917, first in Turkey, then in Denmark, and finally on the road between Berlin and Stockholm, forms the core of the book and well over half of its length. To recount here the facts it documents so well, both about the personalities and policies on the German side (the Russian part comes out a little less forcefully and clearly), and about Helphand's part in these events, would be as wrong as it is to divulge the solution of a detective story in a review.

HELPHAND WAS A FASCINATING MIXTURE of principal and agent. It was he who to a large extent persuaded stuffy and conservatively correct

* Z. A. B. Zeman and W. B. Scharlau, **The Merchant of Revolution,** The Life of Alexander Helphand (Parvus) 1867–1924. Oxford University Press, 1965, 45s.

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German diplomats, expecting their negotiating situation to be ready-made by force of arms, that the judicious use of money, lies, and contacts, could pay handsome dividends in furthering the German goal of knocking Russia effectively out of the war. The dramatic personal implications of a situation in which the ugly foreigner with his bohemian habits and his boastful bravado, manoeuvred a tradition-bound bureaucracy into expending vast sums of money on his scheme, are very well brought out; yet the tight professionalism of the authors never oversteps the constraint of the evidence or the unfilled gaps in the imagination which any good drama requires. Helphand unashamedly made money out of these activities, and never hesitated to fling this fact in the face of both employers and critics. He had begun as a revolutionary. This change of situation inducted him into the world of diplomats, of government, and necessarily separated him from that of socialism. It is perhaps the most remarkable facet of Helphand's personality that, when the inevitable happened and the German government had no further use for him (and anyhow was shortly afterwards swept away in defeat), he continued to exercise a baleful fascination for the lower-middle-class pedants who took over a defeated Reich in the name of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD). From among these he had already managed to attract a small group of hero-worshippers, intellectually uprooted by the re-orientation which the outbreak of the first world war brought to so many seemingly enthusiastic socialists. And finally he mocked the post-war society of which—and only of which —he was in some ways typical by ensuring that at his death there should be nothing but mystery. Before he died he burned almost every record in his possession.

Yet he was a disappointed man. The authors suggest that in spite of his native cynicism he expected to win German Foreign Office support for his 'soft' policy towards the victorious Bolsheviks in the vital month of November 1917, that it was only their cold dismissal of a no longer useful tool that turned Helphand momentarily into an applicant Bolshevik. Rebuffed there in turn, he became once more a political outsider—by necessity, not choice; hawking his revengeful anti-Bolshevik schemes to those same cool German officials on ever less attractive terms, namely money pure and simple. Perhaps it would be more correct to say that he considered himself more necessary than in fact he was to either side. Certainly the final cold shoulder which the now victorious Bolsheviks turned on him brutally restructured Helphand's entire political *Weltanschauung*. Lenin was not a man to be easily outwitted; here as in so many other cases he scooped the pool without sentiment or thank-you. Helphand's railings against the Bolsheviks after 1918 were only one voice among the massed choirs of those who since 1903 had taken on Lenin and had lost. The complaints of cold ingratitude were legion.

The last chapter (Parvus in baroque but lonely splendour on the outskirts of Berlin) is a depiction of personal tragedy, both sour and magnificent, which is so very effective precisely because it is not self conscious or deliberately engineered. Having as it were fulfilled their professional obligations towards documentary accuracy, the authors loosen up and let themselves go on the irony of personal failure. This

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is one of the first rules of good biography; to start slowly and finish with a brisk canter.

Where then is the shortcoming? Let us look more closely at the material which this biography treats. Beyond the confines of the diplomatic and subversive machinations of German officials and Russian revolutionaries, there is the juxtaposition of two entirely different worlds locked for the moment in combat. This confrontation is one of the significant features of recent history, in the particular sense of socialism as well as the broader context of nations and cultures. Throughout his life Helphand had bestraddled the worlds of German socialism and Russian revolutionaries. His biography thus gives ample scope and excuse for treatment of this important and fascinating issue. Yet our authors deal with the larger implications of this confrontation sketchily and sometimes inaccurately.

IN 1914 THE HOPE OF THE Second International was focused on the SPD. Five years later a large section of the international socialist movement was trying to adjust itself to a new International centred on Moscow. This is one of the significant changes of the century. Helphand played a part in it. He was a Russian revolutionary to the Germans, and something of a German socialist to the Russians. This period is covered in the first part of the book, but it is handled less enterprisingly and therefore less satisfactorily than the later story. We are told that he kept his distance from the pre-war Russians deliberately; that except for short periods the Germans kept him at bay equally deliberately. We are given reasons, true enough—but they are existential, not explanatory, related to personalities, not to social situations. Wherever possible, the authors keep away from the latter; when they do mention them, their touch is clumsy and less than original. Why?

It is here that we come back to the limitations of this type of history. There are good though regrettable reasons why fact-seeking and interpretation should be alternative approaches. Academic habits and the constraints of methodology play their part in supporting different approaches. Add to this the personal predilections of the authors, and we have in the last resort a situation in which there must be some regret for an opportunity passed by. For, extraordinary as his personality was, Helphand also suffered from social constraints. The vacuum in which he found himself was the vacuum between two incompatible worlds.

Yet in *Merchant of Revolution* the social problem is raised only marginally, and the sections on Helphand's participation in the pre-1914 SPD explain competently but do not illuminate. Helphand writes a piece on a current problem; the problem is outlined and a précis of his views appended. Helphand writes another piece and the same discrete process is repeated. It is too much like political theory as taught in universities —a subject the only excuse for which can be the pre-eminent validity of the thinkers discussed and analysed, not the manner of analysis. Moreover it is here (and only here) that we find facts and interpretations in *Merchant of Revolution* that one could quarrel with (the bits on the situation of Jews in Russia on pp. 7, 9; the sketch of Clara Zetkin on p. 23; the dating of the three-way split in the German party on p. 115, etc.).

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Perhaps I am over-dramatising and exaggerating the break between the first and second sections of this book, but I cannot avoid the impression that the early parts of the work were a chore for the authors, necessary for a complete biography but of secondary interest or relevance to the main burden of their tale. My own view is rather the contrary; in the last analysis Helphand's historical role may have been more important in these early years than in the heyday of his machinations. He was a catherine wheel of ideas on revolutionary strategy and tactics. Occasionally someone methodically worked on them further and gave acknowledgments, like Trotsky, or failed to give acknowledgments, like Lenin. More often their impact was subterranean and almost impossible to document. Nonetheless it exists. Compared to this, the role of schemer, broker, and manipulator of men is certainly more colourful but perhaps less enduring. The Bolsheviks would have won, Helphand or no Helphand; who knows whether Trotsky's notion of permanent revolution would have germinated without him.

Congratulations to these authors for a readable book, which traces clearly and competently the obscure line of events at the margin of history. Their judgment, selection, and research are impeccable. But they are constrained in the last resort by their context of relevance that falls short of the full possibilities of their subject.

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SURVEY

A Journal of Soviet and East European Studies

TENTH ANNIVERSARY ISSUE

No. 58 **January 1966**

FOREIGN POLICY IN A POLYCENTRIC WORLD

The growing complexity within the communist world, and outside it, is creating a new situation in international affairs. This is analysed in the special tenth anniversary issue of

SURVEY

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

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

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

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